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ABSTRACT
A case study approach was used to evaluate 
organizational change that occurred between 1986 and 1989 at 
General Dynamics Corporation. The purpose of the study was 
to determine how persons in leading positions can 
realistically expect to plan and implement significant, 
planned organizational changes. The changes specifically 
studied were those which resulted from the planning and 
implementation of the Ethics Program. The Ethics Program at 
General Dynamics was examined not only as a case example of 
a planned, intended change, but as a vehicle for broad 
strategic goals pertaining to human resources management.
Historic data from corporate documents and surveys, and 
current data from a resurvey were used to establish changes 
in trends in the organization. Interviews were used to 
explore the planning process and general planning-related 
change trends. Two groups of employees, totaling twenty 
individuals, were interviewed. The planning group (five 
individuals) provided specific information on planning 
processes, and the cultural group (fifteen individuals) 
provided general information on the culture of the 
organization and culturally related changes.
Results indicated that the Ethics Program was 
successful in meeting its specific objectives of making 
employees aware of the standards of conduct and enforcing 
conformance to those standards. The broader human resources
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
goals intended by the program’s designers did not appear to 
have been as successfully implemented. A conflict between 
two distinctively different sets of cultural values appeared 
to have offset many of the intended changes. Findings 
further indicated that the Ethics Program was most likely an 
inappropriate vehicle for the implementation of general, 
strategic human resources goals.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As organizational competition rises to a global level, 
long range planning has become increasingly important. 
Organizations in the near future will be required to go 
through major strategic reorientations that will involve 
technological and sociostructural changes. These changes 
will require technological improvements in products and 
manufacturing methods, structural changes in organization, 
and reevaluations of services, markets, competition, and 
human resources.
In the future, foreign competition will increase, 
natural resources will become more scarce and expensive, and 
productivity levels in the United States will remain the 
same, or even decline (Byars, 1984). Strategic planning 
will be needed in all types and sizes of organizations. 
"Strategic management is concerned with making decisions 
about an organization’s future direction and implementing 
those decisions" (Byars, 1984, p. 6).
Social, political, and economic changes in the 
environment have forced organization heads to consider 
strategic organizational changes, but managers too often
1
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focus on small components of the overall change problem, 
and, further, tend to underestimate the scope of the task. 
Tichy (1983) identified some of the common areas of 
management focus which he called tactical concerns:
1. Should we change from a functional structure to a 
matrix structure?
2. Should we centralize or decentralize?
3. Should we launch an expensive companywide "quality
of work" program?
4. Should we individualize or collectivize the 
incentive program?
5. Should we attempt to do a better job of relating
business strategy to organizational design? (p. 4)
These are called "tactical" concerns because they do not fit 
into an overall framework for planned change. Tactical 
changes are frequently guided by fad or personal preference, 
and are generally not based on a systematic analysis of 
organizational needs. Managers may be able to adapt a trial 
and error method of changing to meet the needs of smaller 
and simpler organizations. Trial and error methods are 
often invited by the massive and unpredictable changes in 
social environment, political posturing, and economic 
conditions. But large organizations with their 
ever-increasing complexity cannot tolerate sporadic, 
discontinuous change and expect to remain in business. Few 
executives believe that the deep and enduring aspects of an 
organization can be easily changed or replaced (Wilkins &.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Bristow, 1987). These authors noted "However, the time 
frames executives consider when attempting to implement bold 
new strategies . . . suggest that many are either not clear 
about the difficulties involved or choose to ignore certain, 
key principles of change" (p. 221).
Organizations of all types facing an increasingly 
turbulent and complex environment must develop strategic 
planning capabilities to survive. Tichy (1983) suggested 
that strategic changes involve three sets of problems: (a)
technical problems, such as selection of markets, product 
development, pricing, and organizational design; (b) 
political problems, such as regulatory requirements and 
shifting power bases; and (c) cultural problems, such as 
shifting personal values and inefficient but traditional 
rituals. These three sets of problems have been addressed 
at General Dynamics Corporation and the proposed solutions 
have been incorporated into the company’s strategic 
objectives. Actions taken on the strategic plan have 
resulted in the implementation of a corporatewide Ethics 
Program.
Historical Background
General Dynamics Corporation began a program of 
strategic organizational change in mid-1985 as the result of 
serious charges of fraud, deception, and graft by the United 
States Government (Larsen, 1987). During the previous year, 
many examples of mischarging to government contracts by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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defense industry companies were brought to media attention 
by various members of Congress. General Dynamics was 
specifically targeted for investigation by then Secretary of 
the Navy, John Lehman. After government auditors found many 
unallowable charges to government contracts by members of 
the corporation, Secretary Lehman threatened to withhold the 
award of new contracts to the company by the Navy and to 
withhold progress payments on existing contracts. General 
Dynamics executives negotiated an agreement with the Navy 
that committed the company to develop and implement 
effective changes in organizational policy and behavior.
In mid-1985, General Dynamics CEO, David Lewis, who had 
been one of the key players in the controversy, announced 
his retirement effective January, 1986, and appointed 
Stanley Pace, formerly of TRW, as Vice Chairman to replace 
him upon his retirement. Pace was commissioned to establish 
a corporatewide Ethics Program and to make any other changes 
required to improve the company’s image and reputation 
(Larsen, 1987). In addition, Pace was charged with the 
responsibility of maintaining the company’s profitability in 
the face of massive cuts in defense spending and sweeping 
changes in the Defense Department’s procurement process 
("General Dynamics," 1988). Because the Department of 
Defense was and is the primary customer of General Dynamics, 
any changes in defense procurement can seriously affect the 
company’s business posture. By May, 1989, the company had 
become financially sound and was devoid of implication in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the myriad of investigations, charges, and fines before the 
Justice Department in 1988 and early 1989 known to the 
public as the 111 Wind scandal. The corporatewide Ethics 
Program, created and implemented as a planned change, and 
its effect on operating procedures, employee attitudes, 
corporate image, and human resources programs, is the focus 
of this research study.
Statement of the Problem
General Dynamics undertook a rare form of strategic 
planning by including an element of social responsibility as 
a formal strategic objective, and the Ethics Program was 
implemented to meet this objective. The company’s business 
posture in 1988 indicated that the specific objectives of 
the program to improve the company’s image and to continue 
winning government contracts were met (Packard, Laird, Moot, 
Bowsher & Conahan, 1988).
The unique nature of the Ethics Program warranted 
further investigation. Even though the strategic objectives 
were apparently accomplished, the broader issue of the 
successful implementation of a planned organizational change 
was not as apparent. The Ethics Program has become a model 
for the industry (Packard et al., 1988), but what actually 
happened inside the organization? The position of the 
researcher as a participant observer in the organization and 
an internal change agent provided the means to examine the 
implied goals of the program further. The implied goals of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Ethics Program were related to expected organizational 
changes that would affect the culture of the organization. 
The specific strategic objectives could be evaluated by 
economic and organizational performance measures, but the 
broader goals of the program would have to be examined as 
changes in the fundamental organizational behavior.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research was to determine how 
persons in leading positions can realistically expect to 
plan and implement a significant, planned organizational 
change such as that envisioned by the Ethics Program of 
General Dynamics Corporation. To accomplish this purpose, I 
investigated three research questions:
1. What changes actually took place at General Dynamics 
between the years 1985 and 1988?
2. Were the changes the result of the strategic plan?
3. Was the Ethics Program successful in meeting its 
specific objectives and its broader goals?
Other than hypothesizing that specific changes have 
taken place over the target period, this research is 
primarily an exploratory case study. The business aspects 
of the corporate mission were not considered except as they 
were relevant to specific programs created as a part of the 
overall Ethics Program. Even though the specific changes 
under examination were probably placed on the agenda as the 
result of economic pressures, the focus of this study is not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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on the specific motivation for change but the planning and 
implementation of the change itself and the results of the 
program.
Definition of Terms
The following terms used in this study may have 
different common meanings than are intended.
Change agent: Any person involved in creating planned
change in an organization. The person may or may not be a 
member of that organization (Bennis, 1966).
Change program: A coordinated series of interventions
that are interrelated and build upon each other to produce 
certain specific planned changes (Bennis, 1969).
Feedback: Information sent from one system or
subsystem to another concerning the performance of the 
receiver which is intended to affect some change in the 
actions of the receiver (Anderson, 1970).
Intervention: A specific action taken by a change
agent to facilitate the change process, usually an action 
that interferes with a common sequence of behaviors (Fordyce 
& Weil, 1971).
Latent functions: Consequences or aspects of an
organization or social group which are unintended, and may 
or may not be recognized (Merton, 1957).
Manifest functions: Consequences or aspects of an
organization or social group which are intended, expected, 
and recognized (Merton, 1957).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Norm: An idea in the minds of the members of a group
that can be put into the form of a statement, and that 
specifies what the members should do, ought to do, and are 
expected to do under given circumstances (Homans, 1950).
Organizational climate: General motivational patterns
among organization members which are supported by formal and 
informal reward systems (Litwin & Stringer, 1968).
Organizational culture: The collection of beliefs,
values, traditions, customs, rituals, and practices that are 
prevalent and enduring within a definable group, and are 
passed from generation to generation of group members 
(Levinson, 1972).
Organizational effectiveness: A measure of the
adequacy of organizational processes and the degree to which 
specified goals are attained economically (Bennis, 1969).
Planned change: A collaboration of some combination of
external and internal change agents who bring about 
specified changes in the organization based on 
organizational goals and objectives (Bennis, Benne, Chin, & 
Corey, 1976).
Strategic plan: A decision or series of decisions made
in the present incorporating the organizational mission, 
goals, and objectives into a behavioral strategy to position 
the organization for long term maximization of opportunity 
(Byars, 1984).
Survey feedback: A specific type of organizational
intervention where a survey is conducted, analyzed, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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summarized and then fed back to the original respondents for 
focused group discussions (Mann, 1957).
Assumptions
The purpose of the study was accomplished through an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Ethics Program at 
General Dynamics. The evaluation included an examination of 
the planning process that resulted in the implementation of 
the Ethics Program, an evaluation of the program itself, an 
evaluation of related program successes and failures, and an 
assessment of the impact of the program on the culture of 
the organization.
Some basic assumptions were made regarding the nature 
of the organization, the nature of change, and the ability 
of the researcher to identify and analyze the sources of 
organizational change. The organization was assumed to be 
represented by divisions located in San Diego, and the 
Electronics Division in particular. Changes were assumed to 
have been detectable and to have had an identifiable source. 
Objectives and programmatic means for selecting those 
objectives were assumed to have been difficult to specify.
The participant observer was assumed to have sufficient 
resources to evaluate programs with respect to the nature 
and quality of the actions of program agents and outcomes.
The study was assumed to be able to explain a particular 
organizational phenomenon within its organizational context.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Limitations
An explanation of the process of planning and change at 
General Dynamics provides a more holistic and meaningful 
theoretical proposition than a carefully controlled 
experiment which excludes many of the most important, 
contextual relationships. However, even though I have been 
a participant observer in the case, I have had little 
control over the significant events. Causative analysis 
cannot be as rigorous in a case study as that found in 
experimental designs. Still, the research questions were 
stated in such a way that causative analysis was not as 
important as descriptive analysis. Thus, the results of the 
study should be considered a descriptive analysis rather 
than a test of hypotheses.
In addition, the results cannot necessarily be 
interpreted as an accurate characterization of the real 
General Dynamics Corporation. Whatever the entire 
organization is, it is remarkably diverse and constantly 
changing. No study could accurately portray the complex 
character of any company of 100,000 employees with several 
major divisions producing different sorts of products in 
different parts of the world. The results of this study at 
best characterize one part of the company at one point in 
time.
General Dynamics is primarily a government contractor.
As such, the company is culturally oriented to the 
protection of information, both as a measure of national
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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security and as a measure of political self-protection. The 
company has allowed the publication of previous research 
conducted in the corporation only if the company was not 
identified. That the present study could be conducted and 
published openly is in itself an indication of actual 
cultural change within the company. Still, there was a good 
deal of pertinent information that could not be revealed 
because it was proprietary or classified. Although the 
results of this study were limited by restrictions on 
certain types of information, the conclusions have not been 
affected by these restrictions. The conclusions may be 
considered both substantial and meaningful in regard to the 
study * s purpose.
Significance of the Study
Despite its limitations, the unique character of the 
case and the opportunities for insightful observation by the 
researcher give this study its merit. The opportunities for 
methodical, longitudinal analysis of cultural phenomena 
within an organization are very rare. As noted in the next 
chapter, most organizational studies are conducted over 
relatively short periods of time by outside agents. Few 
long term members of organizations have the skills or 
motivation necessary to conduct such a study.
But the key contribution of this research to 
organizational literature is the orientation of the 
investigation toward whole processes rather than isolated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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elements of processes. The ultimate goal of this research 
is to contribute to the understanding of leadership as a 
process of collective, purposeful change. Burns (1978) 
specified planned change as a critical test for leaders:
"The test of their leadership function is their contribution 
to change, measured by purpose drawn from collective motives 
and values" (p. 427). Even without characterizing Stanley 
Pace as a leader, the kind of change strategy he undertook 
at General Dynamics is the kind to which Burns was 
referring. It is not my intention to demonstrate whether or 
not Pace was a leader during the time under study. My 
intention is to examine the nature of the change itself to 
determine whether or not people can reasonably expect to 
plan and implement change of this magnitude while having 
some level of control on the manifest outcomes. Verifying 
change that has occurred as the result of the planning 
process may help to indicate whether or not intended change 
is an integral part of the leadership process.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction
As stated in Chapter I, the focus of this study is on 
the process of change and its relationship to leadership. 
Because the study is oriented toward an understanding of the 
whole process of change rather than isolated elements of it, 
a somewhat different theoretical approach was needed to 
facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the results. 
The process of change is far too complex to be understood by 
the usual reductionistic techniques. Rather than using a 
linear rational model to structure the investigation, an 
integrated network of models and concepts had to be 
accumulated. This approach is called bootstrapping (Capra, 
1982).
The bootstrap approach requires a broad framework of 
interlocking models and concepts. None of the models or 
concepts are any more important than the others to the 
framework; each model is valid for some aspect of a 
phenomenon or range of phenomena. Models are considered
13
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approximations of reality rather than all-encompassing 
theories. Linear methods of investigation using a priori 
models tend to produce linear results; the nature of the 
model dictates the nature of the result because reality must 
be structured to accomodate the model. The bootstrap 
approach provides a variety of tools to the researcher to 
apply to reality as it is encountered (Capra, 1982).
The study of organizational change in real world 
situations cannot be facilitated by the simple application 
of organizational change theory to defined organizational 
situations. Understanding change and its implications must 
be an eclectic use of ideas that, in many cases, overlap 
each other but that highlight different aspects of the 
change process. The current study is concerned with how the 
plan for change was developed, the impact of the planning 
process on the organization, organizational change that 
resulted from the implementation of the plan, and the 
meaning of the change to the organization and society at 
large.
Merton (1957) has suggested that there are two types of 
functions of any change or feature of a society: manifest
and latent functions. Manifest functions are those 
consequences for society or any of its segments that are 
intended, expected, and recognized by participants in the 
social system. Latent functions are those consequences that 
are neither intended nor recognized. Although Merton 
specified that latent functions are usually not recognizable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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by group members, he also suggested that they become 
apparent in time.
In viewing the organization as a social system, the 
concept of manifest and latent functions may be used to 
explain various outcomes of the organization’s strategic 
plan. Manifest functions are those functions of the plan 
and its subsequent activities that are related to the 
expected outcomes of the plan. Latent functions are those 
functions that are related to the unexpected outcomes of the 
plan. To restate, latent functions are those developments 
that directly result from the implementation of the plan and 
were not intended by the planners. A successfully 
implemented plan will maximize the manifest functions of the 
plan while minimizing the latent or unforeseen functions of 
the plan. Both types of functions of the strategic plan in 
relation to its consequences for organizational change and 
organizational culture at General Dynamics have been 
investigated in this study.
To investigate manifest and latent functions of a 
program such as the Ethics Program, some background in the 
planning process, organizational change, and organizational 
culture would be useful. An understanding of the planning 
process provides a means to assess the objectives of the 
program and, ultimately, evaluate organizational performance 
to those objectives. The organizational change process must 
be understood to define the development of the planning 
process and the impact of the implementation of the plan. A
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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definition of the organizational culture will provide a 
basis upon which to explain the effects of the program on 
the organization and its members.
Society at large is concerned with the legitimacy of 
the organization and its operations. Whether or not an 
organization can continue to exist depends a great deal on 
the manifest and latent outcomes of its operations and the 
impact of those outcomes on the community in which the 
organization operates. Therefore, the aspects of the 
community’s and the organization’s understanding of the 
organization’s role and responsibility must be examined. In 
this case, the planned change under consideration is 
specifically related to the organization’s responsibility to 
its customers and to the community.
Finally, the role of planned change and its context in 
society is crucial to the process of leadership. Our 
understanding of the leadership process has undergone 
significant evolution in the recent past and should be 
examined. The ultimate objective of the current study is to 
contribute to the understanding of at least one element of 
the leadership process: intended, collective change.
In light of the previous discussion, Chapter II has 
been organized to cover a variety of interrelated concepts 
and models for planning processes, organizational change 
processes, organizational culture, organizational 
legitimacy, and leadership. In some cases, an examination 
of the development of thought in an area is appropriate to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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facilitate an understanding of current thinking. The 
purpose of the chapter is to provide a broad framework for 
the discussion and interpretation of the results of the 
study.
Strategic Planning 
Strategic planning is primarily a management function 
that is designed to have specific business applications.
Most published literature distinguishes between strategy 
content and the strategy process. But there have been very 
few attempts to explore the relationship between strategy 
content and process within an organization (Miller, 1989). 
Strategy content typically consists of marketing strategies, 
product line strategies, technological strategies, financial 
strategies, and growth strategies. Some strategic planning 
literature is devoted to human resource planning (Angle,
Manz & Van De Ven, 1985; Dyer, 1985; Galbraith, 1983; Hall, 
1984; Kanter, 1983a; Lorange & Murphy, 1983, 1984; Miles & 
Snow, 1984; Schuler, 1989; Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Stumpf & 
Hanrahan, 1984), but none specifically addresses social or 
community responsibility as an element of strategic planning 
content. The unique feature of the Ethics Program as an 
element of the strategic plan at General Dynamics is that 
its only potentially measurable objective was to maintain 
the company’s legitimacy. To apply strategic planning 
principles to the planning, development, and implementation 
processes of this program and their impact on the
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organization, the literature can be grouped to examine three 
elements of strategic planning: the planning process
itself, the business aspects of the planning process which 
are primarily related to content, and the cultural aspects 
of the planning process.
The Planning Process
Strategic planning is designed to answer four issues 
for an organization (Byars, 1984). The four issues concern 
organizational identity, current business posture, future 
organizational directions, and desirable strategies for 
progressing in future directions. Strategic planning helps 
an organization make decisions in the present to develop a 
future position. Strategic planning is desirable because 
organizations that develop plans normally perform better 
than ones that do not. Planning insures that decisions will 
be more consistent with the organizational mission, and 
planning allows smoother and more efficient change by 
indicating milestones and timing.
Normally, the strategic planning process is 
characterized as a step by step process (Bennis, 1966; 
Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Byars, 1984; Lorange & Vancil, 
1976; Normann, 1977; Ohmae, 1982; Wrapp, 1967). Ohmae 
(1982) specified five steps in the planning process. First, 
the business domain must be clearly defined. Second, the 
business environment must be extrapolated into the future. 
Third, the choices of strategic options must be listed and 
then narrowed according to predictions of the future
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environment. Fourth, a plan of implementation must be 
developed to coincide with best estimates of available 
resources, and the plan must be implemented to pace itself 
with the distribution of those resources. And fifth, a 
stringent change control procedure must be implemented to 
prevent changing basic assumptions and ground rules unless 
it becomes absolutely necessary.
Ohmae’s suggestion provides a reasonable outline of the 
planning process. However, a specification of more detailed 
activities would be more useful to the functionally oriented 
manager. With this thought in mind, Byars (1984) outlined 
eight steps for the planning, implementation, and evaluation 
of strategic goals. The first five steps are considered 
planning activities, steps six and seven are considered 
implementation activities, and step eight can be considered 
a performance evaluation.
The first step is to define the organizational mission 
with special attention to the organization’s philosophy of 
doing business and purpose for existence. The 
organizational philosophy establishes the values, beliefs, 
and guidelines for the manner in which the organization 
provides goods and services and conducts itself in relation 
to the community. The organizational purpose defines the 
activities that the organization conceptualizes as 
characteristic of its role in business and in the community. 
The mission statement, then, is a brief and succinct
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statement that communicates the organization’s view of 
itself to the world.
The second step is to formulate policies as general 
guidelines for action. These policies specifically outline 
the framework within which organizational objectives are 
established and strategies are selected. Once action 
decisions are made, strategic policies provide guidelines 
for implementation.
The third step is to establish long range and short 
range objectives. Long range objectives specify results 
desired from the pursuit of the organizational mission to be 
expected one or more years from the present. Short range 
objectives set performance targets to be used to achieve the 
organization’s long range objectives.
The fourth step is to identify strategic alternatives 
and options available to the organization for achieving its 
long and short range objectives. In the fourth step, 
omissions of viable alternatives can result in an incorrect 
decision. Therefore error should be weighted on the side of 
inclusion rather than of omission.
The fifth step is to compare alternatives and select a 
strategy. The strategy chosen should be consistent with 
previously decided and specified organizational mission and 
strategic policies.
The sixth step is to develop an organizational 
structure with the appropriate authority relationships and 
ional units to implement the strategy. The
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organizational structure is critical. An inappropriate 
structure can nullify a carefully conceived strategic plan.
The seventh step is to manage organizational activities 
and allocate resources to accomplish objectives. The key 
objective in the sixth step is to ensure that the activities 
necessary to accomplish the mission and strategy are 
performed effectively.
Finally, the eighth step is to monitor the 
effectiveness of the strategy in achieving the 
organizational mission and objectives. The eighth step is 
designed as a feedback loop to provide top managers with 
sufficient visibility to determine whether or not the 
strategic objectives have been reached.
The formalized planning process outlined by Byars has 
the distinct advantage of face validity. Byars intended for 
the eight steps to provide a comprehensive framework for the 
examination and analysis of the planning process in any 
organization. To the uninitiated, the process seems to be 
very clear, precise, and rational. In the world of business 
however, a rationally ordered process with distinct, 
formalized steps may not be as easy to apply as it would 
appear. After studying corporate executives in strategic 
situations, Quinn (1980) concluded that successful managers 
do not use formal methods but rather conscious, proactive, 
and incremental forward movements to facilitate the planning 
process. Incremental movements are specifically designed to 
improve the quality of information, sequencing, and
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organizational awareness, and to decrease resistance and 
uncertainty. In addition, the executives acted 
incrementally to improve the strategic decision process by 
involving those who have the necessary knowledge, skill, and 
decision capability, and to avoid hasty and premature 
actions. Quinn asserted that good strategic management 
avoids becoming committed to details and assumptions too 
soon, and therefore no single paradigm can hold for all 
strategic situations.
Quinn did indicate that his sample of large 
organizations making complex decisions revealed broad, 
general steps used in the strategic planning process. The 
overall character of the planning process included numerous 
loops back to earlier stages to accommodate unexpected or 
overlooked issues. The first general, broad step was to 
create awareness of the organization’s new direction, and 
marshall commitment through active development of informal 
need-sensing systems. At this point, executives facilitated 
the gradual changing of symbols through highly visible 
actions and wordless messages, encouraged partial solutions, 
stimulated increased flexibility, and systematically waited. 
By this method of action, executives gradually legitimized 
the new perspectives and tactical shifts, built political 
support, and overcame opposition.
The second broad step was to solidify progress 
incrementally by creating pockets of strong commitment and 
focusing the organization in the new direction. Pockets of
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formalized commitment were created through champions and 
managing coalitions. Focusing on new organizational 
directions required facilitating the continuous process of 
change by discouraging stagnation and integrating the change 
process with individual and group interests.
Quinn clearly acknowledged the role of political and 
cultural factors in the planning process. Thinking about 
strategic planning as a separate, sequential process and 
relying on the rationality of formally derived strategies, 
according to Quinn, tends to encourage managers to use the 
inherent power of their positions to force organizations to 
respond and create unsuccessful strategic implementations. 
Successful implementations are slow, deliberate, incremental 
processes that adapt to the changing environment and 
organizational conditions. By the time the strategic plan 
begins to crystallize, portions of the plan have already 
been implemented. Quinn observed that the key to successful 
strategic change is to build sufficient organizational 
momentum and identity with the strategy.
The departure from the rational step-by-step approach 
proposed by Quinn has been expanded by Tichy (1983) who has 
suggested that the strategic planning process has been 
overly simplified by executives and theorists who focus too 
narrowly on internal organizational structures.
Organizational problems, crises, and opportunities arise 
from pressures exerted on the organization by the 
environment, diversification, advances in technology, and
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changes in people. Organizational problems, crises, and 
opportunities create uncertainties that must be managed and 
controlled: technical uncertainty, political uncertainty,
and cultural uncertainty. Technical uncertainty can be 
about markets, production capability, and technical 
innovation. Political uncertainty can be about who are the 
candidates for success, power distributions, and resource 
and reward distributions. Cultural uncertainty is usually 
about changing and conflicting values systems.
Each of the three uncertainties (technical, political, 
and cultural) and their resulting problems can be specified 
for the various phases of the strategic planning process. 
During the phases of the planning process, the strategic 
activities and influences can be assessed by three 
organizational systems. The technical system assesses 
environmental threats, business opportunities, 
organizational strengths and weaknesses, and defines the 
mission and the resources needed to accomplish it. The 
political system assesses who influences the development of 
the mission and strategy, and what coalitions are building 
around what strategic alternatives. The cultural system 
assesses the influence of values and philosophy on the 
mission, and helps to develop a culture that is aligned with 
the mission and strategic direction.
The three organizational systems require three sets of 
strategic organizational tasks. Technical strategic tasks 
are environmental scanning and strategic planning.
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Political strategic tasks are lobbying and influencing 
external contingencies, internal governance structuring, and 
coalition activities to influence decisions. Cultural 
strategic tasks involve the use of symbolic events to 
reinforce cultural role modeling by key people as well as 
clarifying and defining values.
Each of the strategic tasks is characterized by various 
process problems. Tichy suggested that technical process 
problems include role and performance ambiguity, faltering 
communication, and resulting resistance to change. These 
problems may be addressed by fitting people into roles and 
specifying performance criteria for those roles, and 
developing information systems and planning systems to 
support strategy implementation. Political process problems 
include ambitious, self-serving power politics, and may be 
managed by controlling succession, or getting ahead, 
politics and reward systems. Cultural process problems 
generally include symbolic incongruence and cultural 
dissonance, and may be managed by controlling symbolic 
language, reward systems, and formal communication networks.
Solutions to each of the process problems brings about 
characteristic organizational changes. Technical changes 
can be expected in technology, organizational structure, 
strategy, and management. Political changes can be expected 
in promotions/successions, reward issues, shifts in power 
centers, external control issues, and internal control 
issues. Cultural changes can be expected in performance
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related values, decision making values, human resources 
values, and management style.
Tichy recommended that development of human resources 
should be oriented with the three aspects of the strategic 
process. Technical aspects require selecting and developing 
employees with technical skills. Effective management 
requires a match of management styles with technical tasks. 
Political aspects of the strategic process require the 
appropriate use of political skills. Effective management 
requires matching political needs with organizational 
opportunities. Cultural aspects require using cultural 
leadership skills. Effective management requires matching 
values of individuals with organizational culture.
Business Aspects of Strategic Planning
The process of strategic planning is important in a 
study of organizational behavior because the nature of the 
process provides a framework within which the behavior may 
be defined. However, an understanding of the cultural 
aspects of organizational behavior requires an exploration 
of the motives and objectives that created the need for a 
planning process. Strategic planning is primarily a method 
used by organizations to maximize profits by gaining a 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1980, 1985, 1987).
Therefore, the business aspects of strategic planning 
receive the most attention in the literature and from 
executive managers. The current study focuses on a content 
element of strategic planning that is not traditionally
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considered a fundamental element, ethical behavior.
Generally, business planning focuses on the broad 
content areas of growth strategies, harvesting or endgame 
strategies, and retrenchment strategies. Early thinking in 
strategic planning specified decision processes and 
identified areas of focus for managers to increase their 
decision effectiveness. Lorange and Vancil (1976) concluded 
that "an effective planning system requires 'situational 
design;’ it must take into account the particular company’s 
situation, especially along the dimensions of size and 
diversity" (p. 75). Lorange and Vancil suggested that 
strategic planning systems have two major functions: to
develop an integrated, coordinated, and consistent long-term 
plan of action, and to facilitate the adaptation of the 
company to environmental change. They specified six 
decision issues to be addressed when designing a strategic 
planning system in an organization.
The first issue concerns communicating the corporate 
performance goals. Middle managers in large companies 
should be able to assess the potential of their own 
division’s business. Therefore, corporate executives should 
not attempt to bias division managers in their assessments. 
Division recommendations should then be the basis for 
corporate goal setting.
The second issue concerns the goal setting process.
The fundamental question for this issue is who sets the 
goals, division managers or corporate executives? In large
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companies, initial goal setting should be effected at the 
division level because of its closer and more intimate 
knowledge of the industry.
The third issue concerns environmental scanning. The 
division management should provide a specific assessment of 
business conditions. Monitoring detailed environmental 
changes is too difficult to be performed by top executives.
The fourth issue concerns the focus of subordinate 
managers. Each division in a large company must adopt a 
strategic outlook and focus on achieving that outlook. 
Division managers should focus on identifying and analyzing 
strategic alternatives and their financial implications. 
However, the planning activity cannot become simply a 
numbers game.
The fifth issue concerns the corporate planner’s role.
In a large company, the corporate planner’s organizational 
status can have a significant symbolic value in stressing 
the importance of formal strategic planning and its 
relationship with conventional budgeting. The planner 
should be a catalyst, encouraging division managers to adopt 
a strategic orientation, and should not become involved in 
formulating the plans. The primary function of the 
corporate planner is system maintenance and coordination.
The sixth issue concerns the linkage of planning and 
budgeting. The planning system should provide the means to 
narrow a broad range of strategic alternatives down to a 
specific strategy and budget plan. The budget plan should
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be designed to accommodate strategic objectives and 
reasonable deviations. The narrowing can be slow or rapid 
depending on situation specifics and business conditions.
In a large company, the linkage between the planning system 
and budgeting is usually loose and the narrowing of 
alternatives can be more gradual because resources do not 
normally need to be committed early in the planning process.
Lorange and Vancil suggested that planning systems in a 
large company evolve from less explicit to more explicit 
goals and objectives. As the planning systems evolve, 
objectives become subject to negotiation, the focus of 
middle management becomes more strategic, and the linkage 
between budget and planning becomes tighter. The design of 
the planning process is a continuous task that requires 
vigilance and insight.
Later strategic thinking began to incorporate 
influences from outside the organization into the planning 
process. Content of the strategy came to be thought of less 
as an end result of the plan and more as a guideline for 
strategic processes. Porter (1980) developed one of the 
most widely used systems for conceptualizing planning 
strategies. Porter divided existing strategies into three 
categories: differentiation, cost leadership, and focus.
The strategy of differentiation is used when a company 
captures the market with a unique product or service.
Porter argued that the strategy of differentiation is 
effective because it creates customer loyalty, restricts
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price variances, and thereby reduces the opportunity for 
other competitors to enter the market. This strategy 
produces higher profit margins because less promotional 
outlay is required. Customers feel compelled to buy because 
there are no viable alternatives or substitute products.
The strategy of cost leadership is simple in concept, 
but one of the most difficult to implement. To remain 
competitive, companies must simply become the lowest cost 
producers in the industry. The key to this strategy is cost 
control so the company may reap higher returns than 
competitors, even at low prices.
Focus is a strategy used by companies producing highly 
specialized products or services for very narrow and limited 
markets. The markets may be limited by geographic area or 
specialized needs or interests of the customers. The focus 
strategy "rests on the promise that the firm is able to 
serve its narrow strategic target market more effectively or 
efficiently than competitors who are competing more broadly. 
As a result, the firm achieves either differentiation from 
better meeting the needs of the particular target, lower 
costs in serving this target, or both" (Porter, 1980, p.
38).
Miller (1989) expanded Porter’s model to include three 
multifaceted process dimensions along which organizations 
might be measured: rationality, assertiveness, and
interaction. The rationality or information processing 
dimension is central and includes intensive analysis, market
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scanning, futuristic thinking, and thoughtful consideration 
to strategic issues. The interaction dimension is the level 
of political and social process inherent in strategic 
decisions, and includes bargaining, politicking, and 
consensus building. The assertiveness dimension concerns 
the level of risk taking and whether decisions are proactive 
or reactive.
Based on his expansion of Porter’s model, Miller 
hypothesized that (a) the strategy of innovative 
differentiation, because of its complexity, will be 
positively related to all three dimensions of strategy 
making— information processing, interactive, and assertive;
(b) cost leadership strategies, because of their emphasis on 
efficiency, will be inversely related to all three 
dimensions; (c) focus strategies, because of their 
simplified decision-making requirements, will be negatively 
related to information processing and interaction 
dimensions, but show no relationship to assertiveness 
because a wide range of risk taking behavior can be 
expected; (d) innovative differentiation will show a 
stronger relationship with information processing and 
interaction in successful firms than in unsuccessful firms; 
and (e) successful and unsuccessful firms will show no 
significant differences in the relationships between cost 
leadership and information processing and focus and 
information processing.
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To test his hypotheses, Miller sampled 98 firms in the 
greater Montreal and Quebec City areas. Most of the firms 
were small (mean number of employees = 381), and many were 
owned by individuals, families, or small groups. Large 
diversified companies were avoided because they tended to 
have diversified strategies. Questionnaires were 
distributed to systematically assess strategic content and 
processes. Some interviews were conducted with CEOs and 
senior managers.
Using measures he developed, Miller found that 
innovative differentiation was positively related to the 
three dimensions, that these relationships were especially 
strong in successful firms, that these relationships were 
not significant in unsuccessful firms, that focus is 
inversely related to information processing, and that this 
relationship was stronger in successful companies. The 
above results supported some of Miller’s hypotheses. The 
second hypothesis was not supported in that there were no 
significant relationships between cost leadership and any of 
the strategy dimensions. The fifth hypothesis was also not 
supported in that there was a significant difference between 
successful and unsuccessful companies on managerial 
interaction.
Miller concluded that strategic content and process can 
have many implications for each other, especially if the 
company is pursuing a strategy of innovative 
differentiation. Successful, innovative companies pursue
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and use carefully extracted information, interact internally 
at high levels, and are fairly risk oriented. Cost 
leadership strategies, because they only make selected use 
of information and managerial interaction, do not have any 
meaningful implications for strategic processes. In fact, 
the cost control oriented companies who were high on 
interaction levels were less successful, probably because 
political bargaining and negotiations are expensive 
activities and tend to nullify cost efficiency. And 
finally, specializing in limited markets and product lines 
eliminates the need for high levels of information 
processing because the narrow focus simplifies 
administrative tasks and strategic decisions.
Miller suggested that managers be conscious of 
consistency between the business strategy and the process by 
which it is developed and implemented. Specifically, 
innovative companies must ensure that information gathering 
and interaction mechanisms are in place, are appropriate, 
and are working. And cost control efforts must be designed 
to eliminate parochial priorities and political squabbling 
which detract from cost efficiency objectives.
Miller’s findings are strongly supportive of a broad 
section of strategic planning literature which addresses 
environmental scanning. MacMillan (1984) argued that to 
remain competitive, companies must adopt certain behaviors 
that capture control of their industries. Strategic policy 
is a dynamic problem that incorporates competitive
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countermoves, and the only way to assess countermoves is to 
be acutely sensitive to the environment.
Wilson (1984) suggested that the purpose of strategic 
planning is to optimize the relationship between the 
organization and the environment, to maximize congruence and 
minimize friction. Environmental scanning encompasses the 
forecasting of future trends and the monitoring of current 
events. Wilson argued that environmental scanning is an 
essential part of strategic planning because it provides the 
framework for logical progression of the strategic process. 
Environmentally based planning must include not only a 
market strategy, but a technological strategy, human 
resources strategy, financial strategy, and a public policy 
and government relations strategy.
Wilson outlined the requirements of an environmental 
scanning system that might be used to feed information to 
the strategic process. The system must operate on the macro 
level, that is assess long range trends, and it must operate 
on a micro level to focus on and interpret specific events. 
The system must be holistic in the sense that it views 
trends in social, economic, political, and technological 
developments, and should be comprehensive in scope. The 
system cannot be linear or segmented, and it must be 
designed to continually revisit the environment instead of 
relying on one-shot or even periodic analysis. The system 
must stress contingency planning, and should be integrated 
into the strategic planning system.
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Environmental scanning systems are important because 
they provide the organization with the ability to predict 
turning points. Without the ability to predict turning 
points, organizations are not able to cope with the volatile 
environment (Emerson, 1985). One mistake many organizations 
make is to forget that members of the organization live in 
and are affected by the environment. Strategic plans that 
do not address human resources, which are supplied by and 
affected by the environment, will generally find difficulty 
achieving strategic objectives (Schuler, 1989).
Schuler (1989) offered a human resources strategic 
management model based on competitive strategies. The first 
strategy offered was cost reduction which strives to 
increase productivity, defined as output cost per person.
Cost reduction strategies can mean reductions in workforce 
or in wages, or it can be achieved through subcontracting, 
work redesign, automation, procedural changes, and job 
flexibility.
The role of the employee in a cost reduction strategy 
requires a certain behavioral profile: (a) relatively
repetitive and predictable behaviors, (b) short term focus,
(c) autonomy and initiative, (d) modest concern for quality, 
(e) high concern for quantity, (f) strong focus on results, 
(g) low risk taking, and (h) stability. The human resources 
management practices prescribed are (a) fixed and stable job 
descriptions, (b) narrowly defined jobs and narrow career 
paths, (c) short term, results oriented performance
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appraisals, (d) compensation levels consistent with the 
market, and (e) minimal employee training.
The second strategy Schuler described was quality 
enhancement which strives to produce and deliver the highest 
possible quality goods or services. The employee profile 
necessary for quality enhancement contains (a) repetitive 
and predictable behaviors, (b) long-term focus, (c) some 
level of cooperative behavior, (d) a high concern for 
quality, (e) a modest concern for quantity, (f) a high 
concern for process, (g) low risk taking, and (h) commitment 
to organizational goals. The human resources management 
practices prescribed for quality enhancement are (a) fixed 
and explicit job descriptions, (b) high levels of employee 
participation, (c) both individual and group criteria for 
performance appraisal, (d) some guarantees of job security, 
and (e) extensive and continuous employee training.
The third strategy discussed was innovation. For an 
innovation strategy to work, employees must have (a) a high 
degree of creativity, (b) long-term focus, (c) high levels 
of cooperation, (d) moderate concern for quality, (e) a 
moderate concern for quantity, (f) an equal concern for 
process and results, (g) high risk taking, and (h) a high 
tolerance for ambiguity. The human resources management 
practices needed for innovation are (a) jobs structured 
around interaction and cooperation, (b) performance 
appraisals that reflect long-term and group performance, (c) 
job mobility and flexibility, (d) compensation systems based
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on internal criteria rather than external or environmental 
criteria, (e) compensation from sources other than pay such 
as stock and bonuses, and (f ) broad career paths.
Assuming that organizational effectiveness is the goal 
of most organizations and that organizational effectiveness 
is increased as conflicting cues and reinforcers within the 
organization are decreased, Schuler suggested three 
propositions:
1. Organizations pursuing a cost-reduction strategy 
should be more effective to the extent they also pursue a 
utilization philosophy of human resources management.
2. Organizations pursuing a quality enhancement 
strategy should be more effective to the extent they also 
pursue an accumulation philosophy of human resources 
management.
3. Organizations pursuing an innovation strategy 
should be more effective to the extent they also pursue a 
facilitation philosophy of human resources management (p. 
172).
Schuler continued that, although these propositions 
might seem straightforward and testable enough, they are 
potentially, and most likely, contingent on the relationship 
between competitive strategies and business life-cycle 
stages. The contingency is based upon the fit among the 
life-cycle stage of the organization, the chosen strategy, 
and the changing demands of the environment.
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The complexity of the contingencies proposed by Schuler 
suggests that few organizations are able to achieve an 
appropriate match of strategy with environment.
Inappropriate matches generally result in partial and 
ineffective change plans which serve to frustrate managers 
and the people who work for them (Emerson, 1985).
Ineffective changes are dangerous for the organization’s 
future.
Emerson (1985) suggested that planned changes in the 
organization must be effective at the grass-roots level or 
strategic planning is nothing more than a paper and pencil 
exercise. If the desired changes do not take place at the 
grass-roots level, Emerson argued, the structure of the 
planning process itself will undergo unpredictable and 
usually undesirable changes. Further, and more importantly, 
the process of internal communication which ultimately 
affects the balance of power and how things get done in the 
organization will change in unpredictable ways. Because of 
these possibilities, the corporate planning process is 
becoming more directed toward supporting the governance role 
of the board of directors and less directed toward the 
management process.
The planning process has become overly dependent on 
numbers and techniques which have replaced judgement and 
experience. Planning at the executive level has become a 
substitute for decision making and responsive action.
Emerson suggested that planning can translate management
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into a portfolio analysis exercise, but cannot transmit a 
feel for the business. It is not enough to establish a 
broad sweeping plan and then hand it down to line managers, 
nor is it appropriate to have line managers develop their 
own plans in isolation and submit them to corporate. The 
key, argued Emerson, is managing employee attitudes. 
Communication, explaining what is going on, must be regular 
and consistent in content. Correcting the company’s 
problems through the planning process is doomed to failure. 
The only way to maintain the flexibility required to cope 
with the changing environment is through internal 
relationships and team building.
Despite such discussions in the literature, on those 
rare occasions when human relations issues are incorporated 
into the strategic plans, they are usually the result of 
knee-jerk reactions by managers to some immediate problem or 
attempts to incorporate faddish management theory rather 
than rational efforts to support organizational goals 
(Gehrman, 1979).
Cultural Aspects of Strategic Planning
Lamb and Shrivastava (1986) insisted that two of the 
most intractable problems of strategic management are 
strategy implementation and strategic performance. "These 
topics are intractable because they are new, ill defined, 
complex, and not amenable to study through simple 
discipline-bound frameworks of analysis" (p. xi). This 
intractability discourages research on these problems, and
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therefore little research is published. The problems of 
implementation and performance measurement are the most 
critical problems facing strategy practitioners. Brilliant 
strategies are quite useless if they cannot be implemented 
and their subsequent performance evaluated.
After tracking the strategic planning process at Air 
Canada from 1937 to 1976, Mintzberg, Brunet, and Waters 
(1986) concluded that the forces that encourage planning and 
the planning process can actually impede strategic change. 
Operational planning discourages strategic thinking: "The 
more an organization relies on planning in the formal sense, 
the less likely its people are to think strategically and 
the less inclined it will be to undergo strategic change (as 
opposed to elaboration or extrapolation of given strategic 
direction). . . .  Formal strategic management may prove 
incompatible with real strategic thinking" (p. 4).
The conclusion of Mintzberg et al. implies that the 
formal planning process becomes an organizational ritual.
The organization’s culture can itself become a major 
deterrent to success when the success model, or how the 
organization characterizes successful strategy, changes. 
Ernest (1985) observed that strategic plans and their 
resulting changes and reorganizations that might work very 
well on paper frequently do not work as expected. The 
latent outcomes of strategic planning are usually the result 
of unseen or misunderstood factors associated with the 
organizational culture. After studying aerospace
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manufacturing firms, retail chains, and electronics 
companies, Ernest concluded that the cultural dimension is a 
major component of organizational success in implementing 
strategic plans. There must be a fit between planning and 
beliefs, and values and practices within the organization.
Ernest defined culture as "a system of shared values 
and beliefs that actively shape the company’s management 
style and employees’ day-to-day behaviors" (p. 51). Culture 
is generally rooted in the values of the company’s founders 
and, to some extent, those of current senior managers. 
Cultural feedback loops reinforce successful behaviors which 
are continuously repeated. As levels of consistency 
increase, the strength of the culture increases. Top 
managers may not have an adequate handle on corporate 
culture if the founders are gone and their own values are 
not accurate reflections of the founders’.
Ernest assessed 100 organizations using a 60 item 
survey of management practices. The survey revealed five 
orientations critical to defining a company’s culture: 
marketing orientation, employee orientation, problem-solving 
orientation, innovative orientation, and service/quality 
orientation. Profiles of each company were developed 
indicating its level on each of the five orientations. 
Relationships between profiles and major problems were 
established. Cultures were categorized on two dimensions: 
action and people. Action involves decision making, 
organizing, monitoring, implementing plans, and generating
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or nonparticipative relative to their employees. The two 
dimensions, action and people, reflected the balance of 
tasks and roles within the organization.
Ernest found that four types of cultures emerged from 
the study, and these can be generalized to the emergence of 
culture in relation to a company’s position on the action 
and people dimensions. Interactive cultures emerge from 
organizations that are both reactive and participative. 
Interactive cultures are highly people oriented and service 
oriented. Integrated cultures emerge from organizations 
that are both proactive and participative. Integrated 
cultures are also people oriented but tend to be more 
effective in identifying and solving problems than 
interactive cultures. Systematized cultures emerge from 
organizations that are both reactive and nonparticipative. 
Systematized cultures are generally focused on routine work 
operating procedures, and external regulations. 
Entrepreneurial cultures emerge from organizations that are 
both proactive and nonparticipative. Entrepreneurial 
cultures are oriented toward the rapid development of 
products and services.
The importance of Ernest’s concept to planning is the 
match of strategy to organizational culture. For example, 
service oriented company may not be expected to be good at 
developing new products. In addition, various 
implementation strategies might be effective in one culture
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and not effective in another. The type of culture is 
important to understand when planning elements of human 
resources, compensation, and performance appraisal.
Ansoff and Baker (1986) agreed with Ernest’s conclusion 
that culture is one of the key determinants of an 
organization’s success in strategic planning. Ansoff and 
Baker hypothesized that the culture is influenced by 
"fashionable" solutions, one of which is the idea of 
changing an organization’s culture. These solutions tend to 
replace one another over time. In the early 1900s, product 
orientation and the development of products dominated 
corporate culture. By the 1930s, product orientation had 
been replaced by a market orientation and the development of 
markets. By the 1960s, strategy orientation and the 
development of strategies had become the dominant cultural 
theme. Ansoff and Baker concluded that as the success model 
undergoes continuous change in the corporate environment, 
the culture becomes critical as a key deterrent to success 
in strategic planning.
Ross and Shetty (1985) suggested that the new strategic 
challenge is to change corporate culture from a productivity 
orientation to a quality orientation. Their study of 2,000 
business units in 300 manufacturing and service 
organizations demonstrated that improving quality in 
products and services increases both market share and profit 
margins. New strategies should include quality as a 
competitive advantage. The current systems of quality
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control are ingrained in many corporate cultures and 
generally contribute to poor quality by detecting rather 
than preventing defects. Success in the future will not 
only be a function of defect-free products but of public 
perception of high quality. To increase public perception 
of quality, corporations must reflect public values.
Because perception of quality is difficult to quantify, 
measurement of it has to be based on cultural values of the 
company. Therefore, public values must be included in the 
company’s value system.
One strategic cultural device that is currently being 
used to compensate for high energy and material costs and 
incorporate the values of efficiency and accuracy is 
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) systems (Melnyk & 
Gonzales, 1987). MRP II systems are of interest because one 
was installed at General Dynamics, Electronics Division 
during the time of the study. Melnyk and Gonzales (1987), 
in a survey of MRP II firms, found that implementation of 
MRP II usually requires corporate cultural changes. MRP II 
is a complex system of material requirements and shop floor 
planning and scheduling that requires a strong commitment by 
top managers to effect the changes necessary to make its 
implementation successful. The commitment must be in time 
and dollars to educate and train employees at every level of 
the organization, to enforce the discipline required to do 
mundane and repetitive tasks well, and to provide the tools 
necessary to maintain high degrees of record accuracy.
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Melnyk and Gonzales characterized the typical 
manufacturing culture as shrouding production capacity, 
master scheduling, and shop floor planning in mystery. To 
successfully implement MRP II, the mystery must be removed 
from scheduling and planning, and they have to be understood 
at all levels of the organization so that everyone involved 
with production can develop and commit to realistic build 
schedules that reconcile customer demands with production 
capabilities. MRP II systems must be integrated into the 
strategic plans of the company, and strategic objectives 
consistent with MRP II must become integrated with cultural 
values. MRP II systems require and facilitate cooperation 
among engineering, manufacturing, procurement, and marketing 
functions. MRP II systems reduce interdepartment conflict, 
alter the nature of institutionalized strategic planning 
processes, link functional areas where barriers existed 
previously, provide smoother transitions to new changes than 
previous change systems did, formalize and standardize 
information, and provide linkages between strategic 
objectives, operating plans, and production goals.
MRP II systems have achieved the status of panacea for 
a multitude of organizational problems and inefficiencies.
One of their attractive features is the ability to play 
"what if" games. The ability to predict the future using 
systems such as MRP II has become more and more important to 
business. "The more unpredictable the world becomes, the 
more we seek out and rely upon forecasts and predictions to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
determine what we should do" (Gimpl & Dakin, 1987, p. 57).
Gimpl and Dakin (1987) examined the available research 
on planning practices and concluded that managers’ obsession 
with the magical rites of long range planning and other 
future oriented techniques is a manifestation of 
anxiety-relieving, superstitious behavior. Forecasting and 
planning have the same cultural function as magical rites; 
they make the world seem more deterministic and increase 
confidence in coping mechanisms. In addition to uniting 
managers as a group and inducing them to take action, these 
rites preserve the status quo.
Methods of prediction or telling the future, such as 
tarot cards, reading entrails, and astrology, have been 
created and used during times of great uncertainty, 
particularly when the various possible outcomes potentially 
have a significant impact on the existing way of life. 
Uncertainty in the business environment brings out the 
consultants, organizational development specialists, and 
other cultural soothsayers who direct the proceedings and 
interpret omens. Gimpl and Dakin suggested that long range 
planning is ideal to calm the discomfort that managers feel 
facing a random world. When managers look into the future, 
they choose a view that requires little change and then look 
for supporting data. Strategic plans that recommend radical 
changes in allocation of resources, corporate behavior, 
fundamental missions, and corporate goals are likely to be 
met with no action.
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Managers rarely try to justify the success of planning 
processes by comparing the plan to actual practice. Long 
range planning is justified, according to Gimpl and Dakin, 
by secondary benefits like increased communication or 
commitment and not on the basis that the plan was followed 
and the predicted results were realized. Strategic planning 
has symbolic value. Planners can never be proved wrong:
They simply did not take all the complex contingencies into 
account.
A low tolerance for ambiguity induces managers to 
develop the illusions of control. Gimpl and Dakin defined 
ambiguous situations as those situations that cannot be 
classified because they are new, those situations that are 
too complex to be analyzed, and those situations that 
contain contradictory elements or structures. Japanese 
managers tend to feel more comfortable with ambiguity and 
will use it to their advantage. Western managers feel 
strongly that they must make decisions as opposed to make 
choices. Decision making implies a level of control. If 
enough facts and data are gathered, the ambiguity is thought 
to be removed and an optimum decision can be made. This 
type of thinking creates the illusion of control.
Gimpl and Dakin concluded that superstitious behavior 
in management has two functions. Under conditions of 
extreme ambiguity, superstitious behavior will stave off the 
tendency to do nothing by reducing anxiety. Secondly, 
superstitious behavior will promote random action which is
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better suited to a random world. Regular patterns of 
behavior are less likely to meet with success in a random 
situation than random patterns because random patterns tend 
to cover unfamiliar ground and generate new responses. 
Magical planning generates confidence in ambiguous 
situations, generates cohesiveness in the management group, 
increases faith in the future, and minimizes bias created by 
regular patterns of behavior.
Summary
Strategic planning is a process within which 
organizations can determine their identity, their position 
in the environment, their direction, and how to get to where 
they want to be. The planning process allows organizations 
the opportunity for introspection and internal assessment.
In addition, strategic planning assures that organizational 
decisions will be consistent with the organizational 
mission, and helps to smooth out the process of change. The 
process of planning is at least as important as the plan 
itself, and should be understood as a thought process and 
not simply a set of procedures or exercises. The planning 
process provides the framework for organizational learning.
Strategic planning requires the involvement and support 
of all levels of management, particularly top management. 
Strategic planning is not a panacea nor will it effect 
miraculous recoveries. Strategic planning cannot be used to 
solve immediate problems in the organization. The planning 
system must be tailored to the situation and the
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organization, and cannot be utilized without a thorough 
understanding of the organization’s power structure and 
political climate. Planners cannot simply rely on 
rationality and quantification, but must incorporate 
political, social, and environmental aspects into the 
planning process.
Strategic planning also allows organizations to examine 
their place in the environment. For an organization to 
compete for and retain legitimacy, it must be clear on its 
own value to society and its intention to serve its own 
employees as well as the community. The planning process 
must optimize the relationship of the organization with its 
environment. The strategic plan must contain an element of 
human relations and an element of public policy.
Companies may vary in culture not only as a result of 
their collective beliefs, values, and behaviors, but as a 
result of the content of their strategic plans and planning 
processes. The nature of the role, product, or market 
orientation a company chooses in relation to society can 
affect how members see themselves in relation to each other 
and in relation to the community. Conversely, the 
organizational culture can influence the choice of role, 
product, and market orientation.
Organizational Change 
Once a strategic plan is adopted in an organization, 
the next step is implementation. The implementation of a
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plan almost always requires some directed changes in the 
organization. Of course, not all organizational changes are 
the result of the implementation of a plan, some may occur 
as a result of pressure from the environment and seme may 
occur as the informal structure of the organization changes. 
Organizational changes can be viewed from three essential 
perspectives: the structural perspective or the traditional
management approach, the psychological perspective or the 
individual’s involvement in the change process, and the 
cultural perspective or the group reaction to and creation 
of change.
Structural Aspects of Change
An understanding of organizational change must 
necessarily begin with a discussion of what is changed. 
Organizations are merely human constructs that represent 
defined human activities. Mintzberg (1979) suggested that 
organized human activity requires two fundamental and 
opposing elements: the division of labor into tasks to be
performed, and the coordination of tasks into activities.
"The structure of an organization can be defined simply as 
the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into 
distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them"
(p. 2).
Mintzberg specified five major divisions of labor that 
every organization has even if more than one division is 
performed by one person. The first division of labor is the 
operating core. The operating core performs the basic work
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that is generally characterized as the organization’s reason 
for existence. The operating core directly produces the 
organization’s products and services by procuring the 
production inputs, processing the inputs into outputs, 
distributing the outputs, and providing direct support to 
the input-process-output cycle. The second division 
Mintzberg called the strategic apex. The strategic apex 
ensures that the organization serves its mission in an 
effective way, and also serves the needs of those who have 
power or control over the organization. The strategic apex 
has three sets of duties: direct supervision, managing the
organization’s boundary conditions and its relationship with 
the environment, and developing the organization’s strategy. 
The third division is the middle line, those middle level 
managers that join the strategic apex with the operating 
core. The fourth division is the technostructure. The 
technostructure is comprised of analysts who design the 
work, plan the work, change processes and procedures, and 
train operators, but do not do the work themselves. The 
technostructure effects standardization in the organization. 
The fifth division is the support staff. The support staff 
provides support activities that are not directly related to 
the work flow such as building maintenance and switchboard 
operation.
Mintzberg outlined five basic mechanisms used by 
organizations to coordinate work: (a) mutual adjustment,
(b) direct supervision, (c) standardization of work
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processes, (d) standardization of work outputs, and (e) 
standardization of work skills. These five elements should 
be considered the glue that holds the organization together.
Mutual adjustment, according to Mintzberg, is pure and 
simple direct communication between workers. Mutual 
adjustment places control of the work in the hands of the 
workers. It is the simplest coordinating mechanism, but it 
is also the only mechanism that works under extremely 
complex and difficult conditions.
Direct supervision uses one individual to coordinate 
the work of others by giving instructions and monitoring 
actions. The mechanism of direct supervision is generally 
the most favored coordination mechanism because of the 
concept that control passes to a single mind which in turn 
controls others.
Mintzberg specified three different standardization 
mechanisms to distinguish a hierarchy of preference. 
Standardization of work process is the preferable 
coordinating mechanism because it is least affected by 
individual differences. Standardization of the work process 
requires specification of procedures and design of the 
environment to control the content of the work. Under these 
standardized conditions, the worker needs little if any 
supervision and very little mutual adjustment communication.
Standardized output is the second most preferable 
mechanism. Standardized output specifies the exact 
dimensions of the output. Here, the process is of no
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
consequence, and little direction or communication is 
required. The worker is free to arrive at the output by any 
means available.
Standardization of skills depends entirely upon the 
training and skill of the worker. This is the kind of 
coordinating mechanism one might find in an operating room, 
where every person involved must rely upon personal training 
and experience rather than communication, direction, 
procedure, or output specifications even though these 
mechanisms may be used to some extent.
Mintzberg hypothesized that as the organization becomes 
more complex, the coordinating mechanisms form into an 
evolutionary cycle from mutual adjustment to direct 
supervision to standardization back to mutual adjustment. 
Direct supervision and mutual adjustment can also be used as 
informal mechanisms to gain power. Often the formal and 
informal coordinating mechanisms within an organization are 
indistinguishable.
Because of the real-life melding of formal and informal 
structures observed by Mintzberg, there are relatively few 
models of organizational change that focus on practical 
application. Mintzberg (1979) complained that 
organizational research generally fails to relate structure 
with the functioning of the organization; in other words, 
research literature on organizational theory lacks context. 
Bedeian (1980) asserted that careful assessments of 
organizational change efforts are extremely rare, and even
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careful assessments are misleading. The criteria for 
success for the planned changes are typically multiple and 
generally vague, and a given investigator is equally likely 
to focus on the successes or the failures of the change 
instead of a proportional representation. In addition, 
assessments of change are expensive and time consuming, and 
specifying, let alone explaining, the results of whatever 
has been produced is difficult and may be beyond the 
available expertise in the organization.
Beckhard (1979) presented a model of change which he 
claimed has had a history of high utility. The model for 
change planning has four major steps: (a) defining the
change problem, (b) determining readiness and capacity for 
change, (c) identifying resources and motive for change, and 
(d) determining the intermediate change strategy and goals. 
When the planned change affects a large system, the proposed 
change must be evaluated in relation to the environment, to 
changes in management strategy and organizational 
structures, to changes in the ways work is done, and to 
changes in the reward systems. In addition, Beckhard 
suggested, the change must be maintained once it has been 
implemented.
A fair amount of organizational literature has been 
devoted to distinguishing the characteristics of successful 
versus unsuccessful change in organizations (Robbins, 1987). 
When examining change in an organization, there are 
basically two points of view: mechanistic and humanistic.
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Both points of view consider manipulation of the 
organization not only appropriate, but necessary for its 
survival. Both points of view are concerned almost 
exclusively with the outcomes of the change.
The mechanistic view holds that people are basically 
components in the organizational machinery and concentrates 
on measures of performance. Organizational performance, if 
properly planned and ordered, will be increased. For 
example, Robbins (1987) suggested that organizational 
effectiveness has been measured by overall ratings, 
productivity, efficiency, profit, quality, accidents, 
growth, absenteeism, turnover, job satisfaction, motivation, 
morale, control, conflict/cohesion, flexibility, adaptation, 
planning and setting goals, goal concensus, internalization 
of organizational goals, role conformance, managerial 
interpersonal skills, management task skills, information 
management and communication, readiness, utilization of 
environment, evaluation by external entities, stability, 
value of human resources, participation and shared 
influence, training and development emphasis, and individual 
achievement emphasis.
Robbins proposed four models of effectiveness that may 
be used to evaluate change: (a) goal attainment, (b)
systems, (c) strategic constituencies, and (d) competing 
values. Under the goal attainment model, the organization 
is effective when it accomplishes its stated goals. Under 
the systems model, the organization is effective when it
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acquires needed resources. Under the strategic 
constituencies model, the organization is effective when all 
strategic constituencies are at least minimally satisfied. 
Under the competing values model, the organization is 
effective when the organization matches its emphasis on 
return on investment, market share, new product innovation, 
and job security with constituent preferences.
The humanistic model still considers people to be 
elements of the organizational mechanism. But because 
people are the primary element, and people are less than 
perfect mechanisms, a theraputic approach applied by 
internal agents, external agents, managers, or CEOs can make 
them more productive. Hopclul in the 1970s that therapeutic 
psychology could be applied to the business world, the 
emphasis of organizational theorists was on organizational 
development as a tool for management to affect humane 
manipulation of the organization. Franklin (1976) studied 
change processes in 25 different organizations (11 
successful and 14 unsuccessful) to determine any consistent 
factors that might contribute to successful change efforts. 
Franklin identified eight specific factors that seemed to 
contribute to successful change: (a) an organizational
reputation for innovation, (b) contact with external change 
agents prior to implementation, (c) a focus on specific 
problems rather than general problems, (d) a commitment to 
survey feedback method of organizational development, (e) 
commitment to the change efforts by top management, (f) the
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change program was presented as part of a total development 
effort rather than as an add-on, (g) there was a commitment 
to no more than a four year time frame for a single project, 
and (h) internal change agents were carefully selected.
From the eight factors, Franklin proposed three general 
factors that distinguish successful from unsuccessful change 
plans. The first factor is that successful changes are 
normally the result of environmental pressure. The 
environmental factor was supported by Alderfer (1977) who 
stipulated that change techniques must include environmental 
issues. The second factor proposed by Franklin stresses the 
importance of commitment by the top managers. Senior 
executives must have priorities that are consistent with the 
change plan. The third factor is that internal change 
agents must be chosen to champion the cause and effectively 
communicate the desired message.
Dunn and Swierczek (1977), in a comprehensive review of 
organizational change literature, insisted that 
organizational practicioners do understand the relationship 
of theory and practice. Dunn and Swierczek analyzed 67 case 
studies conducted from 1945 to 1975 and found that (a) 
change efforts that are collaborative are more successful 
than those that are unilaterally directed, delegated, or 
subordinate directed, (b) participative change agent 
orientation is associated with effectiveness as compared to 
nonparticipative orientations, and (c) participative change 
efforts are more effective than nonparticipative ones.
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Clearly, the findings of Dunn and Swierczek (1977) 
stress the importance of participation among top managers, 
change agents, and all other organizational members in a 
theraputic relationship. This conclusion is consistent with 
the conclusion of Friedlander and 3rown (1974) that change 
efforts must be supported by collaborative involvement of 
all participants. But the issue of environment as an 
important factor in outcome has not been settled in 
humanistic change models. Unlike Franklin (1976) and 
Alderfer (1977), Dunn and Swierczek (1977) concluded that 
the environment does not affect the outcome. Dunn and 
Swierczek also concluded that the type of organization does 
not show any relationship to change outcomes. The 
assumption seems to be that the members of an organization, 
under the appropiate internal conditions, will always behave 
in the organization’s best interest.
More characteristic of organizational literature in the 
1980s is a focus on theraputic managerial behavior and its 
effect on organizational change. Hersey and Blanchard 
(1982) identified two sets of skills and knowledge needed by 
change agents in organizations: diagnosis skills and
implementation skills. The diagnostic process used by these 
change agents includes three steps: (a) determination of
the point of view, (b) identification of the problem, and
(c) analysis of the situation.
After the diagnostic process is complete, change agents 
must plan and implement a change program. The
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implementation of a change program involves identifying 
alternative solutions to the problem and developing a change 
strategy. Hershey and Blanchard suggested that there are 
three broad theories used to develop change strategies: 
force field analysis, change cycles, and patterns of 
communication. Force field analysis, a technique developed 
by Lewin (1947), used an assessment of driving forces and 
restraining forces to determine change strategy. Change 
cycles can be implemented through a participative change or 
a directed change according to the level of change: 
knowledge changes, attitude changes, individual behavior 
changes, or group changes. Patterns of communication in the 
organization along with patterns of intergroup conflict must 
be analyzed, defined, and considered in the change strategy.
Phillips (1986) attempted to identify Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) behavior in a typical corporate change 
pattern. Phillips suggested that once the CEO decides to 
commit to a new strategy, he or she then proceeds to change 
the organization in a manner consistent with the new 
strategy. After a series of announcements, organizational 
shakeups, and personal talks around the company, the CEO 
usually withdraws to let the line managers take over. At 
this point, according to Phillips, the big change usually 
tapers off. It declines because the conventional approach 
to change is not well suited for dealing with habitual 
behavior, parochial priorities, and the current distribution 
of power and influence.
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After studying a successful change in a chemical 
company, Phillips concluded that successful change 
strategies include elements that are substantially different 
from conventional strategies. To launch the change program, 
the CEO of the chemical company announced the change and 
reinforced the objective by running a contest for the best 
slogan to describe the change objective. Next, the CEO 
modified the organizational structure by bringing lower 
level managers up to key positions where interest and 
backgrounds were aligned with the new objectives, and moving 
staff level executives to new positions where they could 
broaden their experience. Following the organizational 
restructuring, the CEO used a series of dramatic and 
symbolic ceremonies and techniques to highlight 
organizational role changes in management and the managers’ 
new responsibilities. In addition, the CEO communicated the 
changes with customers and the community.
A follow-up survey of customers one year after the 
announcements indicated that 47% had noticed a significant 
improvement in service. Phillips concluded that the 
approach used clarified exactly what the new objectives were 
and how the organization was changed to achieve them, 
explicitly and unmistakably contrasted the old with the new, 
dramatized the change to increase both emotional and 
intellectual understanding, and decisively shifted the power 
structure.
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Summarizing his studies of successful changes in 
various companies, Phillips suggested six distinctive 
differences that successful strategies have from 
conventional strategies. First, communication of what 
needed to be done differently was directed at all levels of 
the organization through a concerted communication program. 
Second, efforts were made early on to demonstrate new 
methods of operation. Third, aggressive changes were made 
to standardize operating procedures. Fourth, top managers 
played remarkably visible roles in the change process for 
extended periods of time. Fifth, top management stressed 
the positive aspects of the changes through rewards and 
incentives. And sixth, managing the change program became 
the agenda of senior managers.
Psychological Aspects of Change
During the 1970s, a movement toward concern for the 
welfare of the individual prompted a great deal of 
literature devoted to managing change by understanding the 
psychological profile of organizational members. This 
literature differs from that previously sited in that it 
focuses on the adjustment process of the individual rather 
than on the intended outcomes. The assumptions of this area 
of the literature center on the notion that change itself 
cannot be controlled but that the perspectives of the people 
involved can. If the theraputic manager handles the 
transition properly, resistence to change will be minimal 
and probabilities for success will increase. The amount of
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such literature is vast, but highly repetitive. Therefore, 
a small, selected sample of the writing on this topic should 
produce sufficient background in relation to the present 
study.
There are generally two different perspectives of the 
psychological aspects of change: the perspective of the
change agent (the changer) and the perspective of the group 
member (the changee). As mentioned above, many authors 
suggested that these two roles be combined through 
participative change efforts. Yet, there is no literature 
that suggests that anyone remains apathetic to change; a 
given member of an organization is either in favor of the 
change or resistant to the change. Possibly organizational 
members who might be apathetic to change are not worthy of 
attention by organizational theorists because they do not 
help nor do they hinder change efforts. Regardless, the 
"for" and "against" attitudes are the primary elements of 
focus. The literature, then, falls into two categories: 
the psychological profile of the successful change agent, 
and methods for overcoming resistance to change.
Outside consultants who operate as organizational 
change agents have expended some effort to evaluate their 
own effectiveness in a highly competitive environment. 
Hamilton (1985) concluded that 20% of the consultants 
perform 80% of the effective work in organizational change. 
But the primary focus of change agent effectiveness 
literature is on traits or skills needed by agents to do
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their work (Argyris, 1970; Bennis, 1969; Burke, 1982;
Steele, 1982).
Hamilton (1988) conducted an extensive review of the 
literature to compile a list of factors that are supposed to 
predict a change agent’s effectiveness. Hamilton organized 
the factors into three general categories of effectiveness 
characteristics: (a) openness and responsiveness to others’
needs and concerns, (b) comfort with ambiguity and the 
ability to make sense of it, and (c) comfort with oneself in 
relation to others (p. 40).
Hypothesizing that personality characteristics and 
behavioral tendencies of effective organizational 
development consultants differ significantly from those of 
less effective consultants, Hamilton tested the validity of 
predictive factors on a sample of 105 organizational 
development consultants employed by the United States Navy.
A comparison of psychological profiles measured by three 
personality inventories and effectiveness ratings measured 
by supervisor and peers rating scales indicated the 
following results:
1. Mental agility (a large capacity for making sense 
of ambiguous situations) and a friendly cooperative 
disposition were both positively related to consultant 
effectiveness.
2. Detail orientation, concern about facts and 
figures, procedural orientation, and high need for tangible
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results and specific direction were negatively related to 
consultant effectiveness.
3. The need to work within defined boundaries was 
negatively related to consultant effectiveness.
4. The ability to look for new patterns and see 
meanings, relationships, and possibilities beyond the 
immediate senses was positively related to consultant 
effectiveness.
5. Individuals who were venturesome, trusting, 
relaxed, or imaginative were more likely to be effective 
consultants than individuals who were shy, suspicious, 
tense, or practical.
In light of her findings, Hamilton concluded that certain 
personality characteristics found in effective consultants 
differ significantly from those found in less effective 
consultants.
While there is no apparent research linking the 
psychological profiles of the changer with the changee, 
there is considerable speculation on the reactions of 
individuals to change. Hampton, Summer, and Webber (1982) 
identified some psychological aspects of resistance to 
change including rejection of the change agent, satisfaction 
with the current situation, unwillingness to admit 
ignorance, the influence of past history, the protection of 
parochial authorities, and methods of blocking undesired 
change. The above aspects of resistance should be 
considered when developing a change implementation plan, or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
the most obviously beneficial changes may not be successful. 
One of the critical elements of the potential probability of 
resistance to change and the effects of that resistance is 
the character of the innovation and how that character 
manifests itself in the implementation activities.
Hampton et al. specified three categories of technical 
innovation: routine, distress, and opportunity. Routine
innovation is a small-step technological advancement 
programmed by management, and is characterized by 
well-defined procedures for development, measurement, and 
implementation. Distress innovation is the result of 
economic and/or environmental pressure, and is characterized 
by insufficient resources and planning. Opportunity 
innovation is used to supplement or replace existing 
products of services, and is characterized by sufficient 
funding and planning.
Hall, Goodale, Rabinowitz, and Morgan (1978) studied 
routine innovation in departmental and job characteristics 
over a ten month period in the transportation ministry of a 
large Canadian province. They found more favorable 
attitudes in departments that did not change than in 
departments with either "positive" or "negative" changes.
Hall et al. concluded that people tend to not like changes. 
Following this conclusion, Kanter (1985) proposed ten 
reasons why people tend to resist changes.
Ranter’s first proposed element of resistance concerns 
the perceived control of the change. Change can be exciting
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when an individual chooses the nature and parameters of the 
change. However, when the change decision and process is in 
someone else’s control, change can be threatening. This 
element of resistance, according to Kanter, can best be 
managed through the participative management technique.
The second element concerns too much uncertainty.
Kanter suggested that not knowing the next step leads to 
anxiety about the change process. This element of 
resistance can be overcome with consistent, effective 
communication at every step of the process.
The third element concerns what Kanter called the 
surprise factor. The surprise factor is created by 
decisions and actions that are released without sufficient 
preparation or groundwork. The response by individuals to 
something totally unexpected is shock and defensive 
posturing. The most common area for the surprise factor, 
according to Kanter, is in organizational changes.
Management typically waits for all organizational decisions 
to be made before releasing any information about them.
This element of resistance can be minimalized by properly 
timed communication.
The fourth element Kanter called the difference effect. 
The difference effect is the experience an individual has 
when forced to reevaluate familiar routines and habits, 
which used to constitute the correct way of doing things, 
under the assumption that there is something wrong with 
them. The necessity of thinking through new ways of doing
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things requires more energy and effort than old habits and 
can result in excessive fatigue and burnout. The remedy for 
the difference effect is to minimalize the new ways of doing 
things, and to leave old routines and habits in place as 
much as possible.
The fifth element is related to the fourth. The 
difference effect, in addition to requiring new habits, 
brings into question the individual’s judgement in the 
former adherence to a way of doing things that has now been 
labeled incorrect or inefficient and the individual loses 
face. People will sometimes commit to a course of action 
that is contrary to their long-term best interests to avoid 
losing face. To minimize the effects of losing face, past 
action can be brought into perspective as a step in an 
evolutionary process.
The sixth element involves individuals’ concerns about 
remaining competent in the changing environment. Competence 
anxiety can be minimized by education and training in the 
new methods and procedures required by the proposed change.
The seventh element Kanter called the ripple effect. 
Resistance to change can be caused by the disruption of 
work-related or personal plans and projects to which people 
had committed before the change began. Kanter did not 
specify remedial action except to suggest that change agents 
must be sensitive to the potential for the ripple effect.
The eighth element of resistance is that the change 
will result in more work, more energy, and more time.
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Kanter argued that anxiety related to the idea that more 
work will be required causes less anxiety and is based in 
reality. It is rare, if ever, that change can be 
successfully implemented without diligent and sometimes 
painful efforts. But the successful change agent will have 
prepared all members of the organization to understand and 
accept their roles in the change, and motivate them to put 
forth the required effort.
The ninth element is the history of antagonism and 
resentment that exists between certain members of every 
group. Unresolved grievances from the past almost certainly 
will arise to interfere with the change efforts. The only 
possibility for the change agent to overcome these 
hindrances, according to Kanter, is to identify and resolve 
them.
The tenth element of resistance proposed by Kanter is 
the most reasonable: The change may really be threatening.
Real personal danger usually creates a defensive response, 
and there is little a change agent can do about it except to 
avoid pretense and false promises and deal with the 
resistance as well as possible. Kanter suggested that 
resistance to change is not irrational, and change agents 
can only be successful by developing an understanding of and 
strategies for the inevitable psychological resistance to 
any change program.
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Cultural Aspects of Change
The psychological perspective of organizational change 
has become less prevalent as organizational theorists have 
discovered that anthropological explanations of culture 
better explain the behavior of individuals within the 
context of the group or organization. Kanter (1985) 
suggested that the change agent can effectively deal with 
resistance to change by developing rituals of parting or 
ceremonies that move symbolically from the past to the 
future, stressing future opportunities. Robbins (1987) 
determined that an organizational perspective of change 
differs among cultures on certain key characteristics: the
importance of individual initiative, risk tolerance, the 
clarity of organizational direction, organizational 
structural integration, the levels of management contact, 
the levels of procedural and behavioral control, member 
identity, reward systems, conflict tolerance, and 
communication patterns.
Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985) used a psychological 
framework to show how individual characteristics and 
resulting actions form into a cultural format that guides 
the manner in which organizations learn things and thus 
affect the manner in which the organization changes.
Certain cultural governing variables in the organization 
create action strategies which, in turn, have certain 
consequences. The utilization of the consequences in the 
development of the governing variables and the action
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strategies constitutes the organization’s theories-in-use. 
When consequences are used to modify action strategies, this 
is known as single-loop learning. When consequences are 
used to modify governing variables, the organization is 
using double-loop learning. The learning pattern of the 
organization determines to some extent the manner in which 
the organization will effect change.
One recent cultural change in some organizations has 
been the movement away from control oriented management to 
participative management (Lawler, 1988 ). ~Lawler (1988) 
found three distinct strategies for involving employees in 
decision making: (a) parallel suggestion involvement, (b)
job involvement, and (c) high involvement. Each of these 
three strategies vary on four elements or features: (a)
information about organizational performance, (b) rewards 
based on organizational performance, (c) knowledge that 
enables employees to understand and contribute to 
organizational performance, and (d) power to influence 
organizational direction. Each strategy moves control of 
information, rewards, knowledge, and power down into the 
organization to different degrees.
The parallel suggestion involvement strategy moves the 
four elements down into the organization the least of the 
three strategies, and is the oldest approach to employee 
involvement. Employees are asked to produce ideas, 
suggestions, and problem solutions that will influence how 
the organization operates. This can be accomplished through
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suggestion programs, quality circles, and methods 
improvement programs. Rewards in a parallel suggestion 
strategy are typically based on cost savings or gainsharing. 
Based on a review of related research, Lawler concluded that 
parallel structure can lead to increased organizational 
performance and cost savings, and that employees can be more 
satisfied with their work than in noninvolvement 
organizations. The limitations of a parallel structure 
focus around the character of the strategy as a program or 
temporary system in the organization. Cost savings 
suggestion programs are expensive to run and difficult to 
maintain, they run out of suggestions and knowledge to solve 
complex problems, they are generally resisted by middle 
managers because of the threat to their power base and the 
extra work created by the need for responses to the 
suggestions, they usually create some sort of conflict 
between participants and nonparticipants, and the suggestion 
programs are rarely supported consistently by the reward 
systems. Lawler observed that parallel structure systems 
may go on for a period of time, but they tend to disappear 
after awhile and they do not change the organization’s way 
of doing business.
Job involvement focuses on enrichment of work to 
motivate employees to better levels of performance. Job 
enrichment creates jobs that give feedback, increases 
individual influence in work methods, requires a variety of 
skills, and provides a comprehensive task to perform as
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opposed to a task component. Autonomous task groups, as a
form of job involvement, are the primary unit of
involvement. All group members are equally responsible for 
group objectives and performance. Group approaches require 
interpersonal skills that may not be required in basic job 
enrichment strategies. Reward structures are different in 
group approaches, and groups can have more decision power 
than individuals. For example, teams may make personnel 
decisions and select supervisors.
Lawler found that job involvement technology can result 
in improvements in productivity, quality, absenteeism, and 
turnover. The effective use of this approach depends on the
technology of the workplace. Teams are appropriate when the
task is too complex for one individual, such as in chemical 
plants, oil refineries, banks, and airlines. The individual 
approach to job involvement is appropriate for organizations 
where the technology allows an individual to do the whole 
task or service. Job involvement approaches limit the 
contributions that individuals might ordinarily make to 
strategic decisions because the individuals are limited to 
immediate work decisions. To be effective, job involvement 
approaches must be part of the strategic objectives and 
incorporated into the business plans to receive the 
sustained commitment of management and supervision.
High involvement strategies require the organization to 
be structured so that people at the lowest levels have a 
sense of involvement in the performance of the total
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organization. According to Lawler, high involvement 
strategies contain the elements of job involvement, 
suggestion involvement, and team approach, but they differ 
in the kind of information shared and decision, power, and 
reward systems. In high involvement, employees are not only 
asked to make decisions about their work activities, but to 
play a role in the organization’s strategic decisions.
Rewards are generally based on organizational performance 
rather than individual performance.
Lawler reported that there are relatively few data on 
high involvement organizations because there are so few 
examples to study. Most examples are self-contained 
manufacturing units in isolated locations or new startups. 
Existing research (Lawler, 1986) indicated that high 
involvement organizations tend to be low-cost, flexible, and 
adaptive organizations, and they tend to be quality and 
customer oriented. High involvement approaches require a 
high initial investment in employee selection, training, and 
system development, and are not appropriate for every 
business. The primary determinants of which involvement 
strategy should be used in a given organization are the 
nature of the work it does, organizational technology, 
organizational values, and the characteristic management 
approach used by the organization. The organization’s work 
and technology are centered around two critical aspects: 
the extent to which individuals need to coordinate their 
activities, and the relative complexity of the work
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involved. High interdependence favors a team approach, 
while low interdependence indicates an individual approach. 
High complexity indicates a need for high involvement.
Lawler concluded that high involvement strategies 
require managers to believe that employees are a key 
organizational resource and will behave responsibly, 
consistent with the democratic principle. High involvement 
is not universally good for all organizations, but strategic 
analysis of where the organization is and where it wants to 
be can indicate the appropriate level of involvement.
The process of organizational change, from a cultural 
perspective, must necessarily be a process of socialization 
or resocialization. "As goal-oriented entities, 
organizations seek to influence, determine, and/or control 
the behavior of their members in directions consistent with 
their particular objectives. At the same time, members are 
attempting to define mutually acceptable and satisfying 
roles for themselves in the organization" (Fisher, 1986, p. 
101).
Many authors have suggested that organizational 
socialization can be understood as a serial or stage process 
(Feldman, 1981; Graen, 1976; Schein, 1978; Van Maanen,
1976). But research tends only to support stage models when 
they are related to specific occupations or job content 
areas (Fisher, 1986).
An extensive review of the literature on organizational 
socialization was conducted by Fisher (1986). Fisher
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critiqued the methodology of previous research in 
organizational socialization. Previous research has 
neglected to account for how individuals change during 
socialization and the potential outcomes of socialization. 
Socialization occurs when individuals cross a boundary in 
organizational role or status. There is relatively little 
systematic research on organizational socialization, and 
those few studies available do not include responses from 
the worst failures of socialization.
Most existing studies have focused on only a few 
occupational groups: police, nurse, military recruit,
engineer, and graduate student. Very few studies examine 
more than one occupation within an organization. Fisher 
distinguished between occupational socialization, the 
socialization process found in professions that require 
lengthy training and complex skills, and organizational 
socialization, the socialization process that occurs when 
one enters an organization or during an organizational 
change, but conceded that the two may occur simultaneously.
Fisher defined socialization as primarily a learning 
and change process involving psychological categories of 
content. These categories of content might be (a) 
organizational values, goals, and culture, (b) work group 
values, norms and friendships, (c) job skills, knowledge, 
and procedures, and (d) personal change relating to 
identity, self-image, and motive structure. The 
socialization process can lead to destructive, rebellious
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outcomes and cause disillusionment and turnover. On the 
other hand, socialization can lead to creative change for 
the organization and satisfaction and commitment in the 
organization’s members. Fisher suggested that socialization 
research should include an examination of anticipatory 
socialization: all learning and experience that prepares an
individual for a change.
Before learning can take place, the change agent must 
convince organizational members that the change is 
necessary. This may be accomplished through a process of 
unfreezing or unlearning old or outside cultural values and 
substituting new organizational values (Schein, 1986).
There seems to be some evidence to suggest that individuals 
with low self-esteem are more likely to copy others, and are 
therefore more easily socialized (Weiss, 1978; Weiss &
Nowicki, 1981). But Dalton (1979) disagreed, suggesting 
that increased self-esteem facilitates the change process.
Motivation to become socialized probably changes during 
the socialization process, people do not simply discard old 
values and adopt new values (Van Maanen, 1976). First, 
behavioral compliance is shaped through rewards and anxiety 
reduction, then organizational members learn to identify 
with the primary work group, and finally they internalize 
the new value structure. The effect of socialization on any 
group member depends on whether the change is affected on 
individuals or groups of individuals, whether the process is 
formal or informal, whether the process is structured and
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sequential or random, whether or not there is a fixed time 
table, and whether the socialization is affected by peers or 
with a designated agent (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Weiss 
and Nowicki (1981) concluded that using peers as change 
agents may have the best chance of influencing behavior.
Organizational Culture 
The Anthropological Perspective of Culture
"People go to work to find meaning in their lives" 
(Graves, 1986, p. 143). Meaning, and what people make of 
meaning, is the essential motivating factor in the 
socialization process. Cultural anthropology, which is the 
study of human custom and cultural behavior, explores 
certain questions about people in groups (Keesing, 1958):
Why do humans behave the way they do? How did the customs 
of a particular group develop? How do the customs of one 
group differ from those of another? What things do all 
people have in common, the universals and constants? What 
is the nature of a cultural system? Can cultural processes 
be predicted and controlled?
The study of organizational culture derives from two 
fields of cultural anthropology: ethnology, the analysis of
likenesses and differences among cultures, and social 
anthropology, which is concerned with developing 
generalizations about culture, society, and personality. 
Keesing (1958) defined culture as "the totality of learned, 
socially transmitted behavior, or 'custom’" (p. 16).
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Keesing distinguished culture from society and from 
personality, defining society as "the aggregation of 
individuals in organized populations or groups" who share 
the same cultural beliefs (p. 16). Personality, from the 
perspective of social anthropology, is the collection of 
"characteristics of the individual particularly as a 
consequence of learning and training in a particular 
sociocultural milieu" (p. 16).
Cultural anthropology literature is rich in technique 
and perspective on the investigation of culture. From the 
above definitions, the conceptualization of organizations as 
societies within which characteristic cultures can be 
identified is both reasonable and justifiable. And the 
available organizational literature is generally sufficient 
to address the various questions of organizational culture. 
However, there is one area of anthropological literature 
which warrants some attention in light of the present study: 
the question of cultural determinism. The question of 
determinism is particularly important to the study of 
organizational culture because organizations are best 
characterized as part time cultures for their members. 
Organizational members bring one or more cultures from the 
larger society into the organization. Organizational 
members are socialized in a more pervasive culture before 
they even become aware of the organizational culture.
One of the best arguments in favor of cultural 
determinism was presented by White (1948). White argued
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that even though some people believe strongly that culture 
can be controlled, evidence for this conclusion is scarce if 
not nonexistent. Faith that advances in science, 
technology, and philosophy give people the power to shape 
their own destiny is a weakly supported belief in light of 
the two world wars in the 20th century, and the 
ever-increasing and unnecessary complexities in life such as 
fashion trends and entertainment media. All complex social 
entities can be traced back to earlier approximations. The 
United Nations can be traced back to tribal councils, modern 
warfare and weapons systems can be traced back to 
prehistoric people throwing rocks at each other, and complex 
national and international economic systems have grown out 
of all the barter and distribution processes used since
before the Stone Age.
Culture, asserted White, cannot be explained in terms 
of humans. Humans have remained a constant element of 
culture. Culture cannot be explained in terms of 
environment. Environments have remained consistent while 
the cultures they have contained have changed dramatically. 
Culture must be explained in terms of culture; culture is a 
continuum. All cultural traits grow out of previous 
cultural traits or situations. Culture of the present was 
determined by culture of the past, and culture of the future
will be determined by the past and the present. Culture
makes itself. Although people cannot control the course of 
culture, they can learn to predict it, and even to make some
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adjustments. But understanding culture gives people no more 
control over it than understanding the ocean gives them 
control over the tides.
One of the best arguments in favor of cultural control 
was presented by Opler (1964). Opler argued that culture is 
not a deterministic entity that uniformly creates its 
members. People are not helpless, hapless recipients of 
culture. Rather, they are active shapers of the nature and 
boundaries of their social processes. "Culture is to be 
thought of less as a rigid cast than as a plastic border 
against which men strain" (p. 526). Culture is the work of 
humanity, it seems to be autonomous only because of our 
efforts to define and categorize it.
Whether or not culture can be controlled by people is 
central to the study of organizational culture. If 
organizational culture cannot be controlled, then there is 
no point in its examination except as idle scientific 
curiosity. If culture is determined by previous activities 
and events, then the researcher has nothing to offer the 
business practitioner except an explanation of how the 
current culture evolved. The present study must necessarily 
operate under the assumption that culture in organizations 
can be shaped and controlled to some extent.
The Organizational Perspective of Culture
"People who have experienced past success in 
organizations that are now in trouble usually greet grand 
announcements for significant change with significant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
resistance" (Wilkens & Bristow, 1987, p. 221). According to 
Wilkens and Bristow (1987), a change agent cannot hope to 
identify all the cultural conventions that may interfere 
with change. Most of these latent functions of 
organizational culture come into awareness when they simply 
appear during the process of implementation. Change agents 
must then plan to modify change plans as they uncover new 
insights about the organization’s culture. Any strategic 
plan that changes the direction of the organization must 
still begin from where the organization is at the time, and 
must use the current organizational cultural knowledge and 
skills.
Rather than attempt to change the roots of the culture, 
Wilkens and Bristow recommended using the existing culture 
to achieve the change by considering what motivates and 
focuses the group. Return to the organization’s past to 
find inspiration and instruction, to identify themes that 
form the basis of the existing culture, to identify 
principles that will remain constant no matter what change 
is implemented, to find examples of current successes, to 
identify and label eras that indicate directional shifts, 
and to mourn the loss of the cherished past.
As Tichy (1983) suggested, cultural uncertainties in 
planning are related to the changes and conflicts in 
people’s value systems, and addressing cultural 
uncertainties requires determining the influence of beliefs 
and philosophies on the organizational mission. Allcorn
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(1985) suggested that certain elements of culture have 
work-facilitating or work-inhibiting effects on the work 
force. Organizational atmosphere can facilitate work if it 
is relaxed and informal and inhibit work if it is formal and 
restrictive. Intragroup communication that is spontaneous 
and flexible will facilitate work while restricted or 
cliquish communication patterns will not. A clear 
understanding of the task facilitates work while task 
ambiguity does not. Constructive conflict and frank, 
constructive criticism that encourages revision and 
compromise will facilitate work while ignoring or 
suppressing conflict or making personal attacks leads to 
polarized camps that inhibit the work process. When 
leadership shifts among organizational members and all feel 
a part of the decision process, the work process is 
enhanced.
In agreement with Allcorn’s conclusions, Moch and Huff 
(1987) explored the destructive effects of the "blaming 
ritual" in a large food processing plant in the southern 
United States. The plant was primarily an assembly line 
type production pattern with functional division of labor, 
most of which was unskilled. Moch and Huff observed that 
the centralized power structure at corporate headquarters 
left few discretionary resources for the plant manager to 
use in exchange transactions. In order to meet rigid 
production schedules under heavy restrictions of hiring and 
firing, his major asset was his position and use of language
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and ritual. The primary ritual observed was the blaming 
ritual: In ambiguous situations, individuals or groups of
individuals were identified as the problem or source of the 
problem. The blame was usually tied to personal attributes 
such as laziness or incompetence.
By studying locution, the actual words spoken, Moch and 
Huff concluded that the plant manager’s use of language was 
specifically designed to emphasize separateness from 
subordinates and to highlight their inferiority. Many 
aipeoific rituals were clearly pointless except to define and 
assert power. Blaming rituals contained an unanswerable 
logic (a question or situation for which there can be no 
explanation), surprise (an unpredictable topic and content 
focus), superficial content, and repetition. The blaming 
rituals were met with little or no response from the blamee.
Moch and Huff concluded that the blaming ritual 
provided a number of cultural functions: stability provided
by a familiar pattern where the established behavior is the 
path of least resistance, reinforcement of the boss’ intent 
to maintain power and control, and a restriction of the 
boss’ control from the recipient’s point of view. In 
addition, Moch and Huff concluded that the use of sexual and 
scatological language had the effect of conveying personal 
abuse and identifying the individual as the problem rather 
than the individual’s behavior. But the sexual and 
scatological language also has the effect of keeping things 
informal and shelters the group from more explicit and
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formal control efforts. When a worker is contracted for 
time rather than product, he or she is open to hierarchical 
surveillance. Productivity was assumed to be increased 
through coercive control mechanisms. Language and ritual 
are specifically designed to maintain control of 
productivity in the factory.
"There is not much point in attempting to study or 
change a thing called culture if it does not affect what 
goes on in organizations" (Kilmann, Saxton & Serpa, 1986, p. 
88). Therefore, those authors concluded that one must 
assume that culture does affect organizational behavior and 
performance, and the direction of the organization. The 
nature of the impact depends on the strength or 
pervasiveness of the culture: Is the culture seen the same
way by all members of the organization, or differently by 
different members? Regardless of direction, the culture 
exerts some level of pressure on its members. According to 
Kilmann et al., the strength can range from very weak to 
very strong. A culture has a positive impact on an 
organization when it moves behavior in the right direction 
in relation to the plan, when it is widely shared throughout 
the organization, and when it places a high level of 
pressure on its members to follow specified guidelines. A 
culture has a negative impact if it points in the wrong 
direction, when it is widely shared, and when it places a 
high pressure on members to conform. When the culture 
conflicts with the organizational mission, Kilmann et al.
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suggest it is better to have a weak culture than a strong 
counterculture.
Kilmann et al. defined culture as shared philosophies, 
ideologies, values, assumptions, beliefs, expectations, 
attitudes, and norms that knit a community together.
Culture manifests itself in behavioral norms, assumptions 
and human nature. Norms are readily measurable and 
observable; assumptions can only be determined by 
examination of decisions and decision processes; and human 
nature is the collection of needs, wants, motives, and 
desires that define the group. Organizations may have 
multiple cultures moving in multiple directions with 
multiple strengths. Kilmann et. al. concluded that managing 
culture is essential and possible, and that more research is 
needed to improve understanding and develop methods that 
increase control of corporate culture.
Echoing the theme that corporate culture can be 
controlled, Bettinger (1989) advocated a thorough assessment 
of the organizational culture by senior management. "Without 
a thorough understanding of the existing culture, the 
compatibility of strategy cannot be effectively evaluated by 
management" (p. 38). Bettinger identified certain key 
cultural components which can be assessed such as the 
general attitude toward change, the current focus, standards 
and values, the rituals supporting these values, reward 
systems, methods of conflict resolution, and levels of 
commitment to organizational goals.
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Most models of organizational culture seem to be the 
result of observations by consultants and what might be 
called clinical experience, and are not systematically 
supported by research. In light of the complexities of 
organizational behavior and the infancy of this area of 
conceptual thought, the dearth of research is
understandable. But one exception to this generalization is 
the research conducted by Hofstede (1980). Hofstede studied 
the values and beliefs of 116,000 IBM employees in 40 
different countries and, as a result, developed a model to 
order societies on four cultural dimensions: power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, 
and masculinity-femininity.
Power distance is the extent to which a culture 
encourages unequal distribution of power among its members. 
Cultures can be rated high or low on this continuum. In low 
power distance cultures, interaction among classes and 
socioeconomic levels is higher. In high power distance 
cultures, interaction is lower and tends to be autocratic. 
Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of the 
society feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and 
take steps to avoid uncertainty. In a low uncertainty 
avoidance culture one would find fewer written rules and 
procedures, less structure to activities, and higher risk 
taking. A society low on individualism-collectivism would 
tend to be loosely structured and self-sustaining 
(individualistic), while a society high on this variable
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would tend to be more cohesive and would place a high value 
on loyalty and dependance on others (collective). The 
masculinity-femininity dimension categorizes societies on 
the extent to which they value masculine traits such as 
assertiveness, competition, and acquisition of tangible 
things, or feminine traits such as passivity, cooperation, 
and emphasis on feelings. In masculine organizations, 
people believe that the job should offer challenge, 
opportunity for gain, and advancement. In feminine 
organizations, people feel that the job should offer good 
working conditions, security, and the opportunity for open 
expression and personal growth. Masculine organizations use 
rational or political methods to solve problems, while 
feminine organizations use intuitive methods.
Hofstede determined that certain countries tended to 
produce organizational members with similar cultural 
orientations that may be assumed to be the result of the 
nesting culture rather than the organizational culture. For 
example, IBM employees from France tended to express high 
power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, medium to high 
individualism, and medium masculinity, while IBM employees 
from Switzerland tended to express low power distance, 
medium to high uncertainty avoidance, medium individualism, 
and medium to high masculinity. Hofstede developed eight 
clusters into which most of the countries in the study fit. 
The only single country in a cluster was Japan, which was 
medium power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, medium
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individualism, and high masculinity. As a result of his 
research, Hofstede cautioned that an organizational culture 
can only be a subculture of the larger society, and should 
be examined in that context.
Using Hofstede*s paradigm, Jackofsky, Slocum, and 
McQuaid (1988) analyzed the relationships between cultural 
values and selected CEO roles in five different countries: 
Sweden, West Germany, Taiwan, France, and Japan. 
Characterizing their conclusions as tentative because of the 
difficulty of separating the behavior of the CEO from the 
behavior of the organization, Jackofsky et al. found that 
each culture embodies distinctive attributes and that these 
attributes are manifested in the CEO’s behavior. Intangible 
factors such as personality, presence, ability to 
communicate, and physical appearance all contribute to the 
difficulty of the analysis. The role of the CEO is critical 
to the interpretation of national and international values 
within the corporate culture, and the complexity of the 
CEO’s role only serves to discourage direct research.
The findings of Jackofsky et al. bring to the fore the 
question of the role of leadership as an element of 
organizational culture. Several authors (Bass, 1985;
Bennis, 1969; Bettinger, 1989; Dalton, 1979; Deal & Kennedy, 
1982; Enz, 1986; Graves, 1986; Hauserman, 1987; Linton,
1936; Opler, 1964; Schein, 1986; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984;
Wilkens & Bristow, 1987) have stressed the importance of 
heroism in culture. The cultural component of heroism, for
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Deal and Kennedy (1982), was a pivotal and necessary 
component of leadership. Heroes are central to any 
corporate culture because they are symbolic figures who 
demonstrate that ideal behavior and success are attainable. 
Heroes defy order in the pursuit of a vision. Although Deal 
and Kennedy felt that some heroes are "born" into the role, 
they suggested that organizations with strong cultures 
create their own situational heroes. Companies that promote 
people who embody fad management practices instead of those 
who embody key organizational values wind up with weak 
cultures. Strong cultures, according to Deal and Kennedy, 
create heroic positions and develop certain types of 
individuals for those heroic roles. Heroes make success a 
human possibility, provide inspiring role models, symbolize 
the values of the company to the outside world, preserve 
what makes the company special, set a standard of 
performance, and motivate employees. Bass (1985) proposed a 
similar idea: Transformational leaders are quality of life
managers in that they create and maintain the culture of the 
organization. If leaders are concerned with the quality of 
life, and if they plan and implement change, then the change 
must promote quality of life in terms of the organizational 
culture.
Most philosophies of administration are founded in 
rationalistic positivism and tend to avoid quality of life 
or value issues that are central to management functions 
(Hodgkinson, 1983). The very foundation of administration
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is decision making, and decision making is based on beliefs 
about good vs. bad, right vs. wrong, cost vs. benefit, and 
so on. Meanings that people create are inherent in their 
philosophy: "Philosophy involves a set of beliefs about how 
the world is structured, and administrators, knowingly or 
not, put those beliefs into practice" (Foster, 1986a, p.
19) .
Even though there seems to be a consensus of opinion on 
the importance of philosophy, values, and beliefs to an 
understanding of organizational culture, there is some 
disagreement on the definition of culture, and, as noted 
above, definitions that presume to provide practical 
guidance tend to be inadequate for research. Smircich 
(1983) has suggested that there are at least five different 
perspectives of organizational culture:
1. Classical management theory perceives culture as an 
instrument serving biological and psychological needs.
2. Contingency theory views culture as an adaptive, 
regulatory mechanism which unites individuals into social 
structures.
3. Cognitive organizational theory sees culture as a 
system of shared cognitions, a product of the mind which 
defines rules.
4. Symbolic organizational theory perceives culture as 
a system of shared symbols and meanings.
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5. Transformational organizational theory understands 
culture as a projection of the mind’s universal unconscious 
infrastructure (pp. 339-358).
Graves (1986) has pointed out that the various 
perspectives can be characterized as falling into two 
categories: (a) the anthropological approach which treats
culture as a phenomenon in itself, and (b) the psychosocial 
approach which treats culture as a variable which is capable 
of manipulation by managers to improve productivity and 
performance. The psychosocial approach is sometimes 
referred to as organizational climate.
Graves argued that the phenomenological culture changes 
slowly and unpredictably over time, while climate can 
reflect day to day changes. Graves also suggested that the 
culture of an organization can be used as a bench mark for 
organizational change. In fact, change is usually justified 
by an inappropriate culture. Organizational culture can be 
theoretically seen as a means of providing stable behavior 
through a system of causal relationships. These 
relationships apply an incentive for people to commit to the 
organizational goals, reduce anxiety, and act as an operant 
conditioner. Graves stated that although there is general 
agreement that the concept of organizational culture is 
meaningful, there are no clear definitions of culture or 
climate.
Tagiuri (1968) defined organizational climate as "a 
relatively enduring quality of the internal environment of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
an organization that (a) is experienced by its members, (b) 
influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms 
of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or 
attributes) of the organization" (p. 27). Payne and Pugh 
(1976) defined climate as "the characteristic behavioral 
process in a social system at one particular point in time" 
(p. 1,126). This behavioral process is the result of and is 
influenced by members’ attitudes, values, and beliefs, with 
the context and structure of the system being more stable 
than the people.
Graves and the other organizational climate theorists 
are interested in a definition of culture that is precisely 
definable and readily measurable. Graves (1986), for 
example, used the Ghiselli Self-Description Inventory to 
investigate the culture of four types of companies in 
England. The inventory was given to managers in training 
seminars because, Graves reasoned, the personality of the 
upper management set and manipulated the climate of the 
organization. But if the organization itself is nothing 
more than an "accounting practice" used to make meaning from 
socially constructed reality, as suggested by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), then a survey of the personality 
characteristics of senior managers is likely to fall 
drastically short of a meaningful representation of the 
culture. In addition, the distinction between culture and 
climate may be useful when considering the manifest
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functions of management, but does not make sense when 
considering the latent functions of management.
After conducting his survey, Graves (1986) concluded 
that organizational culture is something an that 
organization is as opposed to something that it has, that it 
is possible to distinguish managers in one company from 
those in another using character traits and needs, and that 
the notion of organizational culture is linked to the 
perceptions of managers and may not exist in any objective, 
measurable form. Changing an organizational culture can 
take place at three levels: behavior, attitudes, and values. 
Changing behavior can be accomplished through rearrangement 
of the physical environment, facilities, and meeting times. 
Changing attitudes can be accomplished by restructuring 
broad levels of management to adjust mental set and 
perceptions of employees. Changing values requires a change 
of senior managers, and can only be accomplished by new 
people at the top.
If culture can be considered a benchmark by which 
managers can assess change, then a concept of culture which 
provides a suitable framework for the entire organization is 
needed. Porter, Lawler, and Hackman (1975) defined culture 
as a set of customs and typical patterns of ways of doing 
things. "The force, pervasiveness, and nature of such modal 
beliefs and values vary considerably from organization to 
organization" (p. 489). Organizational cultural change
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attempts fail if the prevailing and dominant norms and 
values are not taken into account.
Enz (1986) suggested that research based on definitions 
of culture that stress symbols, stories, and rituals is too 
fixated on examining cultural artifacts and ignores common 
values. "Organizations do not operate under simple rules of 
reasonableness, but often operate as a function of the 
enduring values shared by organizational participants" (p. 
108). Foster (1986a) agreed: "The ability to label coffee 
breaks as rituals hardly results in a cultural analysis of 
the organization" (p. 136).
Foster (1986a) defined culture as "the lived and 
experienced collection of beliefs that are not really 
amenable to rationalistic intervention by managers" (p.
136). Leaders do not change culture through programs,
Foster argued, but through a personification of values and 
beliefs that facilitate development of the culture that they 
favor. The notion of manipulating the culture is overly 
simplified, and cultural understanding of the organization 
will never be adequate until it begins to include political 
and structural aspects of the organization and their 
relation to the larger society.
The operational definition of organizational culture 
which was used for this study is that offered by Schein
(1986), that culture is "a pattern of basic
assumptions— invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external
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adaptation and internal integration— that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught 
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to these problems" (p. 9). Schein agreed 
with Bass (1985) by stating that "the only thing of real 
importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture" 
(p. 2).
The creation and management of culture requires 
knowledge of the process of learning and unlearning complex 
beliefs and assumptions. Typical behavior patterns in an 
organization, according to Schein, could be as much a result 
of the environment as the culture, and should not be used as 
the primary basis for defining the culture. Instead, Schein 
recommended examining the culture on three different levels: 
(a) artifacts, the visible level of culture; (b) values, the 
sense of what ought to be as opposed to what is; and (c) 
basic assumptions, people’s relationship to their 
environment, and the nature of reality, time, space, human 
activity, and human relationships.
Clearly, the culture of the organization is the 
keystone to organizational planning and organizational 
change. An appropriate culture can facilitate successful 
planning and change while an inappropriate culture can deter 
both. The culture of the organization specifies how 
problems are perceived, how strategies are developed to cope 
with the problems, and how the organization itself responds 
to its own plans. Yet culture is difficult to define, and
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even more difficult to measure. The evaluation of the 
success of any strategic change must be conducted with 
respect to cultural context.
An organization’s culture is not a clearly defined 
entity because it is constantly influenced by the nesting 
social culture. Members of the organization are also 
members of the society within which the organization 
operates and, therefore, will reflect social values which 
may or may not be consistent with organizational values.
The relative merit of an employee’s behavior within the 
organization and his or her response to change must be 
understood not only by the standards of the organization, 
but within the broader context of social responsibility.
Social Responsibility of Organizations 
American society is becoming increasingly less tolerant 
of corporate crime (Cullen, Maakestad & Cavender, 1987).
The current trend in American organizations is to define and 
manage the normative systems that channel the behavior of 
organizational members (Weiss, 1986). The organizational 
culture is the entity that provides the guidelines for 
ethical behavior at work by standardizing general and 
pervasive characteristics of the organization which affect a 
broad range of decisions (Victor & Cullen, 1988).
Schein (1986) suggested that in order to understand 
behavior within an organization, the underlying assumptions 
that have developed within the organization must be
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considered. Schein also suggested that three levels of 
culture interact to produce behavior: (a) operational basic
assumptions including the nature of the organization’s 
relationship to the environment, (b) the organization’s 
perception of the nature of time and space, and (c) the 
organization’s perception of the nature of human activity 
and human relationships. These levels are generally 
invisible and taken for granted. But they lead to values 
that are tested in the physical environment and by social 
consensus at some level of awareness, and, in turn, produce 
the visible artifacts and creations such as technology, art, 
and the visible and audible behavior patterns of 
organizations.
Ethics
The study of ethics is concerned with two basic 
questions: What is the nature of life’s greatest good
(summum bonum), and what sort of right and good action is 
required to bring about the good life (Sahakian & Sahakian, 
1966)? One’s theory of summum bonum is said to be one’s 
ethical philosophy, and one’s application of behavior in 
practice of ethics is said to be one’s moral standard. The 
ethical theory of an individual or group is a fundamental 
basic assumption upon which all other operational 
assumptions are based. Normally when discussing 
organizational ethics, the actual focus is on the behavioral 
or moral standards. Writers in the field of organizational 
ethics rarely address the ethical theory behind the
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behavioral prescriptions they are discussing because their 
primary question concerns whose rules organizations should 
follow. The ethics or theory behind the prescribed 
behaviors should be examined in order to make sense of the 
prescriptions. Often the behavioral prescriptions create 
conflicts because there is more than one ethical theory 
involved.
For example, Elkins and Callaghan (1981) outlined a 
social responsibility doctrine within which business forms a 
social contract with society. Business functions by public 
consent, and its basic purpose is to serve the needs of 
society. If business fails in this contract, society is 
obligated to seek out some other institution to serve its 
needs. Business is responsible equally to shareholders 
(owners), customers, labor and employees, all levels of 
government, suppliers, financiers, special interest groups, 
and local communities.
The social responsibility model outlined by Elkins and 
Callaghan is in direct conflict with Friedman’s concept of 
the social responsibility of business. Friedman (1983) 
suggested that business serves society best by serving its 
owners and by making profits. Contributing to society may 
be in direct conflict with conducting business; only people 
can have responsibilities, an organization is an artificial 
person and can only have artificial responsibilities. The 
employee, as a person, has a responsibility to society. But 
as an employee, responsibility is owed to the owners of the
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organization to conduct business according to their wishes.
If the organization is owned by the public (i.e. nonprofit), 
then the responsibility is to society.
Elkins and Callaghan (1981) pointed out that neither 
the normative economic model nor the social responsibility 
model are adequate for use by a manager. The economic model 
is descriptive and prescriptive for structured conditions 
within markets and organizations that don’t exist. The 
social responsibility doctrine is too vague and presents 
some serious philosophical questions. In addition to the 
above criticisms, it should be pointed out that neither 
model examines or defines a consistent picture of summum 
bonum, or what the objective is for the organization and 
society in general. Friedman (1983) suggested that there 
are two different objectives for organizational behavior, 
and they conflict. If Friedman’s conclusion is valid, then 
organizations and the society that nests them are in heated 
conflict with no hope of resolution. Since the conflict has 
not resulted in the defeat of either side, there must be 
some rules involved that prevent this from happening.
Ladd (1983) insisted that there are rules involved.
Ladd stated that certain facets of the organization ideal 
are incompatible with the ordinary principles of morality 
and the resulting dilemma is one source of alienation. Ladd 
also noted similarities between the language-game of formal 
organizations and the language-game of other types of games, 
such as chess and baseball. Challenging the rules of these
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established games is inappropriate as is challenging the 
rules in the organization language-game.
Ladd also argued that decisions or actions of the 
organization are attributed to the organization and not to 
the individuals or even the collections of individuals that 
make up the organizations. The phenomenon of attribution 
allows people to have two sets of ethical principles: one
when they act in behalf of the organization, and one when 
they act as a member of society. An employee is acting in 
behalf of the organization when actions are consistent with 
organizational goals. Ladd gave the example of a naval 
officer: the officer is not personally responsible for
bombarding a village and killing all the people because that 
is what the navy does, but that same officer is held 
personally responsible if the ship runs aground. In other 
words, decisions that are consistent with organizational 
goals are attributed to the organization, and decisions that 
are inconsistent with organizational goals are attributed to 
the individual. Following this reasoning, if an 
organization’s behavior is unethical from society’s 
perspective, the behavior must necessarily be considered 
consistent with organizational goals if no responsibile 
individual has been identified as the wrongdoer.
What, then, happens to the individual who must 
assimilate and follow two sets of ethical principles? 
According to Ladd, the organization cannot assume a genuine 
moral posture because the organizational repertoire does not
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contain concepts like moral obligation, responsibility, and 
integrity. Rationality in an organization is determined by 
means and ends, not by ethical principle. An individual 
must go along with the organization because there is no 
evidence that individual action can change the system. One 
has the same feeling about changing organizational behavior 
as one would have about changing the nature of the army 
during a war.
Lachs (1978) suggested that psychological distance from 
deeds renders us ignorant of the conditions of our existence 
and the outcome of our actions. Lachs used the example of 
General Yamashita, Commander of Japanese forces in the 
Philippines during World War II. At the war crimes trial, 
General Yamashita claimed that he simply ordered his troops 
to do whatever was necessary to stop the guerrilla activity 
not realizing his orders would result in legal atrocities.
He was not in effective control; without knowing the mental 
condition of his troops, he could never understand how a 
professional and innocent order could have been interpreted 
as a license for murder and torture. Assuming that a person 
acts as an individual based on what he or she knows, and 
considering the expected organizational repertoire of 
soldiers during a war, Yamashita is blameless. After all, 
managers may not necessarily question the wisdom of 
organizational direction. Managers are only doing what they 
have to do because their responsibility is to the 
organization. If managers did not perform as expected, they
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would be removed from their jobs and replaced by someone who 
would.
The Relationship of Culture and Ethics
LaCroix (1978) listed three cultural myths, paradoxes 
really, in business that illustrate the cultural crossover 
and how it manifests itself in the organization’s sense of 
social responsibility: success, work, and self-interest.
Success means that the hero succeeds. Yet any consistent 
winner is detested by everyone else and must be humbled.
Even though everyone in an organization may be working 
toward the same ideal, achieving that ideal can result in 
ostracism by one’s peers. Work builds character and keeps 
people from mischief. Work is valuable in itself and a 
person’s time is best spent working to produce something of 
value. If work really is intrinsically valuable, LaCroix 
asked, then why do so many people complain about work and 
spend so much effort getting out of it? If producing is 
satisfying, then why do so many organizations have to 
implement programs to increase productivity? Self-interest 
and utility maximization express a person’s prime 
motivation. If utility maximization is so important for the 
individual, argued LaCroix, then why do we have 
organizations at all? Do organizations exist for the 
maximization of an individual’s objectives? If the answer 
is yes, then all individuals in the organization must have 
the same objectives. Otherwise, it would mean that some
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individuals are not working to maximize their own 
objectives, but rather the objectives of others.
The three cultural myths listed by LaCroix— success, 
work, and self-interest— are clearly carryovers from the 
culture that nests the organization. They illustrate how 
individuals in the organization attempt to explain their 
ethical posture when there is no organizational posture.
The problem of considering organizational culture and its 
relationship to the organization’s sense of social 
responsibility is confounded by three issues: (a) the
organization cannot be held accountable in the same way an 
individual can be held accountable, (b) the organization is 
made up of a collection of individuals with differing 
ethical philosophies, and (c) the organization will present 
any image necessary to the nesting society to maintain its 
existence.
To examine the relationship of culture and ethics, the 
culture must be adequately described to include a concept of 
underlying foundation, or basic assumptions, and the ethical 
philosophy of the organization must be determined. The 
ethical philosophy of an organization consists of the unique 
manifestation of the philosophies of the individuals that 
give the organization a behavioral direction regarding its 
treatment of the nesting society. In order to discuss 
organizational culture or social responsibility, the 
organization must be conceived of as an individual with all 
the accountability of the individual. The problem with this
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concept is that the organization may remain the same, but 
the individuals in the organization change. Incoming 
individuals, particularly at top management levels, bring in 
new ethical philosophies. Fortunately, there is some 
consistency within organizations after individuals have 
shifted because of the pervasive organizational culture.
The complexity of the problem is not limited to the 
description of the organization, but must also include the 
way in which the nesting society, which is also a collection 
of individuals, views the organization, and the relationship 
between the two. For example, business ethics conflicts 
listed by LaCroix (1978) illustrate the complex relationship 
between the individual as a member of the organization and 
the individual as a member of society:
1. Complying with superior’s requirements when they
conflict with one’s code of ethics,
2. Job demands infringing on home obligations,
3. Methods employed in competition for advancement,
4. Avoiding or hedging responsibility,
5. Maintaining integrity when it conflicts with being 
well-liked,
6. Impartial treatment of subordinates because of 
race, religion, or personal bias,
7. Moral concern that one’s job does not fully utilize 
one’s capacities;
8. Condoning poor quality,
9. Knowingly giving less than best performance, and
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10. Misrepresentation of the facts to protect 
organizational interests.
Each of these conflicts exemplifies the dissonance felt by 
the individual when weighing the moral standards of society 
and the moral standards of the organization. Understanding 
this conflict is the key to understanding the relationship 
of culture and ethics in an organization.
The ethical elements of organizational culture do not 
include methods of gathering information, conventions or 
rules that have arbitrary consequences, or organizational 
decision making that does not have a differential effect on 
others (Victor & Cullen, 1988). Victor and Cullen (1988) 
defined the ethical elements of organizational culture as 
the ethical climate based on the interaction of the type of 
ethical criterion with the locus of analysis. The ethical 
criterion could be based in principle, benevolence, or 
egoism. The locus of analysis could be the individual, the 
local community, or the cosmopolitan society. The ethical 
climate refers to how people in the organization decide, for 
example, whether it is right or wrong to pay kickbacks, but 
not to information gathering such as determining whether or 
not kickbacks are expected, or conventional decisions such 
as whether the kickbacks should be paid in cash or goods.
Victor and Cullen (1988) surveyed 872 employees in four 
different companies to determine whether or not ethical work 
climates have organizational bases separate from individual 
perspectives and evaluations. Victor and Cullen assumed
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that (a) organizations and subgroups within organizations 
develop different institutionalized normative systems, (b) 
these normative systems are well known to group members and 
are perceived as a type of work climate, and (c) perceptions 
of ethical work climate differ from effective evaluations of 
ethical work climate.
Victor and Cullen tested two hypotheses: First, the
variation in perceptions of ethical work climate between 
groups is greater than the variation for the individuals 
within groups. And second, perceptions that describe the 
ethical work climate are not correlated with attitudes that 
evaluate work climate. Victor and Cullen concluded that 
there are at least three distinct sources of ethical 
climate: sociocultural, bureaucratic or structural, and
organization specific sources. There are many types of 
ethical work climates, and the wide range of relationships 
between the climate types and evaluations of organizational 
ethics indicates that climate differs from affective 
responses to organizations. It is possible, argued Victor 
and Cullen, that ethical climates might affect 
organizational performance factors, and that ethical climate 
prescriptions may influence what ethical issues are 
considered at work and what criteria are used to resolve 
these issues. The ethical climates identify the decision 
processes which generate the systematic responses of 
organizations to ethical dilemmas.
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Ackerman (1973) concluded that there are two major 
deterrents which inhibit integration of social policy into 
corporate planning: the perception of daily business
activities as separate from and unaffected by the corporate 
social role, and the notion that socially responsible action 
goals are not cost effective, that is they provide no 
business return for the cost. Carroll and Hoy (1984) agreed 
with Ackerman that social policy must be integrated into 
strategic planning and operationalized into organizational 
practice.
Carroll and Hoy suggested that corporate social policy 
must be addressed at two levels in the organization: the
macroview and the microview. The macroview is characterized 
by organizational goals, high level decision making, concept 
formulation, high risk taking, and long range planning, and 
concerned with organizational goals, strategic goals, 
corporate decisions, and the business environment. The 
microview is characterized by functional goals, day-to-day 
decision making, operational implementation, lower risk 
taking, and short range planning, and concerned with 
functional operation, operating plans, and coordination. Of 
the four factors of strategic planning specified by Carroll 
and Hoy (corporate competencies and resources, market 
opportunities, the personal values and aspirations of the 
management group, and acknowledged social obligations) only 
the fourth element is concerned with what managers ought to 
do as opposed to what they want to do.
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Conflicts between social trends and corporate 
stakeholders are inevitable. Social responsibility, 
according to Carroll and Hoy, is generally treated as an 
environmental factor, and social policy is usually one of 
adaptation. The public good should be a factor in corporate 
strategy because corporate legitimacy depends on its 
responsiveness to social responsibility, the potential for 
government intervention is high in some cases, and 
developing a responsive policy is good business practice 
from the standpoint of business success and continued 
existence. As society changes, social forces influence 
marketplace decisions, self-protection decisions, and 
anticipatory decisions at the macrolevel.
Nielsen (1985) classified several types of strategic 
responses that can emerge when managers are faced with a 
conflict between personal morality and organizational 
strategic thrust. The first, and most common, type of 
response is to avoid thinking about the problem. But the 
avoidance response is rarely effective because it does 
nothing to make the problem go away. Other than avoidance, 
managers can either obey, leave the company, conscientiously 
object, secretly go outside the organization to the press or 
government, or negotiate and build a consensus for a change 
in strategic objectives. All the responses have their 
advantages and disadvantages, but the response with the 
greatest potential for success is negotiation and consensus 
building, which also is the most difficult to implement.
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Nielsen suggested that when negotiation and consensus 
building is implausible, many managers find the most 
expedient method of affecting change is to go to outside 
authorities, sometimes called whistleblowing. Hauserman
(1987) defended whistleblowing as an appropriate response to 
affect change because whistleblowers are asserting a basic 
individual value or sense of value that approaches ideals 
beyond the value structure of the corporate America. 
"Whistleblowers need to be protected against employer 
retaliation" (Hauserman, 1987, p. 75). If we wish the 
society of the future to be better off, we need to encourage 
those who would stand for these ideals.
Whistleblowing, according to Hauserman, reestablishes 
individual conscience and community standards. Community 
citizenship has been replaced by feelings of corporate 
citizenship. This change in allegiance fosters 
unwillingness in individuals to feel responsible for the 
victimizing or criminal actions of others. The failure to 
protect a person who does report misconduct is a sanctioning 
of moral turpitude. Allowing employees to be fired for 
reporting illegal actions of corporations supports the 
notion that loyalty to the corporation is more important 
than loyalty to society and personal moral values.
However, action taken by an individual does not 
necessarily promote a sense of community. Nielson (1989) 
speculated that the state of being as an individual can mean 
the necessity for intervention to end unethical practices by
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working against other individuals and groups. Neilson 
listed twelve different types of intervention strategies 
that an individual might take, such as whistleblowing, 
noting that all of them can be effective. However, 
intervention can have important limitations. According to 
Nielson, the individual intervening could be wrong about the 
organization’s actions, the individual could damage 
relationships within the organization to the extent that no 
action will correct the problem, the organization could be 
hurt unnecessarily, or the individual could be encouraged to 
exercise power inappropriately.
Magnet (1986) concluded from interviewing several high 
status individuals in the financial world that oral 
transactions can no longer be made because people do not
keep their word, that written contracts cannot be trusted
because no matter what language is used it is open to 
interpretation, and that one cannot simply refuse to deal 
with unethical individuals because one cannot see this 
element of character. Part of the problem uncovered by 
Magnet seems to be that employees hop consistently from one 
company to the next and begin to see themselves as free 
agents and their role as self-serving. Employees become
devoted to their own objectives instead of the company’s and
therefore feel no obligation to protect the company.
Magnet suggested that not only has loyalty between the 
employees and the company been weakened, but also between 
the company and its customers. Customers make no secret of
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the fact that they select vendors on an economic basis and 
not on the basis of long-term relationships. Misconduct on 
the part of a supplier no longer results in a permanent 
exclusion of the supplier from business if economic 
agreements can be reached. The ethic of the past, according 
to Magnet, was more of a class value belonging to a genteel 
oligarchy. But today’s managers belong to no class or time 
honored ethical code. The new ethic is based on the making 
of money. An individual is admired for the amount of money 
he or she has, and not how that money was obtained. There 
is no place for people to acquire mainstream values: The
schools strive to be inoffensively value-neutral, colleges 
teach that everything is relative, and television advocates 
instant gratification. People in our society have been 
taught that the cause of wrongdoing is the economic or 
psychological environment of the wrongdoer, and it is right 
to hire and promote people not because of merit but because 
of their membership in a group.
Magnet lamented that business ethic is currently a 
perversion of the free market economic theory: By pursuing
their own interest in their own way, people will augment the 
wealth of the nation and the well-being of society. The 
strong are presumed to prevail over the weak; the strong can 
do whatever they want and their success proves they were 
right in doing it. If one works long hours, one has the 
right to any amount of money because compensation can never 
be adequate for losses in terms of social and family life.
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This sense of entitlement weakens the conscience and serves 
to identify the sense of self as a function of possessions. 
The quest for increased profits and reduced budgets has the 
effect of lowering behavioral standards and increasing fear 
and resentment among corporate survivors, and shredding the 
corporate cultures in which these standards are embedded.
Even though business schools teach that managers must 
prevent the creation of corrupt cultures that encourage 
misreporting of revenues and expenses and cheating on 
contracts, the message ends with the tacit assumption that 
individual employees cannot be held responsible for their 
actions. The result is pious corporate ethics that do not 
require any person to be ethical.
Contradicting Magnet’s observations to some extent are 
the findings of Greenberg (1988) that managers are concerned 
with fairness to their employees. After conducting a survey 
of 815 managers across the United States, Greenberg 
concluded not only that looking fair at work was considered 
to be different than being fair at work, but that managers 
expressed a significantly greater concern about looking fair 
than about actually being fair. A followup survey indicated 
that looking fair did not necessarily mean that unfairness 
should be hidden. The followup sample identified four 
methods managers felt would promote the image of fairness:
(a) announcing all pay raises and promotions, (b) explaining 
how pay raises are determined, (c) allowing workers to 
participate in decisions, and (d) explaining why work
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assignments are made. These four methods would indicate 
that the managers sampled placed a high value on openness 
and honesty. Greenberg concluded that this tactic increased 
the managers’ power base and influence, and reinforced the 
managers’ identity and self-esteem. Decisions may tend to 
be designed to indicate fairness to oneself and others.
An appropriate conclusion to this section on social 
responsibility in business would be a summary of the 
observations former Defense Secretary David Packard, former 
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, and former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Robert Moot made during a roundtable 
discussion on ethics in the defense industry (Packard,
Laird, Moot, Bowsher & Conahan, 1988). Packard argued that 
ethical problems in the defense industry were caused in part 
by bad practices on the part of the government. Moot agreed 
with Packard adding that -the government changes the ground 
rules too often, defining formerly acceptable behavior as 
unacceptable. Packard also suggested that corporate 
executives frequently failed to give their lower level 
managers a clear understanding that integrity is more 
important than financial performance, and Laird agreed that 
performance incentives have a tendency to corrupt ethical 
standards.
Packard proposed that there are several possible 
solutions to the problem. One might be adoption of the 
Defense Industry Initiative, which identifies six critical 
elements for effective self-governance by industry: codes
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of conduct, employee training, reporting of violations by 
employees, procedures for voluntary disclosure by 
contractors, responsibility to the industry, and public 
accountability. Packard argued that senior managers must 
become committed to ethical principles not only by 
acceptance but through enforcement of the intent of the 
rules throughout the organization. Packard also advocated 
the encouragement of whistleblowers not only within the 
contractors, but within government as well.
Leadership and Organizational Change
Historically, interest in leadership has led 
philosophers and researchers to speculate on what sorts of 
personality traits distinguish great leaders from others 
(Stogdill, 1948). Stogdill (1948) considered this approach 
inadequate because it did not take other important variables 
into account like interpersonal relationships and 
environmental variables.
Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) were among the first 
to recognize that leadership could not be defined out of 
context. Lewin et al. concluded that leadership style 
created social climates of three different types: 
authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire. But the first 
significant departures from focus on leader traits were not 
made until almost ten years later. Hemphill (1949) studied 
leaders in different settings and concluded that leadership 
must be defined by group tasks and group structure, and that
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personality characteristics of the leader must be 
deemphasized.
In the early 1960s, interest in leadership tended to 
focus more on power and authority relationships as well as 
on other processes (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Janda, 1960; 
Raven, 1965). But in the latter 1960s, the focus on the 
interrelationships between leaders, followers, and 
situations led to a revisiting of the psychological aspects 
of leadership (Fiedler, 1967; Hollander, 1964; Steiner,
1964). Fiedler’s (1967) assertion that the Least Preferred 
Coworker (LPC) scale could identify the leader’s style again 
brought the focus of attention to the characteristics of the 
leader, this time in relation to the situation.
By the end of the decade, enthusiasm for Fiedler’s 
model began to wane. Hollander and Julian (1969) cited 
limitations of the trends in leadership research to this 
point. Earlier studies had failed to distinguish the 
process of leadership from the leader as a person. The 
relationship between leader and followers was thought by 
Hollander and Julian to be built over time and to involve 
exchanges or transactions in which both leaders and 
followers give things and get things. The personality 
characteristics of the leader are determined by followers’ 
expectations of the leader’s role as well their own levels 
of satisfaction. It is the perception of the followers, 
asserted Hollander and Julian, that determine the value of 
the leader’s traits, not the measurable personality
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characteristics of the leader. In addition, Hollander and 
Julian concluded that leadership traits do not generalize 
over situations and that leadership effectiveness must be 
evaluated in relation to the group’s achievement of desired 
outputs.
In the early 1970s, House (1971) attempted to 
incorporate situational variables, aspects of personality, 
and subordinate perception into a theory of leadership he 
called the path-goal theory. The path-goal theory states 
that effective leaders (a) recognize and/or arouse 
subordinates’ needs for outcomes over which the leader has 
some control, (b) increase personal payoffs to subordinates 
for work goal attainment, (c) make the path to these payoffs 
easier by directing the subordinates’ work, (d) help 
subordinates clarify expectations, (e) reduce barriers to 
subordinates’ goals, and (f) increase opportunities for 
personal satisfaction contingent on effective performance.
The path-goal theory was later revised to include 
environmental variables and individual difference variables 
(House & Dessler, 1974). House considered these six 
functions of a leader, which he referred to as strategic 
functions, to be complimentary to the subordinates. The six 
functions were supposed to increase subordinate motivation 
necessary for effective performance by providing coaching, 
guidance, support, and rewards not normally available in the 
environment. The original path-goal theory states that 
subordinate motivation is increased to the extent that the
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leader fulfills these strategic functions. The revised 
theory suggests that the required behavior of the leader is 
determined by the situation in which the leader operates, 
which is determined by environmental variables and 
personality characteristics of the subordinates.
Environmental variables, in context of the theory, are 
determined by the subordinates through attribution of 
control and level of value.
Although House and Dessler found support for the 
path-goal theory, other researchers indicated that the model 
did not account for all the relevant variables necessary for 
an adequate explanation of the leadership process (Barker, 
1976; Downey, Sheridan & Slocum, 1975; Sims & Szilagy, 1975; 
Stinson & Johnson, 1975). The primary criticisms were that 
the model focused on supervisory positions where leadership 
is defined as position power, and the model did not 
generalize to different types of supervisory positions.
The first major departure from the management trends in 
leadership studies was a lengthy musing on a general theory 
of political leadership by Burns (1978). Burns suggested 
there was a crisis of leadership: the mediocrity and
irresponsibility of those in power. Regardless of the 
research on leadership and the detailed investigations of 
the lives and personalities of political and business 
leaders, little if anything is known about leadership. The 
failure of leadership study, according to Burns, was the 
failure to combine leadership and followership roles
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conceptually. Processes of leadership are part of conflict 
and power dynamics. Leadership is nothing without 
collective purpose, and the effectiveness of leaders must be 
judged by actual social change measured by intent and by 
satisfaction of wants, needs, and expectations of followers. 
But the characteristic that set the Burnsian notion of 
leadership apart from the previous definitions was the 
emphasis on moral leadership: Leaders are different from
mere powerholders. Leadership elevates both leaders and 
followers to higher levels of morality by their taking 
responsibility for commitments.
Burns specified two different types of leadership: 
transactional leadership, and transformational leadership. 
Transactional leadership is the brokerage of power and 
resources. Transactional leadership differs from management 
in that the transactional leader "takes the initiative in 
making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of 
valued things" (p. 19). Burns’s concept of transactional 
leadership is akin to the path-goal theory of leadership 
where the leader is understood to arouse and satisfy 
followers’ needs for payoffs.
Transformational leadership is a concept inspired to 
some extent by the historic emphasis on charismatic traits 
of the leader, but differs from traditional notions of 
leadership in its involvement of the followers in the 
leadership process. Transforming leadership occurs "when 
one or more persons engage with others in such a way that
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leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of 
motivation and morality. Their purposes . . . become fused. 
Power bases are linked . . .  as mutual support for common 
purpose" (p. 20). Burns saw transformational leadership as 
collective, dissentual, causative, morally purposeful, and 
elevating. Transformational leadership is concerned with 
end values such as liberty, justice, and equality.
Leadership must be understood as based in ethics, otherwise 
it is "reduced to management" (p. 389).
The movement that Burns started took two basic 
directions. The first direction is essentially the same old 
direction with a new language. Management oriented 
leadership theorists borrowed Burns’s conceptual 
descriptions but retained the same old assumptions about 
leadership: (a) that leadership can be expressed as
criteria for effective management (Levinson, 1980); (b) that 
strategic change is wholly dependent on the CEO’s behavior 
(Hosmer, 1984; Levinson & Rosenthal, 1984; Paulson, 1984);
(c) that leaders are responsible for choosing the "right" 
kind of leadership and corporate lifestyle (Tichy & Ulrich, 
1984); (d) that the essence of leadership is the creation of 
incremental change in the organization (Nielson, 1989); and 
(e) that leadership is excellent management, the excellence 
of which is determined by outcome (Kanter, 1983b; Kotter, 
1988; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Tichy & Devanna, 1988). But 
the inadequacy of this direction is expressed even by some 
of its proponents (Bass, 1981; Bennis & Nanus, 1985).
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The second direction started by Burns is more 
philosophical and integral than the management performance 
approach. Certainly decision making is central to 
administration, but decisions are based on values: good and
bad, right and wrong, benefit and cost, efficiency and 
effectiveness (Hodgkinson, 1983). "Values do not exist in 
the world. They are utterly phenomenological, subjective, 
facts of inner and personal experience" (Hodgkinson, 1983, 
p. 31). Hodgkinson (1983) argued that since values act as 
determinants of behavior, and motivation is a key to 
organizational performance, leadership cannot be understood 
except as a function of value issues. And the rationalistic 
positivism that pervades traditional leadership studies is 
inadequate because it avoids value issues.
Foster (1986b) argued that the management approach to 
understanding leadership has failed to produce consistent 
evidence or minimal clarity of the concept. The current 
paradigm of leadership operates under several false 
assumptions listed by Foster: (a) that leaders and
followers operate within an uncontested and real social 
structure, (b) that a major function of hierarchical 
leadership is the improvement of productivity within that 
structure, (c) that continual refinement of instruments will 
facilitate more complete understanding of leadership, and
(d) that an empirically justified model of leadership can 
ultimately be developed. Foster suggested that "leadership 
is a construct which must be dismantled and rebuilt" (p. 3).
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"The theories of leadership which have dominated social 
science can be dismissed largely on the basis of their 
non-reflective quality and their inclination to be 
substitutes for theories of management" (Foster, 1986b, p.
10).
Rost (1988) agreed, suggesting that "traditional 
leadership scholars and the theories they have developed 
have been concerned with the peripheries of leadership: 
traits, personality characteristics, born or made issues, 
greatness, group facilitation, goal attainment, 
effectiveness, contingencies, situations, goodness, style, 
and above all the management of organizations— public and 
private" (p. 1). Rost continued, arguing that emphasizing 
the peripheral elements of leadership allows practitioners 
to grasp something tangible: Followers see leaders taking
charge and feel good about following, society experiences a 
collective sense of greatness and accomplishment, and 
civilization is given the means to perpetuate its cultural 
values. The pursuit of leadership within a logical 
positivist framework provides scholars with scientific 
comfort even if it provides nothing meaningful toward the 
understanding of leadership.
Rost contended that scholars have focused on the 
content of leadership: what leaders need to know about
leading. Leadership scholars should be addressing the 
process of leadership: the relationship between leaders and
followers. Rost criticized Burns for failing "to develop a
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consistent conceptual framework that clearly (1) 
distinguishes leadership from management, (2) develops a 
case for transactional leadership being leadership, and (3) 
defines the noncoercive nature of leadership" (p. 8).
What, then, are the implications of this second, 
radical movement in leadership study? Adams (1986) 
suggested that transforming leadership is a state of 
consciousness rather than a personality trait or set of 
skills. Foster (1986b) argued that leadership is a symbolic 
force; it identifies action which yields social change and 
improvement. Even though the psychological approach 
normally identifies leadership as a property of personality 
or position, Foster contended that leadership is a temporal 
property of the actor in the process of acting and resides 
neither in the personality nor the situation. Foster 
(1986b) argued that leadership is a transient phenomenon 
that may reside equally well in different players at 
different times, and later (Foster, 1989) added that 
leadership is a real phenomenon because it does make a 
difference and the world would be different without it.
After reviewing the leadership definitions of Bennis 
(1983), Burns (1978), Selznick (1957), and Tucker (1981), 
Foster (1986b) identified several commonalties: (1)
Leadership is an interactive process that is not possessed 
by the individual identified as the leader, (2) the 
leadership process is largely political in nature because it 
justifies the mores of a community and the allocation of its
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resources, (3) the political aspects of leadership include 
negotiations, conflict management, interest groups, and 
coalitions, (4) leaders and followers exist in political 
tension, (5) symbolism is important in leadership, and (6) 
leadership assesses and reforms social and organizational 
structures. Foster noted that even though these four 
theories are an advance over traditional functional 
approaches because they attempt to account for political and 
social action, their definitions of leadership are 
implicitly hierarchical and characterize leadership as a 
property possessed by some individual. Leadership is 
treated as a volunteeristic trait, where one can choose to 
exert leadership.
Foster (1989) characterized leadership as a process of 
tapping into mainstream consciousness and changing it 
through dialectic relationships, that is the exchanging of 
roles between leaders and followers; leadership is a 
communal relationship. Foster offered four criteria for 
distinguishing leadership: (1) Leaders must be critical in
the sense that they reflect critically on existing social 
structures and common understandings, (2) leaders must be 
transformative in the sense that they must be oriented 
toward social change without necessarily having to change 
the social structure, (3) leaders must be educative in the 
sense that they must have a vision of the intended 
alterations, and (4) leaders must be ethical in that they 
must be self-critical and self-clarifying. Rost (1988) also
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offered four criteria that he considered to be the essential 
elements of leadership: (1) Leadership is "a relationship
based on influence, (2) leaders and followers develop that 
relationship, (3) they intend real changes, and (4) they 
have mutual purposes" (p. 51).
Of interest to the present study is Rost’s discussion 
of the role of change as an essential element of leadership. 
Rost contended that actual change is not necessary for 
leadership to have occurred; the intention of change is 
sufficient. Once changes have been completed, there is no 
longer any leadership process. But the impact of change in 
the leadership process cannot be measured by outcomes. 
Successful outcomes do not mean that leadership has 
occurred, and unsuccessful outcomes do not mean that 
leadership has not occurred. Failed changes can be a part 
of the leadership process. The pursuit of goals and the 
attainment of objectives are management functions, not 
leadership. Leadership, according to Rost, is based on 
influencing relationships, intended changes, and mutual 
purposes.
Summary
Organizational planning and change is a complex 
process. Strategic planning objectives and the resulting 
implementations are directly related to the organization’s 
perception of its mission and its manifestation in 
organizational policy, strategy, and activities. Planning
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cannot be assumed to be a rational process despite all the 
rational tools used in the planning process. Rather, 
planning is an incremental and constantly readjusted process 
that includes technological, political, and social 
implications.
Organizations create strategies within the context of 
the environment, and then match the process to the content.
Of critical importance to the planning process is the human 
element, both in terms of organizational culture and human 
resources. The human element affects both the process of 
planning and the outcome. No plan will work if the human 
resources are unavailable or inappropriate. And once the 
humans who will carry out the plan are in place, the nature 
of their interaction will determine the nature and 
interpretation of the outcome.
Organizational culture is a key determinant of planning 
success and is rooted in the values and beliefs of top 
managers. The selection and placement of individuals within 
the organization, the tasks they are assigned, and the way 
in which activities are rewarded are all linked to the value 
system of those at the top. Culturally, planning relieves 
anxiety about the future and about control over the present, 
and the planning process provides a cultural framework for 
organizational learning and change.
Essentially, the present study is concerned with the 
process of change on two different levels. To evaluate the 
organization within its own context, the traditional linear
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
management theories must be used. Examining the 
effectiveness of the organization and the changes as they 
were planned and implemented in the board room makes no 
sense if it does not relate performance to rational 
organizational structures. However, understanding the 
change process is another matter. As suggested by Rost
(1988), the change does not have to be successful in the 
traditional linear sense to be meaningful within a 
leadership context. The management perspective of change 
must necessarily provide positive evidence of change toward 
goals and objectives; the leadership perspective of change 
is not concerned with outcomes.
Asking the question "has change occurred in the 
organization?" is superfluous in the literal sense. Of 
course change has occurred. If nothing else, there has been 
turnover in the organization. The question from a 
traditional perspective is concerned with the outcomes of 
the changes and whether or not they are consistent with the 
plan. The question from a leadership perspective is 
concerned with whether or not leadership was involved in the 
changes, regardless of outcome. In the present study, the 
question was addressed from both the traditional perspective 
and the leadership perspective.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to determine how persons 
in leading positions can realistically expect to plan and 
implement a significant, planned organizational change such 
as that envisioned by the Ethics Program of General 
Dynamics. The purpose was accomplished through an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Ethics Program as a 
case example of intended, significant organizational change.
Normal scientific methodology would require the 
researcher to isolate the Ethics Program for evaluation.
This positivistic approach would eliminate the most 
important contextual relationships that govern both the 
senior managers’ intentions and the employees’ expectations 
of the program. It would be a grave mistake, in this case, 
to separate the Ethics Program conceptually from other human 
resources elements of the strategic plan. Within the 
company, the Ethics Program had come to symbolize all human 
resources programs as the central vehicle for strategic 
human resources objectives.
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The evaluation included an examination of the planning 
process that resulted in the implementation of the Ethics 
Program as a vehicle for strategic change, an evaluation of 
the program itself, related programs, their successes and 
their failures, and an assessment of the impact of the 
program on the culture of the organization. Three different 
but related approaches were used to formulate conclusions in 
this study: (a) the case study approach, (b) the survey
approach, and (c) the program evaluation approach.
The Case Study Approach
Yin (1984) defined a case study as "an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple 
sources of evidences are used" (p. 23). Yin felt that, in 
general, case studies are preferred when "how" or "why" 
research questions are asked, when the researcher has little 
or no control over the situation or events, and when the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.
The current study can be characterized as a case study 
even though other approaches were incorporated into the 
methodology. The case example is the Electronics Division 
of General Dynamics Corporation and the case study is 
concerned with how the Ethics Program and related programs 
were implemented in the division and what the effects of the 
program were.
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The greatest value of a case study over an experimental 
design is its flexibility for evaluating possible 
alternative configurations of factors in prediction 
(Labovitz & Hagedorn, 1971; Leedy, 1980; Ronan & Prien,
1971; Tripodi, Fellin, & Epstein, 1978). Case studies 
generally use field research techniques, common in everyday 
life, which try to make sense out of an on-going process 
that cannot be predicted in advance (Babbie, 1979; Tripodi 
et al., 1978). Case studies are useful where it is 
difficult to specify objectives and programmatic means for 
selecting those objectives (Tripodi et al., 1978).
Information from a case study may also be used for 
evaluating programs with respect to the nature and quality 
of the actions of program agents, internal and external.
The present study required extensive use of field 
techniques to examine and interpret on-going processes. 
Because organizational processes are continuous, there is no 
clear definition of what constitutes a change, when that 
change can be said to have occurred, and what were the 
probable causes of the change.
Case studies fall into three categories and can be used 
in a variety of settings. The three categories are 
explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive case studies, and 
they can be used in policy and political science research, 
social science research, administrative planning research, 
or organizational and management research (Labovitz & 
Hagedorn, 1971; Yin, 1984). The present study was designed
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to describe the process of change and support speculation on 
probable causes and potential controls. The case study 
method was used to evaluate not merely static combinations, 
but dynamic processes involved in shifting structural 
configurations.
The purpose of a case study is to describe a unit of 
measure rather than to test a hypothesis (Labovitz &
Hagedorn, 1971). The case study method lies midway between 
the descriptive survey method and the experimental method 
(Leedy, 1980). The case study is low on control compared to 
the experimental method and low on representation compared 
to the survey method, but the advantage of using the case 
study method is the richness of its descriptive elements.
In the present case, the study was designed to explain a 
particular organizational phenomenon within its 
organizational context: how a specific organizational
change was planned and implemented at General Dynamics, 
Electronics Division.
Even though I have been a participant/observer in the 
case, I have had little control over the significant events. 
Still, an explanation of the process of planning and change 
at Electronics Division can provide a more holistic and 
meaningful theoretical proposition than a carefully 
controlled experiment that excludes many of the most 
important contextual relationships.
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The Survey Approach
There are three devices for direct questioning of 
respondents that are versatile and useful in almost any 
social topic, and which can be used to extract useful 
information in one session (Labovitz &. Hagedorn, 1971). The 
three devices are (a) questionnaires, (b) schedules, and (c) 
guided interviews.
Questionnaires can be used over large geographic areas 
and for large populations. The major disadvantages are (a) 
respondents must be able to read and write, (b) there is a 
high degree of self-selection, (c) questions must be 
restricted in length and scope, and (d) there is a lack of 
depth or ability to probe for meaning.
Both schedules and interview guides are comprised of a 
set of items or questions that are asked verbally. The 
disadvantage is that an interviewer must be present to give 
questions and receive responses. A schedule is a 
questionnaire that is read to the respondent. More meaning 
may be extracted from the interview, but the sample must be 
smaller.
An interview guide is a loosely structured schedule.
It lists topics to cover in the interview, but does not list 
specific questions. The interview guide provides maximum 
flexibility in extracting meaning, particularly in those 
areas where little is known.
These three techniques have six potential problems:
(a) sensitive subjects who respond differently because of
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the presence of the interviewer or simply because they are 
being questioned, which means that results cannot be 
inferred to a population, (b) faulty memory of subjects, (c) 
the response rate is always less than 100% leading to an 
overall biased response, (d) the tendency of the questions 
to tap opinions, attitudes, or perceived behavior and not 
the actual behavior in a situation, (e) some respondents are 
unqualified to provide certain data, and (f) invalid 
responses as a result of lying or misrepresentation. These 
problems can be overcome to some extent by using other types 
of observations and restricting the use of survey methods to 
appropriate techniques.
The survey method is applicable to many types of 
problems in many fields. Surveys depend on direct contact 
with people, but they are inexpensive and relatively easy to 
administer. The adequacy of a survey depends on the 
adequacy of the sample, and the geographic area and the 
population must be well defined. Gender, socioeconomic 
class, occupation, ethnic background, and common experience 
can be used to define the sample. Festinger and Katz (1953) 
specified the various types of data that may be extracted 
using the survey method: demographic, environmental,
behavioral, and data which show the level of information, 
attitudes, opinions, motives, and expectations of 
respondents. The forms of analysis for these data can 
include the comparison of different parts of the sample,
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linking behavior and attitude, analyzing motivational 
forces, and prediction.
The present study relied to a large extent on survey 
data. There was a comprehensive survey of employees 
conducted by the company in 1986 (hereafter referred to as 
the 1986 Survey of Employees). This survey was used as a 
baseline to compare with the results of smaller surveys 
conducted in 1983, 1988, and 1989 by the researcher.
Hendrick and Jones (1972) suggested there are a number 
of attitude factors that influence the outcome of a survey, 
some of which may be controlled and some of which may not.
For example, surveys are developed under the assumption that 
people do not work for years to become unhappy. Yet some 
behavioral patterns indicate that people do not make the 
choices that would logically lead to what they specify as 
happiness. Respondents answer items that attack their 
beliefs in different ways depending on the level of 
forewarning. For this reason, survey data were compared 
with other sorts of data in the present study.
Using data from the 1986 Survey of Employees in the 
study necessarily required a secondary analysis of the 
results. Babbie (1979) suggested there are advantages and 
disadvantages for secondary analysis of survey data 
collected by another individual. Secondary analysis 
primarily saves time and costs in data collection, but the 
disadvantages to secondary analysis have to do with 
validity. The researcher must determine the extent to which
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the purposes of the original survey meet his or her own 
needs. Original items may come close to asking what the 
researcher wants to know, but may not provide the 
appropriate scope or context to meet specified objectives. 
This situation usually leaves some question unanswered or 
with incomplete answers. Secondary analysis should be 
restricted to special purposes such as those used in 
connection with case studies. The present study, as much as 
possible, used followup surveys designed to be similar to 
the initial survey. The emphasis was more on the potential 
changes reflected by the surveys than on the specific 
information gathered, although the nature of the information 
was considered important.
Leedy (1980) distinguished between descriptive survey 
techniques and analytical survey techniques. Descriptive 
surveys are primarily qualitative and verbal and deal with a 
situation which demands that observations be the principle 
means of collecting data. Populations must be carefully 
defined, carefully chosen, and delimited. Data obtained by 
the descriptive methods are particularly susceptible to 
distortion through the introduction of bias into the design. 
Data collected by descriptive methods must be organized and 
presented systematically so that valid and accurate 
conclusions may be reached. Leedy suggested various methods 
for developing descriptive surveys and limiting design bias.
Analytical survey methods generate quantitative data 
that can be analyzed by the appropriate statistical tools.
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The purpose of using analytical surveys is to probe those 
data so that certain meanings may be inferred, and the 
presence of dynamic forces and potential forces may be 
discerned. These forces may provide clues for further 
investigation.
Surveys used in the present study were designed to 
generate qualitative observations of the company’s 
operations and employees’ attitudes toward those operations. 
The initial survey was used to pinpoint organizational 
problems that required intervention by management. The 
followup surveys were designed to compare similar sample 
responses with the initial survey data to determine if the 
interventions were effective.
Program Evaluation
Most evaluation research is conducted on social, 
political, and educational programs (Madaus, Scriven, &
Stufflebeam, 1983). Therefore some adjustments had to be 
made to the language and application frequently used in 
evaluation research models to accommodate a study of a 
program for organizational change. However, these 
adjustments should not have changed the basic conceptual 
framework of the models under consideration.
Rossi and Freeman (1985) defined evaluation research as 
"the systematic application of social research procedures in 
assessing the conceptualization and design, implementation, 
and utility of social intervention programs" (p. 19). The 
present study is concerned with the evaluation of a program
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designed to change the attitudes, behaviors, and values of 
the employees of General Dynamics. In a sense, the Ethics 
Program was attempting to change the culture of the 
organization and, therefore, could be considered very much 
akin to a social intervention program.
The naturalistic inquiry model of evaluation (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1985) focuses on the issues and concerns inherent 
in any social context. Guba and Lincoln (1985) defined a 
concern as a matter of interest to one or more parties in 
the society. Concerns are rarely defined and specified 
although they contribute significantly to actions taken by 
those who hold the concerns. An issue, on the other hand, 
is a statement that provides a basis for the presentation of 
different points of view, or a proposition about which 
reasonable people might disagree. Issues and concerns are 
the basic organizers of the evaluation because they provide 
a pluralistic context for considering merit and worth.
Guba and Lincoln considered evaluation as a process for 
describing an evaluand and judging its merit and worth. The 
merit of an evaluand can be considered against a stable and 
relatively unaffected standard, while worth is determined by 
comparison of a snapshot of the evaluand with a variable 
standard. In a pluralistic society, merit is a relatively 
stable notion of value that is widely understood and 
accepted even in situations of conflict. Worth is a 
fluctuating value associated primarily with economic 
parameters. The importance of merit and worth in evaluation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
is fundamentally linked with the communication of 
information to the audience of interested stakeholders: 
those who share interests and concerns that are related to 
the evaluand. Merit and worth are pluralistic phenomena 
that provide the context for the process of evaluation.
The present case presented a perplexing evaluation 
problem. Normally, the worth of a company’s business plans 
can be judged by comparing the plan outcomes with the 
economic standards established by the company’s objectives 
and by the environment. The Ethics Program was an element 
of the business plan at General Dynamics, but it was more 
appropriately judged on its merit to society.
Guba and Lincoln suggested there are four steps to a 
case study: (a) to chronicle, or to develop a register of
facts and events; (b) to render, or to depict and 
characterize; (c) to teach, or to provide with knowledge; 
and (d) to test, or to prove. The fourth step is, according 
to Guba and Lincoln, an evaluation and is an integral part 
of an evaluative case study. In contrast with the other 
three steps, the final and ultimate product of an evaluation 
is a judgement. The judgement is based on examination, 
clarification, and synthesis of the facts, and leads to a 
naturalistic generalization in contrast with the scientific 
generalization of the experimental method. To make the 
judgement effective, the evaluator must constantly interact 
with the stakeholders in a process of negotiation. It is
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this process that provides the proper checks and balances 
for the evaluation.
Guba and Lincoln specified that the rigor of an 
evaluation can be demonstrated through credibility, 
applicability and external validity, and consistency and 
internal validity. Credibility can be enhanced by 
collecting data on short notice, addressing experimenter and 
subject biases, and describing the data gathering 
techniques. Applicability and external validity can be 
enhanced by checking facts with sources, exploring 
self-interest conflicts, and investigating institutional 
myths. Consistency and internal validity can be enhanced by 
clarifying information, documenting audit trails, 
triangulation, and following up on divergent leads.
Research Design
The research questions were answered using corporate 
documents and surveys, participant observations, surveys 
conducted by the researcher, media observations, and 
corroborative observation and analysis by selected members 
of the organization as triangulated sources of information.
A comparative analysis of these data was conducted to 
develop and support answers to the research questions. The 
corporate documentation equaled three years worth of data 
collected from the Ethics Program. These data represented 
the nature of the complaints registered with the Ethics 
Program directors within the corporation, and actions taken
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as a result of those complaints. An analysis of these data, 
combined with corroborative analysis, provided sufficient 
basis for an evaluative judgement of the effect of the 
program.
In addition to the data gathered by instrumentation, 
the experiential perspective and the intimate familiarity 
with the organization that I have as a result of my tenure 
there have proved to be significant factors in the 
formulation, analysis, and interpretation of the results.
My continuous participation in the organization and its 
processes has given me the capability of understanding and 
interpreting motives and values behind statements made by 
interviewees that may have been missed or interpreted 
differently by a researcher unfamiliar with the 
organizational culture and history.
There were some opportunities to compare the 
implementation of the Ethics Program at Electronics Division 
with that of other divisions. But the case example had to 
be limited to Electronics Division because of time and 
logistic limitations, and because initial examination 
revealed that the differences between divisions were great 
enough to potentially confound the results.
Methodology
The study was conducted in three basic phases: (a) the
planning process used to develop the Ethics Program was 
researched and defined, (b) the effects of the program were
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examined using surveys and interviews, and (c) a judgement 
of the effectiveness of the program in achieving its goals 
was developed. The development of these three phases 
required examination of the antecedents to the program, 
program goals, implementation activities, manifest or 
intended outcomes, actual outcomes, and latent actual 
outcomes.
The primary unit of analysis was the Electronics 
Division of General Dynamics. The corporation as a whole 
could not be examined because it was too large and complex 
to be represented in one study.
The analysis was carried out in four steps: (a) the
planning process and the nature of the intended change were 
defined, (b) the nature of the program and its objectives 
were defined, (c) the organizational culture and its changes 
over the past two years were examined, and (d) the success 
of the plan and the program was evaluated. The plan was 
defined by gathering data about the environmental and 
political pressures affecting the organization and how these 
pressures resulted in a new management philosophy and 
revised strategic position. These data came from 
unclassified company documents, media sources, and 
interviews. The nature of the ethics program, its 
implementation, its objectives, its broader goals, and 
subsequent programs was defined using company documents and 
interviews. The organizational culture was examined using 
guidelines and recommendations suggested by Schein (1986)
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for the three levels of understanding. Plan and program 
success was assessed using data gathered in the previous 
three steps.
Participant and Site Selection
Participants were located in the four sites of General 
Dynamics, Electronics Division located in the San Diego 
area. Electronics Division employs an average of about 
3,500 people during the time of the study. This accounts 
for approximately three percent of the company’s employees. 
Participants included myself, the investigator, who has 
worked for the company for more than ten years, key 
individuals within the division who had direct knowledge of 
the planning process and its effects at top levels of the 
division and in the corporation, and division employees at 
various levels of the organization.
I was involved in the implementation of the Ethics 
Program and I conducted training classes for other employees 
to introduce them to the program and its requirements. For 
the previous eight years, I had been involved in developing 
and implementing business plans for production and material 
control, and I have had access to the key procedural 
mechanisms that produce action from policy. At the time of 
the study, I occupied a policy making position for 
developing and implementing procedures and systems to 
control United States Government owned property located at 
the division. I was a member of the Vice President of 
Material’s staff.
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Five key individuals, three males and two females, were 
interviewed to determine the specifics of the planning 
process and implementation. This group of key individuals 
will hereafter be referred to as the planning group. By
agreement with them, I cannot reveal their names or
positions because of possible repercussions. These five 
individuals, whose longevity with the company ranged from 8 
to 3 7 years, were selected because they were known to the 
researcher to be cooperative, insightful, straightforward, 
and they were involved as a result of their positions in the 
major administrative processes of the division. None of the 
key participants were aware of the identity of the others.
The impact of the implementation and potential cultural 
changes was examined by interviewing ten professional 
employees, five females and five males, and five hourly 
employees, two females and three males, each with more than
three years of service (range = 3-14 years). This group of
15 employees will hereafter be referred to as the cultural 
group. By agreement with them, I cannot reveal their names 
or any other information that might result in their possible 
identification. With the exception of two individuals, the 
subjects did not know the identity of the other participants 
(two subjects were interviewed together). The subjects were 
selected because they were known to me to be insightful, 
credible, and straightforward. Because an element of risk 
was involved as a result of their participation, 
trust— particularly their trust in me— was an essential
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criterion of selection. The subjects represented 
Engineering, Material, Operations, Quality, Finance, Human 
Resources, and Information Resources departments.
Participation in the 1986 Survey of Employees was 
voluntary and on-site participants were determined through 
stratified random sampling localized in each division. All 
employees not selected to fill out the survey during working 
hours were mailed a copy to be completed and returned. All 
General Dynamics employees were given the opportunity to 
participate. About 70% (61,974) of all General Dynamics 
employees completed and returned the survey and were 
included in the analysis. About 70% (1,273) of all 
Electronics Division employees participated: 952 completed
the survey on site, and 321 completed the survey at home and 
mailed it to the consulting firm. A categorical breakdown 
of corporate and division respondents is represented in 
Table 1.
The corporatewide survey was wholly developed, 
conducted, and analyzed by Sirota and Alpert Associates,
Inc., a consulting firm hired by the company specifically 
for that task (Sirota, 1986). To protect anonymity, no 
General Dynamics employees were allowed to see the completed 
questionnaires.
The researcher conducted three surveys that provided 
comparison data. The first survey was conducted in April, 
1983 (hereafter referred to as the April 1983 Survey) within 
the Manufacturing and Material Control Department of
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Table 1










Electronics Division. All department employees were given 
the opportunity to respond anonymously and 60% (253) did 
respond. The second survey was conducted in March, 1988 
(hereafter referred to as the March 1988 Survey) within the 
Material Department of Electronic Division. All department 
employees were given the opportunity to respond anonymously 
and 16% (50) did respond. The third survey was conducted in 
June, 1989 (hereafter referred to as the June 1989 Survey) 
within the Material Department of Electronics Division. All 
department employees were given the opportunity to respond 
anonymously and 76% (205) did respond.
A fourth survey used for comparison was conducted in 
the Engineering Department by Engineering personnel in 
February, 1989 (hereafter referred to as the February 1989
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Engineering Survey). All department personnel were given 
the opportunity to respond anonymously and 8% of the 
approximately 900 Engineering employees responded. The 
exact number of respondents is unknown.
Instrumentation
The 1986 Survey of Employees was designed by the 
consulting firm of Sirota and Alper Associates hired by the 
company for that purpose (Sirota, 1986). The consulting 
firm began by conducting interviews with small groups of 
employees selected at random in the different divisions 
about specific employee concerns. Fifty interview sessions 
were held with a total of 500 employees. The consulting 
firm also interviewed various union leaders, customers, and 
other outside consultants. The final survey included 125 
basic questions asked of all General Dynamics employees, and 
40-50 additional questions designed to address issues 
specifically related to the employee’s division. The 
Electronics Division version of the survey contained an 
additional 36 items for a total of 161 items (Appendix A).
All questions were multiple choice design with most items 
containing a space for write-in responses. The purpose of 
the survey was to gather information about employee issues 
and concerns so that management and supervisory personnel 
could take structured action to resolve problems (Sirota, 
1989). There was no validity or reliability information 
reported.
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The April 1983 Survey was designed by the researcher 
for purposes of exploring the issues and concerns regarding 
the existence and function of the Program Control Department 
of the Manufacturing and Material Control Department of 
Electronics Division. The survey was commissioned by the 
Director of Manufacturing and Material Control to determine 
the possible need for reorganization. The survey consisted 
of nine open-ended items (Appendix B) addressing topics that 
were suggested by the Director. Reliability and validity 
data were not determined.
The March 1988 Survey was designed by the researcher to 
determine the issues and concerns employees had about the 
Material Department of Electronics Division. The survey 
contained one open-ended item: "What are the top ten 
problems in GDE in general and in the Material Department 
specifically?" Reliability and validity data were not 
determined. Because the March 1988 Survey contained only 
one item, it does not appear in the Appendices.
The June 1989 Survey was designed by the researcher to 
compare responses within the Material Department to 
identical items in the 1986 corporate wide survey. The 
survey consisted of 14 items, thirteen of which were 
identical to the original survey (Appendix C). Item number 
two was a modified version of item number one and did not 
appear on the original survey. The items to be addressed 
were selected by collective agreement of the Vice President 
of Material and his staff because they had indicated
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employee concerns on the original survey and were singled 
out for corrective action. Reliability and validity data 
were not determined.
The February 1989 Engineering Survey was designed by 
Engineering Administration personnel to address an action 
item selected by department management to address concerns 
identified by the 1989 Survey of Employees. The purpose of 
the February 1989 Engineering Survey was to examine changes 
in communication patterns within the Research and 
Engineering Department of the Electronics Division that may 
have occurred between 1986 and February, 1989. The survey 
consisted of 11 multiple choice items (Appendix D). No 
reliability or validity data were available.
All interviews were conducted from interview guides 
prepared by the researcher. Two types of interviews were 
conducted: (a) interviews designed to extract information
about specific programs and program results conducted with 
the key individuals (Appendix E), and (b) general interviews 
of employees designed to uncover values, beliefs, and basic 
assumptions under the guidelines recommended by Schein 
(1986) for assessing organizational cultures (Appendix F). 
Data Collection And Analysis
Some existing data were reanalyzed for this study.
These data included the results of the corporatewide 1986 
Survey of Employees, the results of surveys conducted by the 
researcher (the April 1983 Survey and the March 1988 
Survey), the results of the survey conducted by the
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Engineering Department (the February 1989 Engineering 
Survey), the actions planned and reported upon as a result 
of the 1986 Survey of Employees, the tabulation of 
complaints received by the Ethics Program directors, and 
changes to existing standard practices and departmental 
procedures.
Original data were gathered from the June 1989 Survey, 
from interviews with a sample of employees regarding their 
perceptions of changes in the company and other observations 
related to the organization’s culture, and from interviews 
with key individuals regarding their analysis of the 
planning process and the effects of the Ethics Program and 
its success in achieving its specific objectives and its 
broader goals.
Interview participants were asked to agree to be 
interviewed multiple times, depending upon their position in 
the company and their relative contribution to study 
objectives. Second interviews were conducted with all 
respondents regarding cultural assessments but not with any 
of the key individuals. The second interview explored the 
validity of summaries, observations, and speculations 
derived from the first interview and interviews with other 
respondents.
The specific data gathering steps were as follows:
Phase I - Defined the planning process.
Step 1 - Reviewed corporate documentation.
Step 2 - Structured program interview guides.
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Step 3 - Conducted interviews with key personnel.
Phase II - Examined program effects.
Step 1 - Reviewed initial survey data.
Step 2 - Conducted resurvey.
Step 3 - Structured cultural interview guides.
Step 4 - Conducted interviews with selected employees.
Step 5 - Analyzed data.
Step 6 - Reinterviewed.
Phase III - Judged program effectiveness.
Step 1 - Organized and analyzed all data.
Step 2 - Interpreted data.
The nature of the data required comparative and 
descriptive analysis. Inferential techniques were not 
necessary, and would not have contributed to any meaningful 
interpretation of the data.
Human Subjects - Ethical Considerations 
Employees were subjected to two types of observation: 
paper and pencil survey, and interview. Some subjects 
participated in both types. All surveys were anonymously 
distributed and received. Interviews revealed two types of 
information: program information and cultural information.
All subjects signed an agreement (Appendix G) which stated 
the purpose of the research and informed them that their 
identity would not be revealed. Therefore, the identity of 
subjects interviewed will be known only to the researcher, 
and their responses will be grouped to eliminate the
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possibility of identification. Subjects at no time were 
placed in a potentially harmful situation by the process of 
research.
Conclusion
The design allowed for the accumulation of a large 
volume of data, and also provided the flexibility for latent 
insights to emerge. The rigor in the design was supported 
by the triangulation of a variety of sources of information. 
The methodology did not impose rigid controls on gathering, 
analyzing, and, ultimately, interpreting the data. However, 
my obvious biases, which would ordinarily result from 
prolonged immersion in the organization’s culture, were 
offset by my ability to comprehend and sort out the 
understatements, overstatements, parochial attitudes, and 
symbolic language that may have passed unnoticed by an 
outsider. Whatever was lost in terms of control was 
replaced by cultural insight and conceptual flexibility. 
Insight and flexibility are essential when attempting to 
extract meaning from complex social processes.
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RESULTS
The Planning Process at General Dynamics 
The official division policies for developing and 
reporting division strategic and operating plans are 
specified in Division Standard Policy SP.07.05.01. This 
policy states that the Division Planning Department of the 
Marketing Department is responsible for developing the plans 
with the assistance of the General Manager’s staff and 
submitting them to corporate headquarters, and that division 
plans must be reviewed and approved by the General Manager. 
The plan’s contents are considered company private 
information and are to be handled using standard security 
procedures. The policy also states that the division 
strategic plan, which contains the division’s long-term 
objectives, associated risks, and their impact on the 
division, and the division operating plan, which contains 
the division’s commitment to a level of performance and 
performance forecast, both should be prepared annually. 
Division strategic plans and operating plans should be 
prepared in accordance with Corporate Policies 4-103 and
151
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4-104 respectively which give specific details for 
preparing and submitting the plans.
Division business plans are distinguished from 
strategic and operating plans in SP.07.10.07. Business 
plans are developed for new business opportunities as the 
need arises. Business plans contain detailed analyses of 
the new opportunities and are used in the decision-making 
process. SP.07.10.07 specifies the required sections and 
suggested subsection topics for the business plan outline.
The required sections are a program or product line 
overview, an assessment of the customer, an assessment of 
the competition, an assessment of the market, a recommended 
strategy, a proposed support organization and schedule, 
investment requirements, technology requirements, key 
issues, and a plan of action.
According to an internal corporate memo from Herb 
Rogers, President of General Dynamics, to all division 
general managers and key corporate and division planning 
personnel dated 20 March 1989, corporate executives 
considered the strategic planning process to be an 
opportunity to identify strategic objectives, to develop 
long-term alternative actions, and to articulate appropriate 
strategic responses to the business environment. The memo 
also stated that the strategic plan consists of a mission 
statement, a strategic approach, five strategic goals, and 
operating guidance. In addition, the memo firmly 
communicated the suggestion to disseminate the corporate
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strategic guidance throughout the management structure so 
that everyone can understand their roles in implementing the 
intended business direction.
The above mentioned memo was the cover memo for the 
corporate strategic plan. The memo specified that the 
purpose of the plan was to initiate discussions and 
negotiations between division and corporate executives that 
would culminate in the development of division-specific 
strategic objectives, and that these objectives would be 
achievable only when actions were defined and completed.
The plan itself is a company private document and 
cannot be quoted directly. However, the corporate mission 
statement as it appeared in the strategic plan was quoted in 
the division newspaper (Riccitelli, 1989a). The following 
mission statement was attributed to company president, Herb 
Rogers in the article:
General Dynamics is dedicated to achieving and 
maintaining the highest integrity of our products, our 
people, and our corporation. The foundation of General 
Dynamics’ business will be based on developing and 
delivering superior world-class, high-technology 
systems. We will give priority and focus to continuous 
improvements in the quality of every aspect of 
operation correspondent to reductions in cost. Our end 
objective is two fold: first, to meet the needs of our
customers; second, to ensure that all our actions are 
in the best interests of our shareholders, (p. 1)
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Another version of the corporate mission statement is 
available in both editions of the unclassified handbook 
General Dynamics Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct 
(Appendix H), the pamphlet used to communicate the specifics 
of the company’s Ethics Program to all employees. The 
mission statements are identical in both editions, but where 
the statement appeared on the back cover of the first 
edition, it was moved to page four of the second edition 
following the table of contents and the message from the 
Chairman. The change in position of the mission statement 
in the second edition appears to reflect the corporate 
executives’ desire to communicate the corporate mission to 
all employees.
Following the mission statement in the second edition 
of the ethics handbook (Appendix H) is a statement of key 
commitments, values, and responsibilities. The five key 
commitments are to the customers of General Dynamics to 
bring them the highest quality products for the lowest cost, 
to the suppliers to be a good customer, to each other as 
employees to treat one another fairly and with dignity and 
respect, to shareholders to pursue growth and earnings 
objectives while keeping ethical standards in mind, and to 
the communities in which the company operates to act as 
responsible and responsive corporate citizens. The key 
values specified in the handbook urge employees to be 
dedicated and loyal to company and country, law-abiding, 
honest and trustworthy, responsible and reliable, truthful
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and accurate, fair and cooperative, and economical in using 
company and customer resources. These key commitments and 
key values communicated the intentions of the corporate 
executives to utilize the Ethics Program as a central 
element of strategic human resources planning. By providing 
this conceptual framework as an introduction to the 
standards, executives appeared to have intended to 
communicate to employees that ethical behavior begins with 
treating each other with dignity and respect. Thus, 
employees rightly expected the Ethics Program to alter 
unfair treatment by supervisors and peers, and to be the 
foundations of good business practices.
Having specified the key commitments and key values, 
the pamphlet stipulates the responsibilities of the company, 
supervisors, and individual employees. The company’s 
responsibilities focus on creating and maintaining the 
Ethics Program, communicating the ethical standards, 
enforcing those standards, and ensuring that working 
conditions at all locations are supportive of those 
standards. Supervisors are responsible for assuring that 
all new employees are properly trained in the meaning and 
application of the standards, demonstrating their own 
commitment to the standards by exemplary behavior, and 
maintaining an environment that encourages frank and open 
communication and concern for the standards of conduct. All 
employees regardless of rank or station are responsible for 
knowing and understanding the standards of conduct,
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upholding associated policies and procedures, seeking help 
when necessary, being sensitive to potentially unethical or 
illegal situations, counseling fellow employees, and 
reporting violations of the standards. Following the 
definitions of responsibilities, the handbook defines the 
standards.
The 1989 strategic plan predicted trends in shifting 
demographics of the workforce, increased involvement of 
employees in improving productivity, increasing quality and 
reducing cost, and increased social responsibility of 
industry. Based on predicted trends, the assessment of the 
environmental conditions concluded that new approaches to 
human resources management and work force training were 
needed. In a section entitled "Operating Guidance," 
suggestions were made for managers to involve employees and 
their ideas for improvements, to be sensitive and responsive 
to the diverse needs of the workforce, to plan and implement 
flexible human resource programs emphasizing training, to 
plan good corporate citizenship and conduct business to the 
highest ethical standards, to maintain a work environment 
that respects the rights and dignity of employees, to accept 
the increasing social responsibility expected of 
corporations operating in communities, and to communicate 
with employees, shareholders, citizens, and political 
leaders. Combining these elements into a single section 
indicated that all of them were aimed at the same general 
goal. Business practices at General Dynamics have been
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characterized as dependent upon a work environment that 
maintains the basic moral treatment of human beings as 
members of the community so that they might actively 
participate in the business process.
The basic elements of the strategic plan had been 
communicated to employees through company newspapers. An 
article on corporate level strategic plans (Riccitelli, 
1989a), in addition to stating the organization’s mission, 
outlined the major points of the business charter, the 
company’s assessment of the business and market environment, 
and the company’s strategic goals. This article focused on 
corporate business plans for economic growth, technological 
growth, and increased productivity but did not cover any of 
the elements regarding corporate responsibilities, 
communication, or ethical standards.
Division level strategic objectives were covered in a 
different article (Riccitelli, 1989b) which also stressed 
specific economic, sales, technological development, 
quality, and productivity goals. However, this article 
devoted one section, entitled "Provide a Fulfilling 
Workplace for Electronics Division Employees," to a specific 
division goal to provide resources and training and 
development opportunities to employees to increase their 
productivity. Communication of senior executives’ desires 
to increase human resources awareness seemed to be 
intertwined with their desires to increase ethical 
awareness.
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A similar article (Riccitelli, 1988) outlined the 
process of developing operating plans and specified the 
division’s approach to implementing certain economic, sales, 
and performance goals. Performance to goals has been 
consistently reported in the division newspaper as a summary 
of the General Manager’s annual State-of-the-Division 
address to the management club in January, and in occasional 
articles covering quarterly performance. The Ethics Program 
has been subjected to the same type of management controls 
as other human resources programs. For example, performance 
to Ethics Program goals was outlined in an article (Andrews, 
1988) and in a specific report (General Dynamics, 1988).
Other strategic plans were communicated to employees.
An explanation of a strategic organizational restructuring 
in the division (to focused business units) was offered in 
an article by Dong (1989). This particular planned 
organizational change was cited as a source of concern by 11 
of the 15 employees interviewed by the researcher.
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics was created in 
June, 1985 by Stanley Pace, then Vice Chairman of the Board, 
as one of five elements in the corporation’s Zero Defect 
Administration Program. The specific objective of the 
Ethics Program was to "put the Standards of Business Ethics 
and Conduct into practice" (General Dynamics Corporation, 
1988, p. 6). A broader goal was implied by Kent
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Druyvesteyn, Staff Vice President-Ethics Program: "The 
purpose of the General Dynamics Ethics Program is to help 
employees in their everyday business activity, not to catch 
them in wrongdoing" (Andrews, 1988, p. 3).
Pace developed a four phase plan to increase employee 
awareness of the rules, to increase commitment to standards 
of behavior, and to increase knowledge regarding the 
resolution of ethical dilemmas in the workplace ("Ethics 
Training," 1986).
Phase one of the plan was to have the division general 
managers meet in early 1986 at corporate headquarters to 
discuss the strategies for developing and implementing the 
program. When the general managers had been briefed, 
one-day awareness workshops were conducted for the general 
managers’ staff members.
Phase two involved hiring or appointing division ethics 
directors and setting up lines of communication for 
employees to use when seeking advice or reporting 
wrongdoing. A program director was hired at the corporate 
office, Ethics Program Directors were appointed at each 
division, and an advisory group was convened at corporate 
headquarters in August, 1986 to review the proposed 
standards and to create long-term plans for implementing and 
maintaining the Ethics Program ("Five Ethics," 1986). There 
were a total of 34 ethics directors, nine of whom were 
devoted to the task full time in the nine major divisions 
(General Dynamics Corporation, 1988). Primary modes of
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communication were telephone calls and personal visits. A 
toll free "hotline" was established for the entire 
corporation to use, and each division set up a special local 
number that was answered directly by the Division Ethics 
Director or was answered by a recording device if the 
director were unavailable. The Division Ethics Directors 
maintained an open-door policy so that they would devote 
immediate and confidential attention to anyone who visited 
their private offices.
Phase three required each division staff to select an 
adequate number of internal trainers for the division based 
on division population (there were 17 trainers in 
Electronics Division). The division trainers attended a 
two-day offsite session to prepare themselves to train all 
other division employees.
In phase four, all other employees in the corporation 
(approximately 103,000) participated in a training course in 
which they were introduced to the Standards of Business 
Ethics and Conduct (hereafter referred to as Standards).
The training sessions were four hours long for salaried, 
professional employees, and two hours long for all other 
employees. In addition to covering the rules, the training 
session was designed to heighten employees’ awareness of 
common ethical dilemmas and how to deal with them. The 
training sessions were discussion type seminars which were 
facilitated by the in house trainers. All new employees
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receive a review of the Standards as a part of their 
orientation.
The first edition of the Standards was published and 
distributed in August 1985 (General Dynamics Corporation, 
1988). In that same year, the Board of Directors 
established the Committee on Corporate Responsibility to 
review the effectiveness of the Ethics Program and to 
receive reports on its progress. In addition to the 
Committee, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer created 
the Corporate Ethics Steering Group to provide advice on the 
implementation of the program. The Steering Group reviewed 
policies, procedures, and practices and made recommendations 
for improvements. The Steering Group was composed of 
corporate functional heads including Legal, Human Resources, 
Internal Audit, Contracts and Pricing, International Offset, 
and Controller.
The Standards were revised and redistributed in October 
1987 (General Dynamics Corporation, 1988). All corporation 
employees received a one hour training session at that time 
conducted by a new set of in house trainers to familiarize 
them with the changes in the second edition of the 
Standards. At both the initial training session in 1986 and 
the update session in 1987, employees were required to sign 
a card stating that they had received and read a copy of the 
Standards and understood that the Standards represent the 
policies of General Dynamics Corporation. The second 
edition of the Standards included two new standards: one on
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safety, and one on the proper use of the Ethics Program. In 
addition to changing the Standards to strengthen and clarify 
the meaning of the rules, the second edition of the 
Standards was published to emphasize the importance of the 
program (General Dynamics Corporation, 1988). The process 
of distribution was designed to increase awareness of the 
Standards and to stimulate commitment to the program.
On April 30, 1986, the Chairman, Stanley Pace, signed 
Corporate Policy and Procedure (CPP) 23-103, "Investigations 
and Sanctions - Business Ethics and Conduct," that specified 
the policy and procedures for investigating alleged 
violations of the Standards and the appropriate sanctions to 
be applied to violators. Electronics Division created two 
Standard Policies to further clarify CPP 23-103. The first, 
SP.02.04.01, "Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct," was 
authorized on July 14, 1986 by the Division General Manager 
to establish division policies on business ethics and 
conduct. This policy specified who had what 
responsibilities to investigate and resolve ethical issues, 
and that the identity of whistleblowers will be protected.
The second, SP.02.04.02, "Conflicts of Interest - Giving and 
Receiving Items of Value," established division policy 
regarding the exchanges of items of value between employees 
and current or potential customers and suppliers. This 
policy covered giving and accepting items of value including 
meals, entertainment, and promotional gifts, misrepresenting
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the value of items on official documents, and special cases 
or exceptions.
In addition to the training, the scope and gravity of 
the Ethics Program was communicated to employees in various 
articles in company newspapers. The first of these were 
announcements in division newsletters about the initial 
Corporate Ethics Awareness Training Program ("Ethics 
Training," 1986), and reminders about the local channels for 
communication (Reynante, 1988). The corporate monthly 
newspaper featured articles announcing the development of 
the Ethics Program ("Five Ethics," 1986), on the 
disciplinary measures taken (Andrews, 1988), on lines of 
communication ("Ethics Program," 1989), and on how to use 
the lines of communication ("Tips Given," 1989). The latter 
article indicated that there was some confusion among 
employees as to the purpose of the Ethics Program. This 
article specified that the ethics hotline should be used for 
questions and concerns regarding the standards, and the 
ombudsman hotline should be used for questions and concerns 
regarding compensation, discrimination, discipline, 
harassment, and so forth.
In 1986, various Ethics Program representatives 
throughout the corporation received a total of 3,646 
communications. In 1987, the total number of communications 
rose to 5,482. However, in 1988 the total number of 
communications fell slightly to 5,379. Table 2 illustrates 
a breakdown of contacts by the specific categories specified
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
Table 2




Gifts, Gratuities, & Entertainment 677 450 392
Inside Information 15 14 19
Outside Interests 128 145 156
Former Government Employees 43 52 66
Selling/Marketing 20 26 16
Antitrust 1 0 0
Pricing, Billing, & Contracting 59 71 38
Time Card Reporting 533 668 610
Suppliers & Consultants 257 416 540
Quality & Testing 96 133 145
Expense Reports 128 144 107
Company & Customer Resources 202 508 784
Security 0 70 87
Political Contributions 0 12 10
Environmental Actions 0 30 37
Safety & Health - 5 113
International Business 0 10 12
Proper Use of the Ethics Pgm. - 3 58
Employee Relationships & Other 1,487 2,725 2,189
Total 3,646 5,428 5,379
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in the Standards. It is interesting to note that nearly 
half the contacts were related to human resources issues, 
labeled as "employee relationships and other."
The data in Table 2 represent first time contacts for 
each case. Followup contacts in any particular case were 
not counted. Demographic data and other identifying 
information was not compiled (General Dynamics Corporation, 
1988). Approximately half of the communications were 
received on hotlines. Approximately one third of the 
contacts raised concerns or allegations; the remaining two 
thirds were inquiries.
Investigations of allegations were specified by CPP 
23-103 and followed three phases: (1) initial screening,
(2) preliminary review, and (3) formal investigation. 
Allegations received through the Ethics Program in 1987 
resulted in an imposition of 205 sanctions, including 29 
suspensions and 27 discharges.
After two years of experience with the Ethics Program, 
General Dynamics Corporation (1988) specified the following 
"lessons learned:"
1. The average person has a strong personal sense of 
integrity and guards his or her reputation jealously. This 
sense is the strength of an ethics program.
2. People often respond emotionally to the word 
"ethics." Reactions are often negative, defensive, or 
cynical. The word must be used carefully in building an 
ethics program.
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3. The commitment of all persons in positions of 
leadership is an absolute condition for establishing an 
ethics program. But the commitment of all employees at all 
levels is absolutely necessary to fully implement and 
maintain the program.
4. An ethics program is best integrated into the 
existing structure of the organization. It should not stand 
alone or exist as a mere appendage. A large independent 
staff and budget are unnecessary and undesirable.
5. The aim of the program must be positive. The 
program must give help. Its primary purpose is to teach and 
guide— not catch and judge.
6. The program should focus on questions of right and 
wrong but not ignore appearances of right and wrong. 
Appearance may be as damaging to the reputation of the 
company as fact.
7. Issues that may involve possible questions of 
ethics arise unexpectedly and often unpredictably. Because 
there is sometimes little time to decide, a means or method 
of obtaining emergency assistance is necessary.
8. Most issues of an ethical nature are practical 
matters of fact. When the relevant facts are gathered, the 
question is answered and the concern is resolved. Few of 
the issues faced by employees are real moral dilemmas 
although they appear to be very perplexing at the moment. 
Employees do not need to be moral philosophers to solve most 
ethics-related questions they may face.
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9. Many questions of an ethical nature would never 
arise if communications were stronger in the basic 
relationships between employer and employee, employee and 
customer, employee and supplier, employee and shareholder, 
and employee and community. Likewise, many questions that 
escalate into issues of ethics would arise less often if 
common civil virtues like trustworthiness, loyalty, 
helpfulness, friendliness, courtesy, kindness, cheerfulness, 
and respect were practiced regularly.
10. An ethics program has certain inherent limitations 
based on the fact that it depends on people for 
implementation. There can be written standards and 
carefully defined policies, but the program can do little to 
change individuals who intentionally engage in misconduct, 
(pp. 23-24)
Item nine of the lessons learned specifically addresses 
the need for stronger humanistic values as a key element of 
the Ethics Program. It is clear that most communications 
about and impressions of the Ethics Program’s objectives 
included a conceptualization of the relationship between 
ethics and other human resources issues such as 
communication, civility, kindness, trustworthiness, and 
respect.
General Dynamics Corporation also noted that some 
negative reactions to the Ethics Program still persisted two 
years after its implementation. Some employees felt that 
ethics is a personal matter and the program is an affront to
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their personal sense of integrity by implying that something 
is wrong with their ethics. Others thought that the program 
was a good idea, but it really did not apply to them 
personally because they do not make important decisions.
Some employees felt that the program was a means to "snitch" 
on other employees, while some feel that reporting offenses 
is reprehensible no matter what the circumstance.
Ethics Program Planning Evaluation
There were two interview groups that provided personal 
assessments and observations on the Ethics Program. The 
first group, which I labeled the planning group (five 
individuals), was asked questions about the planning process 
that resulted in the Ethics Program. The second group, 
which I labeled the cultural group (fifteen individuals), 
was asked questions of a general nature about the Ethics 
Program and its effect on the organization. Following is a 
summary of the planning group respondents’ assessments of 
the planning process.
The unanimous opinion of the planning group was that 
the Ethics Program of General Dynamics was created and 
implemented because of economic pressures from the 
environment, specifically an agreement with the Navy to 
implement the program or lose business. The program was 
specifically designed to avoid losing legitimacy. This 
notion was supported by media sources (Larsen, 1987;
Packard, Laird, Moot, Bowsher, & Conahan, 1988).
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Two of the five respondents in the planning group 
specifically stated that the decision to implement the 
Ethics Program was not the result of a sense of moral 
obligation, but rather it was a decision based on business 
needs. One respondent added that if the end results were 
moral it would not be because moral ends were intended, but 
because they just happened.
The official objectives of the Ethics Program were to 
support individual employees in their daily business 
conduct, to enhance the administrative performance of the 
company in basic business relationships, and to help build 
trust between the company and its customers, suppliers, 
employees, shareholders, and the communities in which the 
company functions (General Dynamics Corporation, 1988). The 
planning group unanimously suggested that one program 
objective was to provide a mechanism for employees to voice 
complaints and receive guidance on questionable behavior. 
Other objectives cited by the planning group were that the 
program was designed to make sure that employees understood 
the rules of the game regarding proper personal and business 
conduct, to promote a professional image of the company, to 
gain public trust, and to keep lines of communication open.
The planning group unanimously agreed that the Ethics 
Program can be considered effective and successful. As 
evidence, the respondents cited high usage of the various 
channels for complaints and inquiries, high levels of 
employee trust in the program, fair and timely
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investigations and appropriate corrective actions, and new 
employee attitudes toward customer and public relations.
Three respondents pointed out that the company had not been 
involved in the latest sweeping scandals involving 
government contractors. Government officials tend to 
support the claim that the Ethics Program at General 
Dynamics was successful ("General Dynamics," 1989; Packard, 
et al., 1988) .
The planning group unanimously stated that the Ethics 
Program had become permanent and could not be discarded 
without serious repercussions. Two respondents remarked 
that it was institutionalized, but one respondent stated 
that he felt it had not yet become institutionalized because 
there was still some resistance to the program. All five 
respondents felt that the program was properly planned, that 
commitment from top managers was strong, that the 
organization for administration of the program was 
appropriate, and that communication of the program 
objectives was adequate. One respondent felt that 
implementation could be considered ineffective because 
supervisors had been allowed to retaliate against employees 
who were known to have used the hotline. Blatant 
retaliation had been controlled effectively, but there were 
no controls on the subtle forms of retaliation that can make 
a subordinate’s life miserable. Other suggestions for 
improvement from the planning group included (a) providing a 
mechanism for interdivision and corporatewide referrals, (b)
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making the issues more visible (they are currently 
considered company private information), (c) publicizing the 
disciplinary actions by category, (d) investigating what 
possible issues are not raised and why, (e) structuring the 
investigation process so that it is less intimidating, and 
(f) providing more program representatives for outlying 
facilities.
All respondents in the planning group felt that 
potential resistance to the program by employees was 
properly planned for and counteracted by building trust 
through education, communication, and individual counseling. 
The planning group perceived that union officials, 
suspicious employees, chronic complainers, lov* performers, 
and some supervisors were sources of the resistance. They 
perceived the primary source of resistance to be union 
officials and strong union supporters because the Ethics 
Program somewhat undermined their grievance procedure.
All respondents felt the company had been successful in 
maintaining the changes intended by the Ethics Program. 
Changes had been both beneficial and consistent. Examples 
of actualized intended changes cited were (a) widespread 
consideration of the spirit of the rules as well as the 
language, (b) detection and resolution of issues while they 
were still small and relatively harmless, (c) disclosures to 
customers were becoming commonplace, (d) complaints were 
receiving immediate attention, and (e) general changes in 
employee attitudes and conduct concerning record keeping and
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record accuracy, particularly those related to financial 
issues, expense reporting, and time cards.
Surveys and Interviews 
The 1986 Survey of Employees
The comprehensive survey conducted by General Dynamics 
Corporation in 1986 was intended to "provide an ongoing 
assessment of employee attitudes toward company policies and 
procedures, management practices, and job satisfaction" 
(General Dynamics Corporation, 1986, p. 1-4). The results 
of the survey were intended to be used to "respond to 
employee needs, customer expectations, and the changing 
business environment" (p. 1-4). The objectives of the 
survey were listed as the following:
1. Assess employees’ perceptions of present and new 
company policies and procedures.
2. Provide employees the opportunity to contribute 
directly to the changing environment of our company.
3. Establish an ongoing action process aimed at 
improving the company’s organizational effectiveness.
4. Determine the current level of employees’ job 
satisfaction.
5. Enhance two-way communications between employees 
and management.
6. Demonstrate concern for employees through 
communication and collaboration.
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7. Define key strengths and key opportunities to 
improve the company.
8. Ensure the results are not used to the disadvantage 
of unions.
9. Accurately report results, both favorable and 
unfavorable.
10. Develop managerial skills in communication, group 
feedback, and collaborative action planning.
11. Maintain confidentiality of individuals, (p. 1-4)
The first five objectives were called initial
objectives and the last six objectives were called feedback 
objectives.
The relationship between the survey and the Ethics 
Program is specified in objectives one and two. The new 
policies and procedures referenced in those objectives are 
specifically those implemented for the Ethics Program.
Survey items 27-30, 78-93, and 114-122 were specifically 
designed to explore the effectiveness of the Ethics Program 
to that point in the process (Appendix A). Table 3 
indicates total corporate and Electronics Division responses 
to items 27-30.
Item 78 asked respondents to evaluate the need for 
change before the Ethics Program was implemented.
Fifty-nine percent of the total corporation respondents felt 
change was needed, and 11% felt none was needed. Of the 
Electronics Division Employees, 53% felt change was needed 
and 12% felt none was needed. Item 79 requested that
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respondents evaluate the amount of change that was 
instituted by the Ethics Program. Of the total corporation
Table 3




27. Welfare of community GD 57% 11%
ED 47% 13%
28. Welfare of employees GD 38% 26%
ED 34% 28%
29. Customer relations GD 62% 9%
ED 64% 6%
30. Public relations GD 38% 26%
ED 35% 28%
* medium and no opinion ratings were omitted 
respondents, 42% felt that more change was needed, and 11% 
felt that there was too much change. In Electronics 
Division, 43% felt there could be more, and 23% felt there 
was too much. Item 80 asked if respondents agreed that the 
right kinds of changes were implemented. Total corporate 
response to item 80 was not reported, but 36% of Electronics 
Division respondents agreed and 41% disagreed.
Items 81-89 asked respondents to evaluate the impact 
that the changes would have in various areas. Table 4
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illustrates the responses to items 81-89 for both the total 
corporation and for Electronics Division.
Table 4




81. Accurate expense reporting GD 68% 4%
ED 72% 5%
82. Accurate time card reporting GD 68% 7%
ED 73% 8%
83. Fair competition GD not reported
ED 42% 8%
84. Cooperation with customer GD not reported
ED 43% 7%
85. Efficiency of division GD 31% 27%
ED 26% 32%
86. Division ethical behavior GD not reported
ED 57% 5%
87. Trust of public GD 57% 6%
ED 57% 4%
88. Trust of customers GD 63% 4%
ED 66% 3%
89. Ability to compete GD not reported
ED 47% 12%
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Items 90-93 asked respondents to assess their own level 
of involvement in the Ethics Program. Responses to items 
90-93 are represented for the total corporation and for 
Electronics Division in Table 5.
Table 5
Personal Involvement In The Ethics Program
Rating
Item Sample Agree Disagree
90. I understand reasons GD 71% 8%
ED 80% 7%
91. Clear about my responsibility GD 83% 5%
ED 88% 5%
92. Change well implemented GD not reported
ED 65% 10%
93. Division mgmt. committed GD not reported
ED 61% 14%
Items 114-118 asked respondents to assess the extent to 
which the company is ethical and perceived as ethical. 
Responses to items 114-118 are represented for both the 
total corporation and for Electronics Division in Table 6.
Items 119-122 asked respondents to rate the 
effectiveness of the ethics hotlines and workshops, and 
responses for both total corporate and Electronics Division 
samples are represented in Table 7.
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Table 6
Ratings of the Business Ethics of General Dynamics
Rating
Item Sample Good Poor
114. General Dynamics’ ethics now GD 56% 12%
ED 65% 7%
115. Own division’s ethics now GD 63% 11%
ED 67% 7%
116. GD’s ethics one year ago GD 25% 43%
ED 36% 30%
117. Div.’s ethics one year ago GD not reported
ED 49% 18%
118. Customer’s rating of division GD not reported
ED 43% 24%
In addition to exploring the effects of the Ethics 
Program, the survey was intended to provide managers with 
information about employee attitudes and with a tool that 
could be used to correct any problems (General Dynamics 
Corporation, 1986). Fifty-seven percent of the total 
corporate sample and 55% of the Electronics Division sample 
reported that they were satisfied with the company (Item 
123), and 62% and 65% respectively reported that they were 
proud to work for General Dynamics (Item 75). Seventy-two 
percent of the Electronics Division sample were satisfied 
with their jobs (Item 2).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
178
Table 7
Ratings of Ethics Hotlines and Workshops
Rating
Item Sample Agree Disagree
119. Hotline is a good idea GD 71% 7%
ED 74% 6%
120. Hotline gets action GD not reported
ED 46% 12%
121. I’ll be hurt if I use it GD 32% 26%
ED 31% 28%
122. EP workshops are effective GD 46% 20%
ED 52% 17%
For the Electronics Division, 45% rated the division 
performance good (Item 141), but 70% rated the division high 
on technological development (Item 12), and 74% rated the 
division high on product quality (Item 13). Only 20% felt 
the division was efficient (Item 17), and only 22% felt the 
division was effectively managed (Item 72). In addition, 
only 33% felt the division was innovative (Item 16), and 
only 28% felt Electronics Division had a clear sense of 
direction (Item 18). A lower percentage, 24%, felt the 
division planned effectively.
In the Electronics Division sample, there was a clear 
critique of top division managers. Sixty-four percent rated 
their supervisor as good (Item 153) and 59% rated top
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corporate management as good (Item 155), while only 26% 
rated division top management as good (Item 154). A good 
deal of this criticism can be accounted for by considering 
interdepartment cooperation and decision making. Only 26% 
of the sample felt the division had a cooperative atmosphere 
(Item 20), and only 20% agreed that decisions were made 
without undue delay (Item 61) even though 52% agreed that 
the lines of authority were clear (Item 47). Sixty-four 
percent felt the level of cooperation within their own 
department was good (Item 144), but only 41% rated 
cooperation with other departments as good (Item 145). Only 
27% of the sample felt the division was interested in the 
welfare of its employees (Item 21), while 54% felt they were 
treated with respect and dignity (Item 7).
Following the development and administration of the 
survey, managers were supposed to analyze the results for 
their own departments, meet with employees and discuss 
problem areas, and develop and implement action plans to 
resolve the problems identified. Instructions for 
developing the action plans and specially designed 
worksheets were distributed to all upper level and middle 
level managers. All supervisors had access to the 
instructions as well.
Electronics Division created an action plan with the 
following three requirements for all supervisors and 
managers: (1) all levels must conduct periodic staff
meetings, (2) all levels must be committed to an open door
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policy, and (3) all levels must provide employees with more 
frequent feedback on expectations, recognition, and 
corrective actions for poor performance. Action plans were 
supposed to be incorporated into departmental objectives, 
then into division objectives, and finally into corporate 
objectives for an integrated corporate plan (General 
Dynamics Corporation, 1986). Progress on the implementation 
of the plans was reported at monthly business reviews. In 
addition, the monthly corporate newspaper, General Dynamics 
World. carried articles in nearly every edition about 
progress on the various action plans. The entire issue of 
the July, 1987 General Dynamics World was devoted to the 
corporate action plan as veil as the general division action 
plans for each division. Nearly every issue of the 
Electronics Division newspaper, The Current. from early 
1987 to 1989, featured the action plan and progress in 
implementing the plan of one of the major departments. I 
wrote the article featuring the implementation of the 
Material Department action plan in The Current ("Employee 
Survey," 1989).
Internal Surveys
The Division Vice President of Material met with his 
staff in late 1987 to formulate an action plan for the 
Material Department. After reviewing the results of the 
survey items for the department, 12 items were selected as 
indicating problem areas. Criteria for selection included a 
high percentage of unfavorable responses by Material
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employees responding to the survey, a critical area of 
employee relations, and a reasonably workable problem within 
the control of the Vice President and his staff. An 
unfavorable response was a combination of disagree and 
strongly disagree, poor and very poor responses, or an 
agreement with a negative statement depending on the nature 
of the item. The degree of criticality and workability was 
judged by a consensus of the staff members. The items 
selected and the percentage of unfavorable responses are 
given in Table 8.
Table 8
Items Selected For Action By The Material Staff
Item No. Issue % Unfavorable
154 Performance of top management 46%
72 Division effectively managed 52%
61 Delays in decision making 54%
62 Frequent changes in decisions 50%
18 Clear sense of direction 57%
106 Organization well suited to work 48%
59 Understanding promotion policies 64%
53 Feedback from supervisor 54%
107 Improved working conditions 64%
33 Equitable distribution of work load 48%
20 Cooperative working atmosphere 79%
39 Correcting poor performance 69%
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Along with the three elements of the division action 
plan, the Material staff adopted the following corrective 
actions: to define and communicate the goals and reasoning
for decisions, to improve communication on objectives, 
performance, and business directions, to reorganize to 
integrate elements of MRP II and to increase cooperation, to 
train supervisors in interpersonal relations and basic 
communications skills and in disciplinary action, to 
investigate options for improving facilities, to communicate 
promotion and advancement policies, and to be more sensitive 
to an equitable distribution of work loads.
In March, 1988, I conducted a brief survey at the 
request of the Vice President of Material to assess progress 
on the action plans. The survey asked respondents to list 
the top ten problems in the Material Department. A total of 
50 surveys were returned out of 314 employees (16%). The 
low rate of return suggests that the results should be 
considered biased.
Of the respondents to the March 1988 Survey, 36% 
indicated there was not enough communication about division 
activities; 24% felt their supervisor was incompetent; 10% 
complained of sexism; 16% complained of disrespectful 
treatment from their supervisor; 34% indicated that 
operations were inefficient or wasteful; 32% felt procedures 
were not followed adequately; 24% felt there was inadequate 
planning; 34% felt their managers were inconsistent; 34%
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were concerned about future business; 24% were concerned 
about their career mobility; 40% indicated a communication 
problem between supervisors and subordinates; 54% mentioned 
at least one problem with facilities; 42% indicated 
communication problems with other departments; 22% felt low 
morale was a problem; 28% felt unprofessionalism was a 
problem; and 28% felt training opportunities were inadequate 
for employees.
In June, 1989, I conducted another internal survey of 
the Material Department. This survey used the exact wording 
of the original 12 items of the 1986 Survey of Employees 
selected by the Material Staff (Table 8) and two more were 
added which specifically asked for evaluations of the 
performance of the Division General Manager and the Vice 
President of Material (Appendix C). This time the sample 
was 205 out of a population of 269 employees. Table 9 
represents a comparison of responses to the June 1989 Survey 
with those corresponding items of the 1986 Survey of 
Employees.
There was surprisingly little difference between the 
results of the two surveys. The only issue where there was 
any apparent gain was in a clear sense of direction (Item 
18). There was almost an equivalent loss in the area of 
managers changing their minds (Item 62). There were no 
significant differences between the two samples. It was 
clear that employees rated the management performance of the 
Vice President much higher than those of the General
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Table 9
Comparison of Unfavorable Responses of the Two Surveys
Survey
Item No. Issue 1986 1989
154 Performance of the General Manager 38% 32%
N/A Performance of the Vice President — 12%
72 Division effectively managed 52% 52%
61 Delays in decision making 54% 57%
62 Frequent changes in decisions 50% 59%
18 Clear sense of direction 42% 31%
106 Organization well suited to work 37% 44%
5S Understanding promotion policies 57% 54%
53 Feedback from supervisor 37% 39%
107 Improved working conditions 64% 71%
33 Equitable distribution of work load 52% 48%
20 Cooperative working atmosphere 44% 46%
39 Correcting poor performance 74% 72%
Manager. There was also some improvement in organizational
structure and working conditions.
In addition to 1986 Survey of Employees which was a 
comprehensive survey of all General Dynamics employees, the 
March 1988 Survey which was conducted to identify general 
problem areas in the Material Department, and the June 1989 
Survey which was conducted to be compared with responses on 
the 1986 Survey of Employees, I used data from two other
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surveys: the April 1983 Survey and the February 1989
Engineering Survey.
The April 1983 Survey (Appendix B) was conducted to 
explore functional organizational difficulties as well as to 
assess organizational effectiveness. The survey asked the 
respondent to list common organizational problems (Item 3).
No records of percentages of responses were kept, but the 
common problems identified by respondents were listed in the 
final report.
The common problems attributed to managers, 
supervisors, and fellow employees by Manufacturing and 
Material Control Department respondents were the inability 
of lower level employees to arouse interest in potential 
problems, failure of managers to provide support in 
resolving problems, failure of managers to specify clear 
priorities, slow status reporting mechanisms, insufficient 
self-discipline, insufficient communication between 
departments, failure of employees to understand the 
responsibilities of other departments, duplication of 
effort, insufficient checks and balances, failure to 
schedule and plan workloads, and allowance of too much work 
backlog.
The survey conducted by the Engineering Department in 
1989 was designed to examine the communication changes 
within the department since the 1986 corporatewide survey.
The questionnaire was created by a review team to evaluate 
the impact of the Engineering Department action plan. A
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nonrandom sample of only 8% of employees from the department 
of over 900 responded to the survey so the results cannot be 
considered reliable. The survey report concluded that after 
the implementation of the action plan in 1987 the levels of 
upward, downward, and bidirectional communications 
increased, but by 1989 they had dropped to preplan levels.
Even though data from the some of the internal surveys 
are limited in scope and reliability, they indicate an 
underlying attitude that seems to have remained constant at 
least since the April 1983 Survey. This organizational 
noise can be understood as characteristic of the 
organization’s culture in the sense that it represents 
prevailing beliefs about the relationship of the 
organization and its employees. The prevailing beliefs are 
that there is little effective communication within formal 
networks, that there is little respect between managers and 
employees, that morale is consistently low even in 
relatively prosperous times, and that opportunities for 
employees are low even though most openings are filled from 
within.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted with two groups of employees. 
The planning group respondents (five individuals) were 
interviewed primarily for their impressions and insight into 
the organization’s planning process in relation to the 
Ethics Program. The cultural group respondents (fifteen 
individuals) were interviewed to determine their
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understanding of the organization and their experience of 
being members.
Both the planning group and the cultural group were 
asked to give some assessment of certain cultural aspects of 
Electronics Division. Subjects in the planning group were 
asked to evaluate the level of innovation in the company.
All respondents agreed that General Dynamics is innovative 
in the technical areas, and that the Ethics Program was 
innovative. Two respondents felt the company had not been 
innovative in human resources areas; two cited programs such 
as the Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II), Total 
Quality Management (TQM), and Focused Business Units (FBU) 
as evidence of innovation, but none of them are human 
resources programs; and one respondent suggested that some 
divisions (not Electronics) had been innovative in human 
resources areas besides the Ethics Program. There was tacit 
agreement that Electronics Division cannot be considered 
innovative in human resources areas. Critical comments 
suggested that the company was low on concern for employees, 
too bureaucratic, reactive and not proactive, dictatorial, 
low on risk taking, and slow to change. Positive comments 
suggested that the company can execute programs well once 
the commitment has been made. However, three respondents 
commented that programs are often implemented on paper and 
put into the objectives without appropriate funding and 
support.
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The planning group was also asked to assess the changes 
in the company over the previous three years. Four of the 
five respondents framed the changes at General Dynamics in a 
positive perspective, and all four attributed the positive 
changes to Stanley Pace, the Chairman of the Board and CEO. 
The one respondent who was critical of the changes focused 
on Electronics Division.
The negative assessment of the changes in Electronics 
Division made by the one respondent revolved around the 
influence of the General Manager as the primary factor in 
the negative outcome. Specifically, the criticism focused 
on poor planning, poor organization, top-down and one-way 
communication, excessive internal conflict, an atmosphere of 
competitive noncooperation, excessive senior management 
attention to detail and neglect of widespread problems, and 
limited decisive action on and support of employee oriented 
programs. The negative respondent cited the Ethics Program 
as the only notable exception in a generally 
nonemployee-oriented atmosphere.
The four positive respondents all assessed the changes 
from the perspective of the whole organization. Positive 
assessments focused on the Ethics Program as a vehicle for 
employees to express concerns without having to use a formal 
grievance process, corporate level financial strategies, 
corporate level proactive marketing, new cost competitive 
strategies, the perceived concern of Pace for the employees 
of the company and his accessibility, improved community
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relations, improved customer relations, and increased 
communications of both good and bad news.
One of the participants in the cultural group had 
complained that employees in the past had actively 
participated in setting departmental objectives which they 
were no longer able to do. I asked one planning group 
respondent who was intimately involved in business planning 
processes to comment on that specific change. The 
respondent, who had provided a positive assessment of the 
changes, suggested that senior managers purposely limited 
employee input into the planning process because too many 
inputs from the bottom confused the issue. Senior division 
managers had apparently decided that the directive approach 
was more efficient.
All 15 members of the cultural group were consistently 
critical of senior division managers. When responding to 
the question of how the organization has changed, the entire 
cultural group was consistently negative in their 
assessment. Even the most positive of the respondents were 
concerned about unannounced management decisions that would 
eventually affect them. Of the sample, hourly employees and 
middle managers were the most critical. The least critical 
responses were offered by salaried professionals.
A new organizational structure recently installed in 
the division drew negative criticism from 11 of the 15 
respondents. Criticism was directed toward the dual lines 
of authority (one person reports to two bosses), the
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atmosphere of competition and noncooperation created by the 
new structure, and the confusion generated by diffused 
responsibility and unclear authority. Respondents were also 
critical of the cost reduction strategies imposed by the new 
organizational structure that deemphasized the importance of 
people in the production process, and decreased support 
costs to a level where adequate support was impossible.
Nine of the 15 respondents criticized the Ethics 
Program. The most common observation was that the most 
unethical activities had been unreported. The most common 
suggestion for improving the program was to implement some 
protective measures for whistleblowers. As one respondent 
put it: "Everyone knows that whistleblowers are penalized. 
Nobody is going to report something that will limit his 
career. Look what happened to the people at Northrup."
Three other respondents suggested that anyone who points out 
problems or proposes an alternate point of view is labeled 
"uncooperative."
Seven respondents cited other employee-centered 
programs as negative changes. Three were critical of the 
new flexible benefits program for various reasons, four were 
critical of the recently signed contract with the union, one 
was concerned that employees were no longer asked by their 
supervisors to list their personal objectives which might be 
incorporated into the organizational objectives. This 
activity was previously an annual activity that coincided 
with merit reviews. Fourteen respondents suggested that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
191
division had become less employee oriented in the previous 
three years, and that the atmosphere had become more 
repressive.
Positive changes were listed by ten respondents. These 
changes included the transition of the material systems to 
MRP II, the emphasis on communication, the improved public 
image of the company, the emphasis on cost competitiveness 
and streamlining, the modernization of methods and 
equipment, less conflict between certain departments, and 
the Ethics Program.
Some assessments of the changes were suggested by 
cultural group respondents that implied contradiction. For 
example, two respondents believed the Ethics Program was 
good and was working but that no real changes had taken 
place. Two other respondents felt the corporation had 
adopted programs that benefited the employees but that 
managers felt no concern for their employees.
Most cultural group respondents attributed changes 
experienced within the organization not to the Ethics 
Program, but to outside influences or top manager behavior. 
Only two respondents suggested that the changes were the 
result of new attitudes and work behavior of the employees 
that might have been inspired by the Ethics Program.
Changes were variously attributed to turnover and shifts in 
management personnel, MRP II, management philosophy and 
style, economic factors, government pressure and budget 
cuts, competition in the marketplace, environmental factors,
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and top management desire for improved image. The most 
commonly cited factor for influencing change was the 
economy.
Five respondents suggested that the first line 
supervisors were the primary catalysts for making things 
happen. Of these five, three were middle managers, one was 
a salaried professional, and one was an hourly employee.
The other four hourly employees suggested that the workers, 
themselves, make things happen. Four salaried professionals 
suggested that middle managers make things happen, while the 
remaining two suggested that whoever has the most pressing 
crisis makes things happen.
The respondents were fairly consistent in their 
assessment of how the various movers actually make things 
happen. The strategies used were politics, yelling the 
loudest, power plays, intimidation, controlling the budget, 
negative reinforcement, big egos, directing, and acting on 
priorities.
The responses given identifying who solves the problems 
were similar to those identifying who makes things happen 
with some minor exceptions. Three respondents suggested 
that special teams assigned to resolve major problems (red 
teams) were the primary problem solvers, and one salaried 
professional suggested that senior managers solve the 
problems. Most respondents cited first line supervisors and 
workers as the primary problem solvers.
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When asked for speculation on what changes were needed 
in the organization, there was a wide variance of opinion 
among the cultural group respondents. The most commonly 
mentioned needs were focused on the actions of senior 
managers: more communication of long-range plans, less
whitewashing of problems, less power politics, more people 
orientation, more managing by walking around, more mutual 
respect and kindness, more courtesy and recognition, less 
fear tactics, more tolerance for difficult people who are
rcompetent in their job, more straightforwardness and 
honesty, less micromanaging, less requirement for needless 
statusing, more interpersonal skills, more consistency of 
actions and words, fewer levels of management, more 
attention to employees’ needs, better planning and 
organizing of work, more positive reinforcement, more 
consistency in giving awards and merit increases, and more 
caring about the organization. Other suggestions were that 
employees should be involved to a greater extent in the 
organization’s planning activities, and that there should be 
more cooperation between employees in different departments. 
Senior managers were criticized heavily for being cold, 
uninvolved, and uncaring. Those critical of senior managers 
suggested that their behavior created low morale, 
frustration, discouragement, and the resulting low levels of 
productivity in employees.
The cultural group was fairly consistent when assessing 
the characteristics of a good employee. All of the
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respondents cited attitude as a major factor, but few of 
them were able to define this attitude. A good work 
attitude was characterized as focused on the employee’s 
behavior toward others: cooperative, positive,
enthusiastic, not defensive, responsive, supportive, and 
ready to help. Other suggested characteristics focused on 
the employee’s productivity: willing to contribute, looks
for things to do, wanting to get the job done, quick turn 
around, thoroughness, and follow-through.
When asked to identify a person who embodied the ideal, 
four respondents indicated that there were none in the 
division. Three females picked female supervisors, one male 
manager picked a female subordinate, and the remainder of 
the sample picked male supervisors or managers. When 
justifying their selections, respondents again focused on 
relationships with others and productivity factors: knows
her job, attention to detail, confident, poised, well liked, 
knowledgeable, respected by peers, hard worker, always 
helps, does job even if she disagrees with procedures, takes 
interest in her employees, personal integrity, never gives 
up, works well with employees, good planner, high 
performance, independent, a happy employee, intelligent, 
creative, good life priorities, good job priorities, and 
creates positive atmosphere.
All of the respondents except two stated that feedback 
from their supervisor was key to whether or not they knew 
they are doing a good job. One of the respondents felt that
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she had to know on her own because she could not trust her 
supervisor, and one felt that verification had to come from 
someone she respected. Other suggestions were that one knew 
one was doing a good job when the work got done, when 
schedules were met, and when problems were solved.
The factors other than money that respondents reported 
as the reasons for their remaining in the company were pride 
in one’s job, security, job satisfaction, benefits, 
familiarity with the job, relationships with coworkers, 
company prestige, sense of accomplishment, and challenge.
Most respondents indicated that money was the major factor. 
Three respondents were actively (and secretly) looking for 
another job. When asked about their favorite stories about 
the company, three respondents cited stories about things 
that happened at work, one cited extra curricular activities 
in the management club, and the remainder cited personal 
stories about coworkers.
When asked if they felt that top managers were trying 
to do the right thing for employees and the public, the 
cultural group unanimously responded no. The reasoning for 
this judgement was that whatever managers do is either for 
the sake of the company’s public image or for personal gain. 
Respondents proposed the following comments as 
characterizing company managers: political games, power
plays, no loyalty to subordinates, would sell people down 
the river to get ahead, too wrapped up in their own problems 
to be concerned about employees, employees are nonessential,
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worried only about profits and image, do not know enough 
about the employees to be able to do anything, no regard for 
humans, interested only in producing the product at the 
lowest cost, would eliminate employees altogether if 
possible and replace them with robots, lay off people with 
no concern for their welfare, profit orientation to the 
exclusion of everything else, no respect for the human 
condition, uncaring, too self-centered and self-serving, and 
concerned only for their image.
The above information reinforces the pervasiveness of 
the organizational noise indicated by the various survey 
results. The interview respondents were selected because of 
their generally positive (or at least neutral) attitude 
toward their work and toward the organization. All of the 
respondents can be characterized as reasonably successful in 
their work. Yet, their feelings are consistently 
pessimistic about the relationship between the organization 
and its members.
Cultural Assessment
As Schein (1986) suggested, the culture of an 
organization is a collection of basic assumptions about the 
nature of reality, the nature of the world, and the nature 
of people. Cultural influences in an old, bureaucratic 
organization such as Electronics Division are deeply held 
and pervasive values. Newcomers into the organization tend 
to be selected on their perceived tendency to embrace those
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values. There is no scientific way for a researcher to 
formulate an understanding of an organization’s culture by 
simply compiling answers to questions.
I studied the data from the organization’s history and 
from the various surveys and interviews and considered their 
relationship with my own experience of the organization. I 
paid particular attention to the massive inconsistencies 
that seemed to present themselves at every turn. I 
concluded that the culture was based on a contradictory 
foundation, and that it contained fundamentally opposing 
assumptions. The following cultural assessment based on 
data gathered was presented to the cultural group members 
and was given blanket approval by respondents.
General Dynamics is a large, complex, bureaucratic 
organization. General Dynamics Corporation in general and 
Electronics Division specifically show two distinct and 
interwoven lines of cultural influence: military and
engineering. The military influence is derived from the 
customers who are usually military organizations and from 
the many employees at all levels of the organization who 
have had military service. Many employees are retired 
military personnel. The engineering influence is derived 
from the collective influence of the middle and senior 
managers who have engineering backgrounds.
The military aspects of the organization are apparent 
in the following organizational assumptions.
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1. Order is more efficient and productive than 
ambiguity. Orderly appearance will necessarily result in 
positive outcomes. Rules are necessary to impose order on 
natural chaos.
2. Time is linear. Schedules are critical no matter 
how arbitrarily they were derived. Meeting schedules is 
absolutely required under all possible circumstances.
3. Physical space utilized for equipment and activity 
is limitless. For personnel, space allocated is a symbol of 
status. Distances are relevant only in a limited logistical 
sense. Separation by distance is unimportant to activities 
or communication.
4. Problems are defined by their necessity for action. 
Problems are solvable by committing sufficient resources to 
solve them.
5. Organizational hierarchies are necessary to define 
the chain of command. The chain of command is important to 
establish class and status distinctions as well as to 
clearly identify who has the right to give orders to whom.
6. Idleness is unproductive. Unless people are 
physically moving, they accomplish nothing. Discipline is 
critical.
7. People are basically lazy and unproductive, they 
need constant supervision to keep them disciplined. People 
are fundamentally inert and must be strictly directed in 
order to keep them active.
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8. Human beings can be trained and disciplined. But 
the training wears off quickly and must be renewed 
constantly.
9. Communication of information must be controlled and 
released only to those whose need to know can be verified.
All persons can be divided into one of two groups: friend
or foe. Any individual is assumed to be a foe unless proven 
to be a friend; the process of proving friendship is ongoing 
and ceaseless. Information can only be released to friends, 
and even then with caution.
10. Heroes are those who take bold and decisive action 
in a time of crisis. Nothing is impossible: the failure to 
accomplish is a personal failure and the result of 
incompetence.
11. Human relationships are based on comradery, which 
in turn is based on loyalty. Tradition and group 
identification (membership) are the most important elements 
of comradery.
12. Rituals are critical in maintaining tradition. 
Rituals should symbolize and reinforce the hierarchy of 
authority, the importance of loyalty, the importance of 
order, and the importance of action.
The engineering aspects of the organization are 
apparent in the following assumptions.
1. Rationality is the only means by which one may find 
truth. The rational method is the only correct method, and 
will necessarily result in efficiency and effectiveness.
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Rules are basic laws of the universe and result from natural 
order.
2. Time is cyclical. All events are manifestations of 
previous events and predictors of future events.
3. Physical space is limited. Both space and the 
things that occupy space can be altered to achieve maximum 
utilization.
4. The universe is mechanistic in nature. The 
organization is a machine, the outputs of the organization 
are machines, and the people in the organization are 
machines which are components of the larger organizational 
machine. The mechanisms must be constantly monitored for 
efficient operation. Organizational hierarchies represent 
the natural mechanical order in the universe.
5. Problems are mechanical in nature and are defined 
by their effects on the efficient operation of the machine. 
Problems are solved by adjustment of the mechanisms or 
replacement of the components.
6. People are fundamentally neutral. Their value must 
be determined in relation to their function and efficiency.
7. Humans are neither lazy nor hard working, they 
simply respond to their environment. Behavior is important 
only to the extent that it is consistent with the efficient 
functioning of the organization.
8. People can be trained for any task within their 
capability. Capabilities are fixed at birth and are 
absolute limitations on abilities. People have an operating
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lifespan and will function effectively as long as they are 
well maintained. As people get older, they wear out and 
become obsolete. Newer models are better because they are 
less worn and incorporate all the latest technology.
9. Heroes solve problems. Really big heroes are those 
who solve really big problems.
10. Human relationships are based on hierarchies of 
functioning within the organizational mechanism.
Relationships based on other grounds tend to interfere with 
operations. Communication should be rational and efficient.
11. Rituals are important if they follow operating 
procedures. Rituals that interfere with operations are 
needless and possibly dangerous. Rituals should symbolize 
effective functioning, and efficient operating procedures.
The above cultural assessment indicates some severe 
conflicts that may have a debilitating effect on the 
organization. Organizational functioning cannot possibly 
continue smoothly when individuals operate on different 
basic assumptions at different times. In addition, two 
individuals within the organization who are operating on 
different sets of basic assumptions would have a difficult 
time communicating because they would not understand each 
other’s values. It is entirely possible that most of the 
communication problems that make up the consistent 
complaints uncovered in the data were the result of the 
conflicting sets of cultural assumptions.
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Within Electronics Division, the engineering cultural 
framework was generally more predominant than the military 
culture. But certain elements of the military culture are 
persistent in guiding managerial behavior. These elements 
tend to manifest themselves in strong tendencies to create 
procedures, strong adherence to schedules, strong needs for 
hierarchies and for symbols of status such as executive 
dining rooms and private parking spaces, strong discipline, 
strong control of information, and bold actions, even if 
they are unrelated to the issue at hand.
The engineering cultural framework also reinforces the 
tendency to create procedures to some extent. But the 
engineering framework also tends to define procedures as 
obstacles to problem solving. The tendency of the 
engineering orientation is to use procedures only when they 
are seen as critical to technical outcomes. Also within the 
engineering framework, there is much less emphasis on 
meeting schedules and much more emphasis on control of the 
organization and solving problems. The engineering 
framework encourages excessive attention to detail by senior 
managers and incessant adjustment of organizational 
mechanisms. Many of the complaints registered by the 
respondents were the result of unnecessary and inappropriate 
tinkering with organizational processes by senior managers 
who were reluctant to release control to lower levels of the 
organization.
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One of the problems in implementing change within the 
engineering framework is overcoming the strong need for 
control that senior and middle level managers seem to feel. 
Management controls, usually in the form of charts that show 
progress toward specific goals, tend to take on a 
ritualistic character within the engineering framework.
Once people within the organization have created these 
controls and the mechanisms for updating them, they are 
reluctant to change or release the controls and formulate 
new ones. One of the difficulties of implementing a program 
such as the Ethics Program is that the nature of the changes 
involved does not lend itself to the style of management 
control typically seen at Electronics Division.
Conclusion
Planning procedures and contextual framework were in 
place in the organization. The strategic planning process 
included an adequate assessment of the environment and the 
context of the organization within the environment. Plans 
and performance to objectives were essentially communicated 
to employees. General Dynamics had what appeared to be an 
adequate strategic and operational planning process.
The Ethics Program was created because of a business 
need, but employees understood the program as a vehicle for 
voicing complaints and raising concerns about human 
resources issues as well as legal behavior. Even though the 
program should have been directed exclusively toward rules
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and rule following behavior, which is the definition of 
morality within the organization, it became a process of 
examination of morality within a broader, social context: 
treating people with dignity and respect. Internal surveys 
and interviews indicated a consistently critical assessment 
of the managers’ concern for employee welfare, internal 
communication, and the maintaining of a fair workplace.
The Ethics Program was initiated because of economic 
pressures, but there is little doubt that its creators 
intended to use it to make the organization into a better 
organization. In order to make General Dynamics a better 
or, at least, a more ethical company, senior managers set 
out to change the culture of the organization. The 
management controls used to monitor the Ethics Program 
indicated that the program met its specific objectives. But 
the management controls used to monitor the organization 
have shown little change in employee attitudes. The most 
viable explanation seems to be that the senior managers had 
no operational understanding of the culture they were trying 
to change. If they had, it is reasonable to assume that 
they would have set up some sort of system to bring about a 
culture that reinforces ethical and humanistic values and 
minimizes conflicting values.
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DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary of Results 
The analysis of the documentation, surveys, and 
interviews indicates that the planning process at General 
Dynamics Corporation was generally a linear, rational, and 
step-wise process. The strategic plan addressed the four 
issues of planning suggested by Byars (1984): (1)
organizational identity, (2) business posture, (3) future 
direction, and (4) strategy. One pluralistic feature of the 
planning process was the participation of the division 
general managers in the development of business plans.
Plans were not directed from the top, but negotiated. 
However, this feature was overridden at times by occasional 
"nonnegotiable" planning elements, the Ethics Program for 
example. Although corporate level plans generally addressed 
the three cultural uncertainties suggested by Tichy (1983), 
technical, political, and cultural, there was little 
evidence that political and cultural uncertainties were 
addressed in any systematic way within Electronics Division. 
The division was oriented toward technical uncertainties.
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Corporate mission statements placed the needs of 
customers and shareholders before any other claims.
Corporate business strategies stressed both quality and cost 
efficiency equally, a condition which both Schuler (1989) 
and Emerson (1985) have suggested may be incompatible with 
consistent human performance. Corporate strategy seemed to 
change somewhat from the strategy of innovative 
differentiation as outlined by Porter (1980), wherein the 
company captures the market through product innovation to a 
strategy of cost leadership that requires maximum cost 
efficiency. The results suggest that parochial priorities 
had not been controlled sufficiently to implement an 
effective cost reduction strategy in Electronics Division.
The Ethics Program was clearly implemented as a result 
of pressure from the environment, and may never have been 
created otherwise. The program was planned and executed 
according to corporate policies and procedures.
Communication of the objectives of the Ethics Program was 
extensive and well understood by the employees. It is 
entirely possible that employees expected the Ethics Program 
to be something more than it was. An equal possibility was 
that Stan Pace envisioned the program as a broad, sweeping 
reform of the cultural flaws that can result in both 
purposeful and unintentional illegal behavior. The broader 
goal of the Ethics Program as stated in the introduction to 
the handbook (Appendix H) was to involve every employee in 
bringing a sense of honesty, fairness, and integrity to the
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job. The introduction, written by Pace, also warns that the 
future of the company depends on employees’ goodwill, 
judgement, self-discipline, common sense, and integrity. In 
either case, the Ethics Program at General Dynamics became 
symbolic of the efforts to eliminate legal and humanistic 
wrongdoing.
The lessons that General Dynamics specified as having 
learned from the development and implementation of the 
Ethics Program, as noted in Chapter Four, generally 
indicated that people are the major resource for the 
successful implementation of such a program. The program, 
in turn, gave employees a mechanism for voicing their 
complaints, although some indicated their reluctance to use 
the communication channels for fear of reprisals.
Employees using the communication channels established 
for the program were primarily concerned with unclassified 
employee and personal relationship questions not 
specifically covered by the program. Some communications 
were concerned with program parameters like time card 
reporting, suppliers and consultants, the use of company and 
customer resources, and gifts, gratuities, and 
entertainment.
Results from the surveys and interviews indicated that 
the Ethics Program was successful in meeting its objectives 
of communicating the rules and standards of conduct and 
improving the company’s image. But the broader goal of 
creating a working environment that is founded on humanistic
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treatment, personal dignity, and mutual respect was not 
realized within Electronics Division in the period of the 
study.
"Despite the apparent success in attaining the specific 
objectives of the Ethics Program, there seemed to be little 
change in employee attitudes in Electronics Division. 
Employees indicated that they felt their senior managers had 
no concern for the welfare of themselves or the community.
In addition, they indicated that, although they liked their 
jobs and liked working for General Dynamics, they were 
basically unhappy. Sources of unhappiness seemed to be 
widespread internal conflict, management ineffectiveness, 
organizational inefficiency, and insufficient communication 
of a direction for the division. Regardless of the 
progressive status reports, there has been little, if any, 
change in the areas that concerned employees the most.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine how persons 
in leading positions can realistically expect to plan and 
implement a significant, planned organizational change. I 
undertook the investigation of three questions to fulfill 
this purpose using organizational change at General Dynamics 
from the period of 1985 to 1988. The Ethics Program was 
used as a case example of significant, planned 
organizational change and was investigated within the 
context of ether organizational changes and processes. The
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three questions were the following: (1) What changes took
place at General Dynamics between 1985 and 1988? (2) Were
the changes the result of the strategic plan? (3) Was the 
Ethics Program successful in meeting its specific objectives 
and its broader goals?
Changes Between 1985 and 1988
Considering the first question, the changes at General 
Dynamics can be identified fairly easily. During the period 
between 1985 and 1988, the company enhanced its reputation 
both with its employees and with its customers. Although 
most of the changes observed were brought about by business 
plans and economic directions, many actions within the 
company were undertaken to improve problematic conditions 
that surfaced as a result of the corporatewide survey. 
Although the changes may have been ineffective or 
insufficient from the employees’ perspective, findings 
indicate that significant and meaningful changes have been 
incorporated into management practices within senior and 
middle levels. Some managers have used the program as 
leverage to enforce their sense of morality and fairness, 
and the managers who would knowingly violate the rules are 
at least forced to maintain an appearance of conformity.
There have been changes in the company’s ways of doing 
business. As mentioned by several of the planning group 
respondents, the company has made it a common practice to 
disclose accounting and procedural mistakes to the 
government when these are discovered. The previous attitude
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in the company was "if General Dynamics employees made a 
mistake, it was up to the government to uncover the error." 
Various product line and business related strategies have 
been strongly influenced by the Ethics Program. For 
example, many small spares and repairs contracts that were 
readily accepted before have been refused by the company 
because the nature of the cost reimbursement methods can 
easily result in actual item costs that exceed the 
reasonable market value of the item. Many other requests 
for proposals on new programs have been declined by the 
company because the program specifications would have 
required excessively expensive engineering or product 
testing. In both cases, the contracts were declined because 
the company has been sensitive to the appearance of 
overcharging the government. The environmental pressure 
that fostered the creation of the Ethics Program because of 
excessive overcharging has awakened the company to cost 
efficiency issues.
More specifically related to the Ethics Program, 
methods of charging work or expenses to the government that 
were commonly accepted ways of doing business by both the 
company and the Defense Department that were not necessarily 
in the best interest of the taxpayer have been eliminated 
altogether. Many of these methods were considered expedient 
ways of operating, and were not conscious cheating. Some of 
those methods were deliberate cheating. The awareness of 
both the inappropriate practices and the appearance of
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wrongdoing had been heightened in the customers as well as 
within the company.
Many changes have occurred that were unrelated, or 
marginally related, to the Ethics Program. An internal 
audit program called the Management Effectiveness Program 
was implemented in 1985 to review the adequacy and 
effectiveness of policies and procedures in the divisions.
In 1985, this program was directed by Corporate Headquarters 
which specified certain questions to be answered by each 
division about its operations, and specified certain actions 
to be taken. The Management Effectiveness Program underwent 
changes in focus each successive year as it identified and 
solved various organizational problems. By 1989,
Electronics Division had developed to the point where it 
created its own effectiveness goals and reported its 
progress to Corporate Headquarters.
A flexible benefits program was implemented in 1988 
reportedly because employees requested such a program 
through the 1986 survey. A more likely reason, shared by a 
planning group respondent, for implementing the flexible 
benefits program was to provide the company with a mechanism 
to have employees share in health insurance costs. Without 
this mechanism, the company would have been forced to cancel 
benefits to control costs. At least the program allowed 
employees to choose which benefits they would be willing to 
pay for.
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A major organizational restructuring of Electronics 
Division was created by two separate events: the
implementation of MRP II and focused business units. MRP II 
affected Material and Operations departments primarily and 
was designed to increase material procurement and shop floor 
control efficiency. MRP II required some major changes in 
the way business was conducted within the division.
Primarily, the required changes centered on following 
procedures more strictly. The engineering propensity for 
tinkering with the organization had, over time, established 
a pattern of working around existing control systems to 
resolve problems. Senior and middle level managers 
frequently ordered employees to use shortcuts to existing 
procedures to resolve a production crisis. The employees 
who actually did the work generally resisted the shortcuts, 
but were overruled by senior managers. The shortcuts 
normally precluded updating of records because record 
keeping is the greatest time consumer and least contributor 
toward meeting production schedules. As a result, records 
were generally inaccurate.
MRP II cannot function properly with inaccurate 
records. Therefore, record accuracy had become a focus of 
awareness at Electronics Division because of the MRP II 
system implementation. The awareness of the importance of 
accuracy and record keeping probably enhanced or was 
enhanced by the main thrust of the Ethics Program which 
emphasized the accurate keeping of financial records. These
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two forces working in tandem seemed to enhance their 
effectiveness.
In addition to supporting the objectives of the Ethics 
Program, MRP II forced some simplification of organizational 
structures to accommodate its relatively inflexible input 
and maintenance requirements. MRP II requires considerable 
communication and coordination between departmental 
functions that have major responsibilities for updating the 
system. The system organizations in the Operations 
Department and in the Material Department were streamlined 
and consolidated to accommodate the system. In tandem with 
this reorganization was another reorganization (focused 
business units) that was unrelated to MRP II system 
requirements. The reorganization of Electronics Division 
into focused business units was completed in May, 1989 after 
a year of planning and preparation. The focused business 
unit concept was thought by senior managers to increase 
division cost competitiveness, but was criticised by 
respondents in the cultural group and the planning group as 
a source of internal conflict and an "us-them" attitude of 
separation and internal competition.
The focused business unit organization essentially 
created three organizations out of one organization. Each 
organization was supposed to be largely independent of the 
others except for certain centralized administrative 
functions. The full impact of this change could not be 
evaluated properly within the time frame of the study.
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However, initial reactions by interview respondents were 
decidedly negative. This may be partly the result of the 
strict secrecy of the planning process and the minimal and 
cryptic communication of the organizational changes and 
their meanings.
Another change that began late in 1988, again as a 
result of pressure from the Department of Defense, was the 
implementation of a program called Total Quality Management 
(TQM) which is based on the theories and practice of 
Japanese-style management and emphasizes quality 
enhancement. The TQM program had not progressed to the 
stage where it could have been evaluated within the scope of 
the study. However, initial reactions to TQM were positive, 
although guarded. Respondents felt that TQM would 
ultimately bring about the sort of humanistic changes that 
many had hoped for as a result of the Ethics Program. Some 
of the respondents were sceptical that any humanistic 
changes could be implemented in the division regardless of 
the nature of the program.
The Strategic Plan
Were the changes the result of the strategic plan? In 
answer to the second question, the changes listed previously 
originated in corporate strategic objectives. The company’s 
approach to strategic planning was well ordered and 
environmentally based. Senior managers were consistent in 
their adoption of corporate strategic objectives. Division 
level objectives were printed on flyers and widely
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distributed throughout the division. Employees who 
responded to interview questions were familiar with the 
objectives, but they did not seem to believe that the 
objectives pertaining to employee development were anything 
more than empty words.
General Dynamics had gained some competitive advantage 
over other aerospace companies during the time under study. 
But there seemed to be some confusion, especially within 
Electronics Division, over the conflicting objectives of a 
quality enhancement strategy and a cost competitive 
strategy. According to Schuler (1989), cost reduction 
strategies require repetitive and predictable behavior from 
employees, little or no expensive employee training, short 
term and results oriented focus, a high concern for quantity 
and a modest concern for quality, a good deal of employee 
autonomy and independence, and an atmosphere of stability 
and low risk taking. On the other hand, quality enhancement 
strategies require cooperative behavior, continuous employee 
training, long term and process orientation rather than 
short term results orientation, a high concern for quality 
and a modest concern for quantity, high levels of employee 
participation, and job security. The type of organizational 
environment required for successful implementation of a cost 
competitive strategy in many ways is diametrically opposed 
to the type of organizational environment required for a 
quality enhancement strategy. There is no reasonable way to
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expect that both strategies could be implemented in the same 
organization at the same time.
The confusion caused by alternate emphases of quality 
and cost reduction is evident in the respondents’ 
assessments of the organization. Employees surveyed and 
interviewed consistently criticized the division for 
inefficiency, ineffective planning, and conflict between 
departments. The most likely explanation for this response 
is that of conflicting strategies. As Emerson (1985) 
warned, inappropriate matches of strategies can result in 
partial and ineffective change plans which frustrate both 
the managers and the people who work for them.
The only element that the two strategies have in common 
is that employees should feel some level of job security to 
allow them to work effectively without feeling preoccupied 
with uncertainties. But the area about which the cultural 
group was most critical was that of job security. Division 
activities in 1988 included the transfer of work to low cost 
manufacturing facilities out of the geographic area and 
subsequent reductions in force. Employees losing their jobs 
were reassured in the formal announcement of the reductions 
that the division financial position would be greatly 
improved by the move. Since the knowledge of division 
financial strength had little meaning to employees about to 
lose their source of livelihood, it was no wonder that 
individuals interviewed felt that senior managers had little 
concern for employees’ welfare.
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Part of the problem may have been in the presentation 
of the various programs. Although corporate level 
communication of change plans was regular and consistent, 
division level communication was left to peripheral 
individuals who were delegated that task. Senior management 
participation in the communications was minimal. Often the 
communication of strategic plans by division employees was 
misleading and confusing for two possible reasons: the
communicators did not thoroughly understand the programs and 
the proposed functioning, and the communicators may have 
embellished the objectives of the plans with their own 
personal values and objectives. It was clear that there 
were differences in expectations of the outcomes of the 
Ethics Program between respondents in the planning group who 
were close to the development of the program and the 
respondents of the cultural group who received information 
about the program third or fourth hand. The differences in 
expectations is probably the result of incomplete and 
inconsistent communication of the details of the programs.
Many of the programs implemented by Electronics 
Division, in the opinion of the cultural group, were 
implemented because they were ordered by corporate 
executives and not because they were priorities with senior 
division managers. Planning and goal setting at the 
division level was more a ritual game of satisficing than an 
exercise in directing the organization. Therefore, there 
was little consideration given to the fit between the plans
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of the organization and the beliefs, values, and practices 
of the members of the organization. While Electronics 
Division should have been an integrated culture, defined by 
Earnest (1985) as oriented toward problem solving, or an 
entrepreneurial culture, defined by Earnest as oriented 
toward product development, to handle the implementation of 
its plans, the division was actually more of a systematized 
culture which is characterized by a reactive management 
style and nonparticipative employees. Electronics Division 
was focused on routine work, operating procedures, and 
external regulations also characteristic of a systematized 
culture. The introduction of the MRP II system, for 
example, although implemented according to recommendations 
specified by Melnyk and Gonzales (1987) regarding record 
accuracy and technical support, was not supported by other 
appropriate cultural conditions: cooperation among
Engineering, Production, Material, and Marketing 
departments, standardized information, and limitations on 
status reporting such as shortage reporting.
While Electronics Division had some elements of the 
appropriate cultural conditions, there was no consistent 
cultural orientation to support the various programs. In 
fact, some of the programs seemed to require cultural 
conditions that conflicted with those required by other 
programs. The majority of program development was normally 
conducted at Corporate Headquarters by specific individuals 
assigned to that task. If major programs were in
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development at the same time, different individuals worked 
on the different programs and did not coordinate with each 
other to determine whether or not the cultural conditions 
necessary for implementation were conflicting. Further, the 
program developers rarely, if ever, determined what sort of 
cultural conditions were necessary and if they were 
different from existing conditions.
Presumably, the program crusaders who were assigned to 
implement the program within the divisions had some 
understanding of the cultural conditions within the 
division. But the organizational noise apparent in the 
results of this study indicated that the crusaders assigned 
to carry out the program within the division may have been 
more strongly influenced by parochial priorities of senior 
managers than by cultural conditions.
Managers at Electronics Division tended to choose a 
view of the future and then go look for supporting data. 
Perceptions of the organization and its direction were 
generally not influenced by what employees wanted or felt 
about the organization. The supporting data were usually 
presented in status reports that were created to support the 
intention of the objective and not to represent the actual 
state of the organization. In other words, the charts 
usually indicated progress toward objectives that was not 
actually present in the organization. Planning at 
Electronics Division was used primarily to reduce anxiety
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about the future and to give senior managers the illusion of 
control.
A meaningful assessment of the relationship of the 
changes in the company and the strategic objectives must 
include an assessment of what has not changed. The elements 
of the strategic plan that allude to company managers’ 
responsibility to provide an environment that respects the 
rights and dignity of the workforce, to provide human 
resource programs that emphasize training, and to be 
sensitive and responsive to the diverse needs of the 
workforce have not apparently resulted in any identifiable 
changes at Electronics Division. Although the Ethics 
Program was intended and expected to bring about such 
changes, it has proven to be an inadequate vehicle.
That is not to say that senior managers at Electronics 
Division have not taken action to implement the objectives 
of the Ethics Program, but the action has generally been 
ineffective or inappropriate. A common organizational 
analysis approach to the situation would be to condemn 
senior division managers as incompetent. But senior 
managers at Electronics Division, as well as in other areas 
of the corporation, are not necessarily to blame for the 
lack of humanistic change. The reward systems to which they 
operate would, by themselves, eliminate the possibility of 
the sort of humanistic changes that employees seemed to 
expect. Managers were rewarded for their achievement of 
specific financial and performance goals, and not for their
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congeniality. When production goals have to be met, 
sometimes managers order employees to work harder or longer 
even if the employees think that is unfair. Planning 
systems in place at General Dynamics tended to support some 
planning objectives with appropriate reward incentives, but 
they also tended to leave other objectives with little or no 
appropriate support system.
For example, the training program at Electronics 
Division required 20 hours per year of training for all 
hourly employees, 30 hours per year for all salaried 
professionals, and 40 hours per year for all supervisors and 
managers. This program, which required a considerable 
commitment of division resources (perhaps as much as $1.5 
million per year), was an obvious implementation of a 
corporate strategic objective to develop and train 
employees. The program did not specify what the training 
should be for; the individual departments and supervisors 
were left with that decision. The senior managers only 
reviewed charts that indicated how many hours each 
department had spent in training. Managers were evaluated 
on whether or not they met their targets of the number of 
hours of training, but were not evaluated on whether or not 
that training did them any good.
A  manager operating within engineering cultural 
framework relies on the assumption that a machine that has 
been properly designed will function properly. There is 
little or no thought given by the engineer to the practical
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or social implications of that machine’s operation. The 
problem for the manager from an engineering cultural 
perspective is to design an organization to meet the 
specifications of operation. The training program mentioned 
above was designed to solve the problem of meeting the 
strategic training objective by providing time commitment 
specifications and resources, but it was not designed to 
make the training meaningful to the people involved or, 
ultimately, to meet the needs of the organization.
Meaningful understanding of the diverse needs of the 
workforce would require face-to-face interaction among the 
people in the organization. A good engineer knows that 
maintenance of a machine is both expensive and inefficient 
if the technician has to constantly check each component of 
the machine. Therefore, the good engineer will construct 
remote monitors so efficient operation of the machine can be 
checked without direct contact with all the components.
Most of the senior managers in Electronics Division, as well 
as throughout the corporation, have been promoted because of 
their engineering skills. Therefore, the most prevalent 
rituals among managers are status reporting rituals which 
are designed to monitor the detailed operation and 
performance of the organization without requiring contact 
with any but a few of the people in the organization.
Not surprisingly, the senior managers in the division 
who do not have engineering backgrounds have tended to 
criticize the common methods of status reporting as too
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expensive and inefficient, and not conducive to human 
relations or direct communication. The engineering cultural 
orientation tends to exclude contact between senior managers 
and employees to the extent that most senior managers have 
little or no idea what the diverse fieeds of the employees 
are, and much less how to address them.
Close analysis of the change process at Electronics 
Division supports the conclusion that the engineering 
culture has not been modified sufficiently to accommodate 
the strategic objectives involving human resources goals.
This analysis also suggests that until there is a decisive 
and direct effort to change the conflicting basic 
assumptions of the two cultural orientations in the 
organization, there will probably be no change in the work 
environment in the directions implied by the strategic 
objectives, and the planning process will be only partially 
effective.
The Effectiveness of the Ethics Program
The third research question must be answered in two 
parts: the first part addressing the specific objectives of
the Ethics Program, and the second part addressing the 
broader goals of the Ethics Program. The question must be 
answered in two parts because there appears to be two 
separate answers: General Dynamics was successful in
achieving the specific objectives of the Ethics Program, but 
unsuccessful in accomplishing its broader goals.
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The specific objectives of the Ethics Program can be 
characterized by the actual standards listed in the 
handbook. The Ethics Program was designed to address an 
immediate problem of behavioral improprieties that resulted 
in both deliberate and unintentional misuse of public funds 
and violation of public trust. Because investigations 
uncovered the fact that most reported violations were either 
unintentional or previously acceptable ways of doing 
business that were no longer acceptable, the program’s 
specific objectives were to make the rules clear to 
employees and to emphasize the importance of following the 
rules. Ethics Program developers did not appear to have 
assumed that deliberate wrongdoing was prevalent in the 
organization.
Even though interview respondents suggested a 
reluctance to blow the whistle if they encountered some 
wrongdoing because it might come back to hurt them in some 
way, evidence suggests that the amount of wrongdoing, both 
intentional and unintentional, has diminished substantially. 
Numerous check and balance systems have been established to 
flag violations of the standards. The wrongdoing discussed 
during the interviews tended to focus on unfair treatment 
and not on law breaking. Employees are certainly aware of 
the standards and the consequences of not meeting the 
standards. From a standpoint of following the rules,
General Dynamics has become an ethical organization.
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The second part of the question of success of the 
Ethics Program has to do with the broader goals implied by 
the presentation of the program to employees. The broader 
goals of the program implied by the introductory sections of 
the handbook were to make the work environment more 
conducive to individual dignity and mutual respect, and to 
promote fair treatment of employees by their managers and 
supervisors. The evidence suggests that these broader goals 
were not met, and some of the interview respondents were 
willing to characterize the organization as unethical 
because it had not met these broader goals.
The first issue of discussion is whether the Ethics 
Program was intended by its creators to actually meet these 
broader goals, or if the concept of mutual respect and fair 
treatment wa^ used as a tool to promote the program.
Because humanistic treatment is consistent with most 
people’s idea of ethical behavior, the elements of humanism 
may have been included more as supportive framework for the 
program rather than as its actual goals. It is entirely 
possible that the humanistic language of the handbook was a 
sales ploy to encourage people to follow the rules.
All programs examined during the course of this study 
have been accompanied by some sort of sales package. The 
Ethics Program was sold to employees using two arguments: 
being ethical is good business, and being ethical will 
enhance the quality of work life. Both arguments have 
substantial emotional and intellectual appeal to the target
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audience. All employees interviewed recognized that the 
Ethics Program was necessary to ensure the financial 
well-being of the company. Since most employees at 
Electronics Division were concerned about their job 
security, the appeal of this concept is obvious. Survey 
data revealed that most Electronics Division employees felt 
that the quality of work life within the organization was 
generally less that satisfactory, therefore the appeal of 
this argument is also easy to understand.
The second issue of discussion is whether or not the 
use of this selling technique for the Ethics Program was 
appropriate. There is no obvious criticism of the technique 
used to sell the Ethics Program except that it seemed to 
have raised employees’ expectations unrealistically. A 
program such as the Ethics Program cannot realistically be 
expected to make quality of work life improvements that are 
not specifically related to the standards. And none of the 
standards specifically require the fair and humanistic 
treatment of employees by supervisors. Not only would fair 
and humanistic treatment be impossible to define, but any 
definition would be undesirable in situations where 
supervisors are pressured to ask employees to do some "dirty 
work." For example, one employee might consider a request 
to work overtime to meet a schedule a fair and reasonable 
request while another employee might not.
Most important issues of fairness and treatment of 
employees are covered by local, state, and federal laws and
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the programs that General Dynamics has implemented to abide 
by the laws, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Program. When Ethics Program creators compiled the 
handbook, they most likely assumed that employees would use 
existing grievance procedures and programs and that the 
globular statements of humanistic treatment would simply 
communicate the senior executives commitment to supporting 
those programs. The broader goals of the Ethics Program as 
understood by respondents were probably not intended by 
program creators as measurable objectives, but rather as 
general attitudes.
The arguments used to sell the Ethics Program probably 
should have been qualified by statements of limitations.
Even though senior executives may not have actually expected 
humanistic treatment to supersede organizational tasks and 
priorities that enhanced the company’s ability to conduct 
business, employees at lower levels of the organization 
clearly expected fair treatment to become their supervisors’ 
number one priority as a result of the Ethics Program.
Aside from answering the specific research questions, 
the Ethics Program can be evaluated by using the models 
explored in Chapter Two. The implementation of the Ethics 
Program can be evaluated using the factors developed by 
Franklin (1976) which are characteristic of successful 
changes. Innovation is an important identity factor at 
General Dynamics, but the innovation that General Dynamics 
usually undertook was primarily in technological areas, not
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in human resource areas. The company executives did contact 
external agents prior to implementing the changes envisioned 
by the Ethics Program. The program focused on specific 
rather than general problems, and used survey feedback as 
one method of self-evaluation. Top corporate managers were 
very visible in their support of the program and their 
commitment to its success. The changes were part of a total 
development effort and were scheduled for completion in less 
than four years from development. And, the internal change 
agents were carefully selected. Based on these criteria, 
the Ethics Program essentially followed the pattern of 
successful change efforts.
However, both Dunn and Swierezek (1977) and Friedlander 
and Brown (1974) might have predicted that the Ethics 
Program would not be successful because it was a directed 
change rather than a participative change. In addition, 
General Dynamics tended to follow a pattern for unsuccessful 
change articulated by Phillips (1986): The CEO decided to
commit to a new strategy, proceeded to change the 
organization in a manner consistent with the new strategy, 
announced and publicly supported the proposed changes, but 
then withdrew to let the division managers take over. 
Normally, according to Phillips, this pattern results in the 
change rapidly disintegrating because there is no mechanism 
for coping with parochial priorities, habitual behavior, and 
current distributions of power and influence. However, at 
General Dynamics, it is likely that the potentially
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detrimental effects of this pattern were offset by the 
recognition on the part of the general managers that the 
change was necessary to the survival of the organization 
and, therefore, they subsequently committed their full 
support.
The organization did meet most of the six criteria of 
successful change suggested by Phillips: (1) communication
of what needed to be changed at all levels of the 
organization, (2) early demonstration of new methods of 
operation, (3) appropriate changes in standard operating 
procedures, (4) the highly visible role of the CEO for 
extended periods of time, (5) the continuous emphasis placed 
on the positive aspects of the program through rewards and 
incentives, and (6) the change becoming the agenda of senior 
managers. The only two criteria that may not have been met,
according to survey and interview results would be the fifth
and sixth criteria. The underlying assumption that appeared 
to have accompanied the implementation of the program was
that if employees knew the right thing to do, they would do
it. Senior managers in the company depended on the personal 
pride and sense of morality of the employees to motivate 
them to change, and backed the intended changes by the real 
threat of discipline if they did not. Interview results 
indicated that some respondents doubted whether senior 
division managers had actually made ethical behavior a part 
of their agenda. In defense of the senior managers, there 
is little doubt that they made, at least, the appearance of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
ethical behavior a part of their agenda. However, although 
the CEO was perceived by respondents to personify the norms 
and values targeted by the Ethics Program, the division 
senior managers were not.
General Dynamics Corporation in general and Electronics 
Division in particular have done a good job of structuring 
the goals and objectives of the organization to reinforce 
the rules and standards of the Ethics Program. It was clear 
to all employees questioned during the course of the study 
and many more encountered during my normal work day that 
when an employee of General Dynamics acts on behalf of the 
company, he or she must follow the standards specified in 
the ethics handbook. The broader goals of the Ethics 
Program to foster human decency and mutual respect have not 
been so clearly supported by the results.
Recommendations For Further Research 
The present study was severely limited by time, 
resources, and access. It would certainly have been more 
meaningful if more divisions were included. Comparison of 
the cultural assumptions in different divisions which were 
more oriented toward human relations than Electronics 
Division would have been most instructive.
Logistics and cost limitations prevented me from 
exploring the actual motivations of the senior executives in 
General Dynamics who were responsible for the actual 
development of the Ethics Program. Future research should
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be designed to include an assessment of the thought 
processes that result in the packaging of such a program for 
consumption by employees. It would be instructive to know 
if Stan Pace actually intended the broader goals that were 
implied by the communications from him.
More research is needed in the assessment of how large 
structural changes are affected by their trip down the chain 
of command. Regardless of what Stan Pace intended, the 
program was presented to employees by corporate and division 
communicators with their own agendas, values, and 
priorities. And more research is needed into the 
translation of symbolic action into collective action by 
members of large, complex groups. I would suggest that 
future research focus on comparisons of large and small 
organizations. Based on my findings, I would expect 
employees in smaller organizations to exhibit more realistic 
expectations of an ethics program’s objectives.
Larger organizations may be too complex to be easily 
characterized by consistent trends of thought and behavior.
It is entirely possible that what appears to be a single 
large organization is really a multitude of small 
organizations. The focus of the present research was on a 
relatively large and diverse organization. Future research 
might be more informative if it examined the longitudinal 
change within a smaller, more stable group (less than 100 
employees).
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Future research should also be directed at the 
seemingly prevailing conflict between the need for profits 
and human resources needs. This particular issue has not 
been adequately defined or explored. My impression has been 
that nearly all research in human resources areas has been 
befuddled to some extent by this conflict.
Conclusion
General Dynamics managers embody at least two 
conflicting sets of cultural assumptions and values: 
military and engineering. Both of these cultural 
orientations characterize people as usable and disposable 
objects and are inconsistent with the social values 
associated with assumptions of the sanctity of life and the 
infinite worth of human beings which are the end values one 
can suppose from the objectives of the strategic plan and 
its implementation vehicle.
The most significant source of negative feelings in the 
respondents discussed through the course of this study seems 
to have been the intrinsic conflict encountered by any 
business that attempts to adopt a higher level of social 
consciousness while still trying to make a profit. In 
addition to the natural conflict of trying to compete while 
following rules that competitors do not necessarily follow, 
there was a serious and potentially dysfunctional conflict 
between different and distinct sets of organizational values 
and basic assumptions. These conflicting cultural values
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can point the organization in conflicting directions and 
exert pressure on organizational members to conform to 
conflicting behavioral standards.
Because the level of employee participation in planning 
and decision making was very low within the division, senior 
division managers rarely had the opportunity to get a feel 
of the actual workings of the organization. In addition, 
employees were left on their own to guess what values and 
assumptions had been applied to what decisions. Because the 
process of decision making was kept strictly secret from the 
rank and file and because the decisions themselves were 
rarely announced until the last possible moment, employees 
felt little or no loyalty to division managers and no 
particular obligation to follow their decisions.
Employees understand clearly that their business role 
is separate from their social responsibility and that 
socially responsible action is not cost effective (Ackerman, 
1973). But employees also understand that breaking the 
rules can lead to a withdrawal of the legitimacy of the 
organization by the nesting society. Although the standards 
imposed by the Ethics Program were certainly incorporated 
into organizational goals, high level decision making, and 
long range planning, for many employees in the division they 
were not as pervasive in operating plans, day-to-day 
decision making, and coordination of activities. General 
Dynamics tended to treat social responsibility as an 
environmental factor and was concerned primarily with
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adaptation— change for business reasons and not because it 
is the socially correct thing to do.
Despite the clear communication of the standards, it 
was commonly recognized among study participants that 
whistleblowing was still considered undesirable social 
behavior by those who had the power and influence to create 
negative outcomes for the whistleblower. Rather than report 
many potentially unethical behaviors, employees would 
probably force themselves to be apathetic, a condition which 
could seriously affect the performance of the organization. 
The Ethics Program was incomplete in that it did not include 
a supportive system for encouraging whistleblowing and 
protecting the whistleblowers.
The dilemma is not an easy one to resolve. The company 
must do the right thing by society or face losing its 
existence. On the other hand, the company must compete 
successfully for business or face the same end. General 
Dynamics undertook a bold, albeit forced, measure to adopt 
the Ethics Program. The program consumed a considerable 
portion of the company’s resources. In addition to taking 
the time and energy of many of the company’s key employees, 
the cost easily topped five million dollars during the three 
year period of the study for development, communication, and 
training. In return, the company had won back a good deal 
of lost public and customer confidence.
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics appeared to have 
incorporated two separate and mutually exclusive ethical
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philosophies. The first philosophy was used to develop the 
standards, and was based on the assumption that there is an 
ultimate, absolute, and categorical truth to which rules can 
be applied. The result of the application of this 
philosophy was an expectation of absolute conformance to the 
rules, and the assumption that all moral problems can be 
resolved with a correct answer. The answer to any moral 
dilemma should be able to be presented to any reasonable 
forum and receive a consensus. The limitation of this 
philosophy is the limitless exceptions that the rules must 
accommodate. Company executives planned for implementation 
of this philosophy by holding training sessions for all 
employees. The training sessions were supposed to provide 
employees with tools and techniques for grappling with the 
exceptions.
The second philosophy was used to present the merits of 
the program and sell it to employees, and was based on the 
assumption that right behavior benefits the greatest number 
of people. The result of the application of this philosophy 
was an expectation that the program would ultimately benefit 
all concerned. The company presented the program as the 
right thing to do because all employees would profit from 
the long term effects of the program by keeping their jobs, 
and the communit3r of taxpayers would benefit by the receipt 
of quality products at fair prices. It is this philosophy 
that most likely led to employees’ expectations that their 
quality of life should improve as a result of the program.
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The inherent conflict between a categorical imperative 
and a utilitarian ideal has led to confusion among employees 
and executives over what the program can ultimately be 
expected to do. Presenting a program that promotes moral 
behavior because it is a good business practice implies *h?t 
rules should be followed because the rule follower can 
achieve a ersonal gain. Tf right behavior has reward as 
its ultimate goal, then one may be justified in 
discontinuing the behavior if the reward is not forthcoming. 
The conflict between philosophies manifests itself in a 
choice between behavior that will increase profits and 
behavior which is altruistic.
Ultimately, the organizational noise is created by 
those who have adopted the reward incentives, but do not 
feel they have received the reward. Simply being able to 
keep one’s job is not, apparently, sufficient reward. 
Employees tend to expect a higher quality of life on the 
job. Upon implementing an ethics program, organizations 
must choose whether to promote the program as a categorical 
imperative, that the law is the law, or whether it is, or 
should be, an integral part of community life and entwined 
within the culture of the organization. If the program is 
presented as a categorical imperative, then the General 
Dynamics Ethics Program is an appropriate model. If the 
program is desired by executives to improve community 
relations within the organizational community, then the
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changes must be broader and more profound than those 
accomplished by the General Dynamics program.
The process of gathering data in an organization that 
has historically been extraordinarily sensitive to the 
release of information to anyone who might release that 
information to the outside world was fraught with 
frustrations and peril. I would not have been able to 
conduct this study to the depth that I did if I were not a 
long term, and reasonably trusted employee. To some extent,
I am sure that I violated that trust in the eyes of certain 
individuals who characteristically feel that nothing 
negative should ever be reported about them or their 
actions.
The study would have taken a different flavor entirely 
if it were conducted by persons from outside the 
organization for two reasons: they would not have been
biased by a history of personal experience with the 
organization and its members, and they would not have had 
the insight into many small but meaningful actions and 
eventa that is gained only through extensive experience with 
the organization and its members.
I feel the conclusions I have reached are valid to the 
extent that they support my experience as a long time 
employee. Although it would be presumptive to present these 
conclusions as generalizable to other organizations because 
of the limitations inherent in the data, I cannot help but 
feel that my experience of certain organizational processes
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are consistent with those of other people in other 
organizations. I would imagine that conflicting cultural 
values within one organization are the rule rather than the 
exception. The miscommunication of program objectives, the 
misunderstandings of those communications, and the 
unrealistic expectations that tend to characterize the hope 
of every person for a better life are present everywhere.
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics was seen by employees 
as the potential means to a better future. It was presented 
to them that way. Is that not the hope that people have for 
every community program?
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c . Production Control
2. What are the strengths of those three departments?
3. What are the common problems?
4. What are the interface problems?
5. What duplications of effort do you think exist?
6. What needs are not satisfied?
7. What suggestions do you have for improvement?






PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING AN X OVER YOUR CHOICE. DO NOT 
PUT YOUR NAME OR ANY OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS ON THE PAPER. “"F" YOU 
ARE THROUGH, PLACE SHEET IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND SEAL IT.
X. HOW GOOD A JOB IS BEING DONE BY THE GDE GENERAL MANAGER?
1-VERY GOOD 2-GOOD 3-SO-SO 4-POOR 5-VERY POOR
2. HOW GOOD A JOB IS BEING DONE BY THE DIRECTOR/VP OF MATERIAL?
1-VERY GOOD 2-GOOD 3-SO-SO 4-POOR 5-VERY POOR
3. HOW GOOD A JOB IS BEING DONE BY YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR?
1-VERY GOOD 2—GOOD 3-SO-SO 4-POOR 5-VERY POOR
4. ALL IN ALL, MY DIVISION IS AN EFFECTIVELY MANAGED, WELL RUN 
ORGANIZATION.
1—STRONGLY AGREE 2-AGREE 3—NEITHER 4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
5. DECISIONS HERE ARE USUALLY MADE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.
1-STRONGLY AGREE 2-AGREE 3-NEITHER 4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
6. MANAGEMENT WHERE I WORK CHANGES THEIR MIND SO OFTEN ABOUT WHAT IT 
WANTS, THAT IT SERIOUSLY INTERFERS WITH GETTING THE JOB DONE. 
1-STRONGLY AGREE 2-AGREE 3-NEITHER 4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
7. HOW WOULD YOU RATE GDE ON HAVING A CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION?
1 -VERY GOOD 2-GOOD 3-SO-SO 4-POOR 5-VERY POOR
8. THE WAY WE ARE ORGANIZED AND STRUCTURED IN MY PART OF THE DIVISION 
IS WELL SUITED TO THE WORK BEING DONE.
1-STRONGLY AGREE 2-AGREE 3-NEITHER 4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
9. I UNDERSTAND PROMOTION POLICIES FOR EMPLOYEES LIKE ME.
1-STRONGLY AGREE 2-AGREE 3-NEITHER 4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
10. I HAVE RECEIVED ENOUGH FEEDBACK FROM MY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR. 
1-STRONGLY AGREE 2-AGREE 3-NEITHER' 4-DISAGRFE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
11. IF CONDITIONS WERE CHANGED WHERE YOU WORK, HOW MUCH WOULD YOU SAY 
YOU COULD PERSONNALY IMPROVE YOUR PERFORMANCE?
1 —A GREAT DEAL 2-QUITE A BIT 3-SOMEWHAT 4-A LITTLE 5-NONE
12. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF WORK YOU ARE EXPECTED TO DO? 
1-MUCH TOO MUCH 2-TOO MUCH 3-RIGHT 4-TOO LITTLE 5-MUCH TOO LITTLE
13. HOW WOULD YOU RATE GDE ON HAVING A COOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE, I.E., 
VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS WORKING WELL TOGETHER?
1-VERY GOOD 2-GOOD 3-SO-SO 4-POOR 5-VERY POOR
14. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EMPHASIS ON CORRECTING POOR EMPLOYEE 
PERFORMANCE WHERE YOU WORK?
1-MUCH TOO MUCH 2-TOO MUCH 3-RIGHT 4-TOO LITTLE 5-MUCH TOO LITTLE
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February 1989 Engineering Survey
1. Does your su p tv ia o r  regularly report to you with information on the following:
I— I Division Staff Meetings □  Major Policy Changes
I ~1 R4E Staff Meetings C 3  Programmatic Developments
CD Organizational Changes
If so, is it reported in a timely manner? |— | Yes I— I fb
2. Do you reoulariv read:
□  The Current □  NMA MAGS
1— I GO IVorid □  CRA Newsletter
3. Have you ever utilized these media as a (brum for personal expression, i.e. letters to the editor?
I— I Yes I— I Nj If yes, how often?_______________________________________________
4. Do you consider communications inprovement suggestions during your daily work routine?
□  Yes I— I No
How many of these suggestions have you submitted to your supervisor (approved or unapproved) 
within the past year? _______________________________________________________________
5. Are you cognizant of the following important phone numbers within the division and/or Corporation: 
I— I Ethics O  Security □  Safety □  Job Opportunities
How many times have you used them within the past year? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
6. Which of the following sources of information do you feel are routinely displayed or accessible
within your department:
□  GD Daily News Summary a Union Announcements .
□  NMA Flyers a Special Activities Pasters
□  Division “Standard □ CRA Newsletter
Distribution* memos □ Training/Course Opportunities
□  Job Postings □ Labor Accounting Updates
'Employees indicate there is insufficient feedback to and from their immediate supervisor 
on division and Company information, and insufficient effort by management to get 
employee ideas on work matters.'
Sirota and Alper Associates Inc.; 1986 Survey o f Employees 
GD World, Special Corporatewide Edition, July 1987
7. Do you believe the above paragraph to be true today? I I Yes I I No
If yes, has the situation: I I Improved |— l Oeqraded I I Remained Unchanged
Higher management in my division doesn't want to hear about problems - they just w .n t 'good news.'
8. Do you believe the above paragraph to be true today? QYes 0  hb
If yes, has the situation: I I Improved I I Degraded I I Remained Unchanocd
9. Do you submit activity reports to your Supervisor, both positive and negative? I I Yes I I No
If yes, □  written or □  verbal?
TO. How would you rate the efmrt made by management to get the ideas and opinions of 
employees like yourself? I I Gxd I I So-so I I Poor
11. Are you aware that Phase It of the General Dynamics Employees Survey will be conducted 
in September 1989? Q  Yes □  hb
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Planning Group Interview Guide
1. What do you think was the main reason for implementing 
the Ethics Program at General Dynamics?
2. What are the objectives of the Ethics Program?
3. Do you feel the Ethics Program has been effective? 
Successful?
4. How can you tell whether or not the Ethics Program is 
successful?
5. How long does General Dynamics intend to carry out the 
Ethics Program?
6. Do you think the Ethics Program was properly planned and 
executed? In retrospect, how would you have changed it?
7- Has there been any resistence to the program? How and
by whom?
8. Was resistence to the program planned for? How?
9. How successful has GD been in maintaining the changes 
intended by the Ethics Program?
10. Would you consider GD innovative?
11. Has the company changed in the past three years? How?
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Cultural Group Interview Guide
1. How is this organization different from what it was a 
few years ago?
2. If there are any differences, to what do you attribute 
them?
3. Who determines how things get done around here?
4. How does this person (group) actually make things
happen?
5. Who solves the problems? How?
6. Do you see a need for changes in this organization?
What?
7. How do you know when someone is really interested in 
doing a good job?
8. How do you know whether or not you are doing a good job?
9. What reasons, other than money, keep you working here?
10. Who do you think is a good example of the kind of 
employee you would like to be? Why?
11. What is your favorite story about the company that you 
would tell someone at a party?
12. Do you think upper management is trying to do the right 
thing for employees?




I- the undersigned, agree to participate in a study of 
organizational change and organizational culture at General 
Dynamics conducted by Rick Barker.
I understand that I may be interviewed more than once, but I 
reserve the right to refuse to answer any questions I 
consider inappropriate or to cease my participation at any 
time.
I further understand that I will not be identified by name 
in the final report, and that no direct quotations of my 
comments nor any specific answers that I give will be 
attributed to me. I understand that no one but Rick Barker 
will know what I have said specifically.
Signed.
Date
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Standards of Ethics and Conduct Handbook
—— i- - lV
“We are dedicated to achieving in 
our administrative performance the 
same high level of excdletcs which 
we have historically achieved In 
engineering and manufacturing.*
GENERAL DYNAMICS
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GENERA!- OVNAMIC5
E le c tro n ic s  D iv is io n
HELP
•  EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
573-7083
•  EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION PROGRAM  
573-50*5
•  EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY  
573-5310
•  ETHICS HOTLINES
Available 24 Hours a Day...7 Days a Week 
573-5384 - Division 
1-800-433-8442 - Corporate
•  LABOR ACCOUNTING  
573-5024
•  OMBUDSMAN HOTLINE
Emoioyee Concerns 
5 -3-5800
•  SAFETY 
573-5911
•  SECURITY HOTLINE 
573-7815
•  WORKER'S COMPENSATION  
573-7085




This booklet is written to help. It contains useful 
guidelines for daily business conduce It also tdls how 
to get assistance if you have questions or concents 
about the Standards o f Business Ethics and Conduct.
This new edition of the booklet has been updated 
and improved based on what we beard from you 
through Ethics Awareness Workshops, tbe Employee 
Surveys, and communications with the Ethics Program 
Directors. The Standards remain unchanged in sub­
stance except for some points of clarification in mean­
ing, the addition of two new Standards, and the modi­
fication of one other. The new Standards are 0) Safety 
and Health and (2) Proper Use of the Ethics Program. 
The modified Standard is Suppliers and Consultants, 
which now permits tbe acceptance from suppliers of 
unsolicited promotional items of trivial value providing 
acceptance does not constitute a conflict of interest in 
either appearance or fact. The material on Our 
Responsibilities has been clarified and enlarged.
The Standards contained in this booklet are like 
roadsigns. They give directions in areas of daily busi­
ness activity where possible problems of conduct could 
occur. Some Standards such as Time Card Reporting. 
Quality and Testing. Security, and Company and Cus­
tomer Resources involve all or most employees of 
General Dynamics. Other Standards such as Antitrust 
or International Business likely involve only some 
employees. Some Standards involve ethical issues 
directly and the Standards stare what conduct is accept­
able or unacceptable. Other Standards involve safe­
guards put in place to avoid either the t in  or the 
appearance of misconduct. All Standards, however, are 
important to administrative excellence.
Every employee has a role to play in upholding the 
Standards. The Standards depend on the sense of 
honesty, fairness and integrity brought to the job by all 
employees. Our values as individuals, applied to every­
thing we do on tbe job. help determine what the values 
of General Dynamics are perceived to be. Our values 
are the values o f the company.
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In the first two yens, die implementation of the 
Ethics Program has made significant progress. The 
program has already had an important impact on 
strengthening our administrative performance and on 
improving our image as a company with our customers 
and the general public. But the challenge continues, and 
without an ongoing effort, the progress that has been 
made could be easily lost. W e are determined to main­
tain the high standards o f conduct set by these Stan­
dards and we believe you share that determinarion. We 
urge you to remain thoroughly familiar with the con­
tents of this booklet and we encourage you to seek 
assistance when a question or coocem arises to which 
there appears to be no immediate answer.
The employees of General Dynamics have demon­
strated repeatedly what is the right conduct We believe 
the future of General Dynamics depends not only on 
the skills, abilities and commitment of all employees 
but also on their continued goodwill, judgment, self- 
discipline. common sense and integrity. Thank you for 
your contribution to the success of General Dynamics. 
W e share your pride in our company's 
accomplishments and look forward to a strong future.
Stanley C  Pace, Chairman
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OUR MISSION
General Dynamics is a company of talented, dedi­
cated and resourceful people who share a responsibility 
to provide the highest quality products for the benefit 
o f the United States and the Free World,
Genera] Dynamics develops, produces and supports 
innovative, reliable and highly sophisticated systems 
and diverse military and commercial products to keep 
our cation technologically strong in every environment 
from undersea to outer space. These progiams consis­
tently evolve as the foundation for the neat generation 
of technical advancements.
As a leading engineering-based manufacturer, we 
©ring together a wide variety of technical and business 
concepts to provide cost-efficient production programs 
which uniquely satisfy our customers’ challenging 
requirements.
OUR COMMITMENTS
There are five key relationships in the business of 
General Dynamics. These relationships involve cus­
tomers, suppliers, fellow employees, shareholders and 
the communities in which we operate. All employees 
participate in one way or another in these key relation­
ships. The following commitments serve as broad ideals 
for shaping these relationships.
•  To our customers we will be attentive and strive to 
maximize the value, quality and operability of 
General Dynamics products and services within the 
requirements of our contracts.
•  To our suppliers we will be the best customer we 
can be and will emphasize both lair competition and 
long-lasting relationships.
•  To each other, as employees, we will treat one 
another fairly and with the dignity and respect due 
ail human beings.
•  To our shareholders we wul pursue our growth and 
earnings objectives while always keeping ethical 
standards at the forefront of our activities.
•  To the many communities of which we are a 
member, and to society as a whole, we will act as 
responsible and responsive corporate citizens and in 
a moral, ethical and beneficial manner.
OURVALUES
In order to fulfill these commitments, it is important 
for all employees to be:
•  Dedicated and loyal to our company and to our 
country,
•  Law-abiding,
•  Honest and trustworthy,
•  Responsible and reliable,
•  Truthful and accurate.
•  Fair and cooperative,
« Economical in urilizing company and customer 
resources.




Under these Standards, the company is responsible
Car
•  implementing the Ethics Program,
•  distributing the General Dynamics Standards of 
Business Ethics and Conduct contained in this 
booklet to all employees.
•  providing all employees with dear guidelines on 
matters of everyday business conduct,
•  making sure through established educational and 
training programs that all employees are aware of 
and understand the Standards,
•  providing continuing counsel on company rules and 
regulations to any employee who seeks it.
•  maintaining working conditions at all locations 
supportive of employee responsibilities under these 
Standards.
•  enforcing compliance with the Standards,
•  recognizing employees who make an exemplary 
effort to implement and uphold the Standards
Supervisors 
Under these Standards all levels of supervision have
a special responsibility for the implementation of the
Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct and will be
measured in their performance for
•  assuring that all current and new employees under 
their supervision receive a copy of the Standards of 
Business Ethics and Conduct and are trained in its 
meaning and application,
•  reviewing the knowledge and understanding of this 
booklet by employees under their supervision and 
ensuring that “refresher” programs are provided as 
necessary,
•  stressing to all employees in word and deed the need 
for a continuing commitment to the Standards.
6
•  demonstrating their own commitment by conducting 
themselves and managing their departments and the 
activities of all employees under their supervision in 
accordance with the Standards,
•  maintaining a workplace environment that 
encourages frank and open communication, free of 
the fear of reprisal, concerning the upholding of the 
Standards.
All Employees
Under these Standards, all employees, regardless of 
rank or station; are responsible for
•  reviewing regularly their knowledge and 
understanding of the Standards,
•  upholding the Standards and the policies, 
procedures, and practices that support them as 
demonstrated by their daily business conduct.
•  contributing to a workplace environment that is 
conducive to the maintenance of the Standards in 
daily business activities.
•  seeking help when the proper course o'f action is 
unclear or unknown,
•  remaining alert and sensitive to situations which 
could result in actions by any employee that are 
illegal, unethical, in violation of the Standards or the 
policies and procedures that support the Standards, 
or otherwise improper,
•  counseling fellow employees when it appears they 
may be in danger of violaung the Standards or 
company policies and procedures,
•  reporting violations of the Standards to those to 
whom responsibility for discipline has been assigned. 
Specific ethical responsibilities of employees should
be clearly defined by the company in education and 
training programs. Any employee still in doubt about 
his or her responsibilities should feel free to seek 
additional counsel from his or her supervisor or any 
Ethics Program Director.
7
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ETHICS PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
The Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct are 
the centerpiece of the General Dynamics Ethics Pro­
gram. The aim of the Eihics Program is to integrate 
these Standards into the daily business activities of the 
company.
To help fulfill this aim. the Board of Directors has 
established the Committee on Corporate Responsibility 
to review and approve Ethics Program policy and the 
effectiveness of the Ethics Program. The Committee 
establishes the requirements for management to report 
on the implementation of the program. The Committee 
consists entirely of outside Directors of the Board.
The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer has 
created the Corporate Ethics Steering Group to assist 
management in the implementation of tbe Ethics Pro­
gram. The Steering Group is available to review 
recommendations on policies, procedures and practices 
pertaining to the Ethics Program. The Steering Group 
consists of corporate leaders of various functional 
departments including Legal Human Resources. Inter­
nal Audit. Contracts and Pricing, International Offset 
and Controller. It is led by the Corporate Ethics 
Program Director and assisted by the Corpor te Vice 
President for Human Resources who is responsible for 
implementing training and education pertaining to the 
Standards and the Corporate Vice President-General 
Counsel who is responsible for appropriate legal gui­
dance under the Standards and for interpreting 
applicable taws, regulations and government orders.
Ethics Program Directors are installed at corporate 
headquanets and at each division or subsidiary to assist 
management in the implementation of the Ethics Pro­
gram. An important pan of every Ethics Program 
Director’s job is to establish and maintain open chan­
nels of communication for all employees at each loca­
tion. Ethics Program Directors provide information and 
advice to employees who have questions or concerns 
about the meaning or application of the Standards. The 
individuals serving as Ethics Program Directors report
8
directly to the head of their local organization and ha 
a functional responsibility to the Cor,orate Eihics Pro­
gram Director.
Attorneys at tbe Corporate Office and at each divi­
sion support the Ethics Program by providing guidance, 
support and counsel pertaining to the Standards and by 
reviewing and interpreting, any applicable taws, 
regulations and government ordere.
OUR STANDARDS
Conflicts of Interest
“A conflict between the private interests and the 
official responsibilities of a person in a position of 
truss."
As employees we should all consider ourselves as 
persons in positions of trust and conduct ourselves 
accordingly. We must be particularly sensitive to the 
many situations, on and off the job. where a conflict of 
interest or even a perception of such a conflict could 
originate. Such conflicts could involve customers, sup­
pliers. present or prospective employees, shareholders, 
or members of the communities in which we operate.
Gifts, Gratuities and Entertainment to 
Customers
As a company, our continuing objective is to provide 
our customers with the highest quality product at the 
best possible price.
It is a serious violation of our Standards for any 
employee to seek a competitive advantage through the 
use of gifts, gratuities, entertainment or other favors. 
Under no circumstance may we offer or give any item 
of value to a customer or a customer's representative in 
an effort to influence a contract award or other favor­
able customer action. St is General Dynamics policy to 
compete solely on the merits of its products and 
services.
In some foreign countries, customs require the 
exchange of gifts. In cases where it is desirable to meet 
such a requirement, the company will provide the gift; 
any gifts received will become company property.
9
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Inside Information
In no instance may we as employees ever use or 
share inside information, which is not otherwise avail­
able to the genera! public, for any manner of personal 
gain as might be realized, for example, through trading 
in the stock of our company or any other company.
Outside Interests
A conflict with the interests of General Dynamics 
can arise when an employee holds a material invest­
ment interest in or is an official, director or employee 
of another enterprise, particularly if that enterprise is a 
supplier of products or services to the company. While 
such circumstances are not automatically prohibited, 
they are not desirable, and must not be entered into or 
exist without prior written disclosure to and approval 
by the company.
Former Government Employees
The company has clear written policies and pro­
cedures which govern the conditions of employment of 
former U.S. Government employees and which will 
affect the duties they perform as employees of General 
Dynamics.
It is absolutely essential that the company and any 
such employee abide strictly by the letter and spirit of 
these policies and proosdures to preclude the la a  or 
perception of illegality or impropriety.
Selling and Marketing
As employees, we should remember these key points 
in connection with sales or marketing of our products 
and services:
If  at any time, it becomes clear that the company 
must engage in unethical or illegal activity to win a 
contrao, that business will not be pursued further.
It is our responsibility as employees to understand 
the requirements of the customer and do rite very best 
we can to satisfy those requirements by submitting real­
istic proposals on performance, cost and schedule.
We must make certain that the company's contrac­
tual obligations are clearly defined.
All information we provide relative to General 
Dynamics produns or services should be clear and 
accurate.
Antitrust
The antitrust laws of the United States and other 
countries are extremely important.
A wide .range of transactions or practices arc prohi­
bited under those laws. No agreement or understanding 
may be made with competitors to fix or control prices, 
to allocate products, markets or temtories, to boycott 
certain customers or suppliers, or to refrain from or 
limit the manufacture, sale or production of any 
product.
The provisions of the antitrust statutes apply to both 
formal and informal communications. Employees 
involved in trade association activities or in other situa­
tions allowing for less formal communication among 
competitors, customers or suppliers must be especially 
alert to the requirements of the law.
Anyone in doubt as to the application of the anti­
trust laws in the United States or overseas should 
immediately consult a company attorney.
Pricing, Billing and Contracting
Employees who are involved in any way in the 
pricing, billing or contracting functions have a 
special responsibility to:
•  understand and 3dhere to all applicable procurement 
regulations and relevant company policies and 
procedures with regatd to all aspects of the sale of 
General Dynamics products or services.
•  ensure that cost accounting standards and principles 
of cost allowability as well as relevant company poli­
cies and procedures are properly and consstently 
followed
10
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establish prices for company products and services 
that are fair and reflect their cost, the technology 
involved, the difficulty of overall performance. the 
market conditions, and all other relevant factors. In 
out pricing negotiations with the U.S. Government, 
we must at all times adhere to the provisions of the 
Truth in Negotiations Act and relevant company 
policies and procedures. Our prices should be clear, 
accurate and presented so as to be fully understood 
by the customer.
accurately reflect, in all invoices to customers and 
others, the product sold or services rendered, the 
true sales price and terms of sale. Payments received 
in excess of amounts billed mu<t be promptly 
refunded or customer accounts credited, as 
appropriate.
Time Card Reporting
Timely and accurate completion of time cards as 
described in company policies and procedures is essen­
tial. We must ensure that no cost is allocated to a 
government contract which is unallowable, contrary to 
the contract or related regulations, or otherwise 
improper. AU employees shall report only the true and 
actual number of hours worked by them. Shifting of 
costs to inappropriate contracts is strictly prohibited. 
Reporting of hours not worked, but for which pay is 
received, must also be true and accurate.
Suppliers and Consultants
Whenever possible, materials, supplies, equipment, 
consulting and other services should be procured from 
qualified suppliers at the lowest cost, keeping in mind 
the requirements for quality, performance and the 
vendor's ability to meet delivery schedules.
As a company and as individual employees, we will 
always employ the highest ethical business practices in 
source selection, negotiation, determination of awards 
and the administration of all purchasing activities. 
Whenever feasible, we will encourage, establish and 
maintain compcution and will at all times comply with 
applicable government regulations and contractual
12
requirements as well as company policies and 
procedures.
Except for items that are dearly promotional in 
nature, mass produced, trivial in value, and not 
intended to evoke any form of reciprocation, 
employees of General Dynamics may not accept gifts, 
entertainment or anything else of value from current or 
potential suppliers of goods or services from consultants 
to the company. Solicitation of any item, regardless of 
value, is expressly prohibited.
Quality and Testing
It is our responsibility a company to ensure that 
our products are designed and manufactured to meet 
the appropriate inspection, test and quality criteria of 
our customers, to perform the testing oecessarv to meet 
these criteria, and to provide the necessary documenta­
tion m support of this testing. The inspection and test­
ing documentation must be complete, accurate and 
truthful. As empioye-s we are all expected to be aware 
of and exercise this responsibility, as our jobs require.
Expense Reports
Business expenses properly incurred in performing 
company business must be documented promptly with 
accuracy and completeness on expense reports.
In the filing of expense reports, employees must dis­
tinguish between personal expenses and business travel 
expenses, business conference expenses and business 
entertainment expenses.
Employees using company funds for such expenses 
should indicate w here, in their judgment, certain costs 
are or might be unallowable or inappropriate charges 
against government contracts.
Company and Customer Resources
The ability of General Dynamics to meet the broad 
commitments to customers, suppliers, employees, 
shareholders and communities, depends on effidentlv 
utilizing company and customer resources. These 
resources include technology, data, buildings, land, 
equipment, cash and the time and talent of employees.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
As employees we may not make improper use of 
company or customer resources nor permit others to do 
so.
This particularly prohibits the payment of bribes, 
kickbacks or illegal payments of cash or other gifts in 
any form and in any amounts.
Other examples of improper use include 
unauthorized appropriation, possession or personal use 
of company or customer assets, technology and patents, 
software, computer, communication and copying 
equipment or office supplies. Also foroidden is the 
unauthorized possession, use. alteration, destruction or 
disclosure of company sensitive data.
Technology and Information
The backbone of General Dynamics as a competitive 
business is our ability to develop and use high technol­
ogy m day-to-day operations. Failure to maintain 
control of our technological edge could cause us irrepa­
rable harm As employees, we are all responsible for 
guarding our technology against unauthorized disclo­
sure. This applies not only to government classified 
information, but also to proprietary and private data 
developed or purchased by us or entrusted to us by cus­
tomers or suppliers. These restrictions apply whether 
the information is in written or electronic form or is 
simply known by us as employees.
Cash and Bank Accounts
All cash and bank account transactions must be 
handled so as to avoid any question of bribery, kick­
backs. other illegal or improper payments or any sus­
picion of impropriety whatsoever. All cash transactions 
must be recorded in the company's books of account.
All accounts of company funds shall be established 
and maintained in the name of General Dynamics or 
one of its subsidiaries, with the exception of petty cash 
accounts. All transactions and accounts involving com­
pany funds shall be dearly and accurately identified in 
General Dynamics’ books and records. All cash 
received by the company shall be promptly r e c o r d e d  
on its books and deposited in a General Dynamics
bank account No funds shall be maintained in the 
form of cash, except to the limited extent reasonably 
required for normal business operations.
Security
General Dynamics is a major contractor with the 
Department of Defense. We. as employees, have a spe­
cial obligation to comply with those government regu­
lations and laws, as wd! as with relevant company 
polities and procedures, which protea our nation's 
security and safeguard our nation's defense secrets.
The effectiveness of national and industrial security is 
heaviiy dependent on those individuals who have 
access to classified information. As employees, security 
is an integral pan of our jobs, whether or not we work 
directly with such information.
Employees possessing a valid security clearance and 
requiring access to specific classified informauor. will 
ensure that such information, in whatever form it exists, 
is handled strictly in accordance with the procedures set 
h n h  by the Department of Defense for safeguarding 
classified information.
We should not seek access to, accept or retain any 
classified materials for which we have no need or to 
which we are not entitled.
The unauthorized possession of classified documents 
or classified information in any form, or failure to 
properly safeguard such information, violates these 
Standards, car. endanger the security of the United 
States, and is punishable under the Espionage Laws 
and Federal Criminal Statutes.
Political Contributions
Federal law and many state laws prohibit contribu­
tions by the corporation to political parties or candi­
dates. Where prohibited by law, therefore, no company 
funds or other assets are to be contributed or loaned, 
directly or indirealy. to any political party or for the 
campaign of any person for political office, or 
expended in support of or in opposition to such party 
or person.
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Where corporate political contributions are legal in 
connection with state, local or foreign elections, such 
contributions shall be made only from funds allocated 
for such a purpose by authorization of the Board of 
Directors.
The company encourages ail of us as employees to 
participate on an individual basis in political activities 
on our own time and in our own way.
Environmental Actions
As a company and as employees, we must exercise 
good judgment with regard to the environmental 
aspects of our use of buildings and real estate, our 
manufacturing processes and our products themselves. 
All necessary action must be taken to eliminate the 
generation, discharge and disposal of hazardous mate­
rials. W e must comply fully with all federal state and 
local environmental protection laws.
Safety and Health
As a company and as individual employees we are 
responsible for maintaining a safe and heaithful work 
environment. We must comply fully with ail federal 
state and local health and safety laws and regulations.
International Business
Special care m uz he taken to identify and accom­
modate the differences between international markets 
and those in the United States.
As a company operating internationally, we encoun­
ter laws which may vary widely from those in the 
United States. These laws may on occasion conflict 
with one another. Local customs and practices with 
regard to business and social dealings may also vary 
from country to country. Our policy is to comply with 
all laws which apply in the countries where we do busi­
ness. The laws of the United States and the countries in 
which General Dynamics docs business must be 
obeyed. Furthermore, in countries where common busi­
ness practices might be less restrictive than those out­
lined in the Standards, we will follow the Standards 
outlined in this booklet.
16
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other U.S. 
laws prohibit the payment ofanv money or anything of 
value to a foreign official foreign political pany (or 
official thereof) or any candidate for foreign political 
office for purposes of obtaining, retaining or directing 
of business. .As a company and as employees, we must 
strictly abide by these laws. Any violations or any solici­
tations to violate must be reported immediately.
The Foreign Comipt Practices Act. although silent 
on the subject, is said not to prohibit so called 
-facilitating payments." such as payments for 
expediting shipments through customs or placing a 
transoceanic telephone call, securing required permits, 
or obtaining adequate police protection —  transactions 
which simply facilitate the proper performance of 
duties. While company policy does not prohibit such 
payments, employees are to seek advice in advance 
from company legal counsel in cases where facilitating 
payments may be involved. Any such facilitating 
payments must be properly accounted for in the 
company's records.
Proper Use of the Ethics Program
An important aim of the Ethics Program is to pro­
vide guidance to all employees on matters of ethics and 
business conduct. The Ethics Program is available to 
answer questions, give advice, address concerns and 
investigate allegations related to the meaning and appli­
cation of the Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct.
Unfortunately such a program is subject to abuse. 
From tune to time, in the name of “Ethics.’* an 
employee may attempt to harm or slander another 
employee through false accusations, malicious rumors 
or other irresponsible actions. Such attempts, if  proven, 
will be subject to discipline.
Again, from time to time, an employee who exer­
cises roponsibility for upholding the Standards may be 
threatened with reprisal by other employees including 
management. Such reprisal is not only against company 
policy but. in some instances, is also a violation of the 
law. Reprisal if proven, will be subject to commen­
surate discipline.
17
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ACXNOWLESGEMENT
As a condition of employment, ail new employees 
are asked to sign an Acknowledgement Card which 
states:
' I  have received and read the Second Edition 
of the General Dynamics Standards of Business 
Ethics and Conduct. I  understand that these 
Standards represent the policies of General 
Dynamics."
A ll current'employees are also asked to sign an 
Acknowledgement Card each ome the Standards are 
revised and redistributed.
One copy of the card is to be retained by the 
employee. The other copy is placed in the employee's 
permanent personnel file.
All standard consultant agreements include a clause 
requiring adherence to the Standards as a condition of 
the agreement.
A ll active suppliers receive an annual solicitation to 
help support the Standards in business relationships 
between them and General Dynamics.
HELP AND INFORMATION
The company has designated personnel to asist 
employees in resolving questions involving ethics and 
conduct. As employees, we should not hesitate to avail 
ourselves of the help.
Supervisors
An employee with a need for help or information 
regarding these Standards is encouraged to take up that 
need with his or her immediate supervisor. If  there is 
reason why asking the immediate supervisor is inappro­
priate. the employee should seek the help of the Ethics 
Program Director or a company attorney.
Eihics Program Directors
Ethics Program Directors have been designated for 
each of the various company locations and are 
available for employee counseling and assistance with 
regard to these Standards. The Ethics Program Direc­
tors may be reached by wav of regular telephone, 
hotline, letter or personal visit. Inquiries will be treated 
with courtesy and discretion.
Company Attorneys
Company attorneys o f General Dynamics are avail­
able to employees and management for assistance and 
information with regard to these Standards and for the 
issuance of interpretative opinions.
DISCIPLINE AND MANDATORY 
SANCTIONS
The Standards in this booklet are important to the 
company and must be taken seriourlv by all of us as 
employees. Accordingly, vioiauons of these Standards 
will not be tolerated and. in accordance with company 
reguiauons and applicable collective oargainmg 
agreements, will result in one or more of the following 
sancuons. as appropriate:
•  A warning.




•  Temporary suspension.
•  Discharge.
•  Required reimbursement of losses or damages,
•  Referral for criminal prosecution or civil action.
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S U M M A R Y
It is the objective of the company and each of us us 
employees, to operate according to the highest possible 
standards. We have a scnous responsibility to ensure 
that our personal conduct is above reproach and. diffi­
cult as it may be at times, we also have obligations 
regarding the conduct of those who work around us. In 
cases where we are aware of violations of the Stan­
dards in this booklet, we should make th3t situation 
known to our supervisor or to an Ethics Program 
Director.
The Standards wiil be enforced at all levels fairly 
and without prejudice. Consistent with our obligations 
under the law. and within the enforcement processes 
established herein, the company will keep confidential 
the identity of employees about or against whom allega­
tions of violations are brought, uniess or until it has 
been determined that a violation has occurred. Simi­
larly, the company will take all reasonable steps to 
keep confidential the identity of anyone reporting a 
possible violauon.
Corporate Policies and Procedures and 
Division or Subsidiary Standard Practices
The Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct 
found in this booklet are supported by more 
deuiled Corporate Policies and Procedures 
(C?Ps) and Divisioa or Subsidiary btandard 
Practices (SPs). These policies, procedures and 
standard practices provide dear and specific 
directions concerning everyday business practices 
and behavior. Employees wishing to consult a 
Corporate Policy or Procedure and Division or 
Subsidiary Standard Practice should ask their 
supervisor or an Ethics Program Director.
20
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April 1983 Survey of Production 
March 1988 Survey of Material 
February 1989 Engineering Survey 
June 1989 Survey of Material (resurvey) 
Interviews with Planning Group 
Interviews with Cultural Group
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